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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-407042</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407042</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407042</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407042</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-129304</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-129304</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Guard Core is an API security core engine for the FastAPI-Guard, FlaskAPI Guard, and DjAPI Guard adapters. From 1.0.0 until 3.13.0, _extract_from_forwarded_header() in guard_core/utils.py returns the selected X-Forwarded-For entry without validating that it is an IP address. In deployments configured with trusted_proxies where the selected entry is attacker-controlled, the arbitrary client_ip string reaches BehaviorTracker in guard_core/handlers/behavior_handler.py and is interpolated into Redis key names and blocking KEYS glob patterns. Glob metacharacters can cause one request to count other clients&amp;#39; behavior events, embedded separators can disturb key parsing, and rotating identities can create unbounded keys while repeatedly scanning the shared Redis keyspace. A non-IP identity can also reach a ban action and cause an uncaught validation error. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Guard Core is an API security core engine for the FastAPI-Guard, FlaskAPI Guard, and DjAPI Guard adapters. From 1.0.0 until 3.13.0, _extract_from_forwarded_header() in guard_core/utils.py returns the selected X-Forwarded-For entry without validating that it is an IP address. In deployments configured with trusted_proxies where the selected entry is attacker-controlled, the arbitrary client_ip string reaches BehaviorTracker in guard_core/handlers/behavior_handler.py and is interpolated into Redis key names and blocking KEYS glob patterns. Glob metacharacters can cause one request to count other clients&amp;#39; behavior events, embedded separators can disturb key parsing, and rotating identities can create unbounded keys while repeatedly scanning the shared Redis keyspace. A non-IP identity can also reach a ban action and cause an uncaught validation error. This issue is fixed in version 3.13.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-129304</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gm9r-hvc9-96gv — Guard Core: Unvalidated X-Forwarded-For-derived string used as a Redis key component and interpolated into a KEYS glob…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gm9r-hvc9-96gv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: guard-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`_extract_from_forwarded_header()` (`guard_core/utils.py:172-181` in 3.12.0; `:179` on master `08780f1`) returns the selected `X-Forwarded-For` entry **without any `ipaddress` validation**. When that entry is attacker-controlled, an arbitrary string becomes `client_ip` and flows into `BehaviorTracker` (`guard_core/handlers/behavior_handler.py:83-102`), which interpolates it verbatim into both a Redis key name and a `KEYS` glob pattern:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
key = f&amp;#34;behavior:usage:{endpoint_id}:{client_ip}&amp;#34;
await self.redis_handler.set_key(&amp;#34;behavior_usage&amp;#34;, f&amp;#34;{key}:{current_time}&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;1&amp;#34;, ttl=rule.window)
pattern = f&amp;#34;behavior_usage:{key}:*&amp;#34;
keys = await self.redis_handler.keys(pattern)      # blocking KEYS, O(N) over keyspace
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Same shape in `track_return_pattern()` (`behavior_handler.py:135-142`). `redis_handler.keys()` maps to the blocking Redis `KEYS` command (`guard_core/handlers/redis_handler.py:265-275`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three consequences, in increasing severity:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Cross-client counter contamination.** `X-Forwarded-For: *` makes the glob match *every* client&amp;#39;s behavior-usage keys for the endpoint. Verified with a fake-Redis harness: a client `9.9.9.9` hit an endpoint 3 times (threshold=3 rule), then a single attacker request carrying `XFF: *` issued the pattern `behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:*`, counted the victim&amp;#39;s events, and tripped the rule on its **first** request. An embedded `:` also shifts which key segment is parsed as the timestamp (`behavior…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: guard-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`_extract_from_forwarded_header()` (`guard_core/utils.py:172-181` in 3.12.0; `:179` on master `08780f1`) returns the selected `X-Forwarded-For` entry **without any `ipaddress` validation**. When that entry is attacker-controlled, an arbitrary string becomes `client_ip` and flows into `BehaviorTracker` (`guard_core/handlers/behavior_handler.py:83-102`), which interpolates it verbatim into both a Redis key name and a `KEYS` glob pattern:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
key = f&amp;#34;behavior:usage:{endpoint_id}:{client_ip}&amp;#34;
await self.redis_handler.set_key(&amp;#34;behavior_usage&amp;#34;, f&amp;#34;{key}:{current_time}&amp;#34;, &amp;#34;1&amp;#34;, ttl=rule.window)
pattern = f&amp;#34;behavior_usage:{key}:*&amp;#34;
keys = await self.redis_handler.keys(pattern)      # blocking KEYS, O(N) over keyspace
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Same shape in `track_return_pattern()` (`behavior_handler.py:135-142`). `redis_handler.keys()` maps to the blocking Redis `KEYS` command (`guard_core/handlers/redis_handler.py:265-275`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three consequences, in increasing severity:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Cross-client counter contamination.** `X-Forwarded-For: *` makes the glob match *every* client&amp;#39;s behavior-usage keys for the endpoint. Verified with a fake-Redis harness: a client `9.9.9.9` hit an endpoint 3 times (threshold=3 rule), then a single attacker request carrying `XFF: *` issued the pattern `behavior_usage:behavior:usage:app.login:*:*`, counted the victim&amp;#39;s events, and tripped the rule on its **first** request. An embedded `:` also shifts which key segment is parsed as the timestamp (`behavior…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gm9r-hvc9-96gv</guid>
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