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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-407008</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407008</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407008</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407008</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8cgq-x343-p74c — mail-parser: One hostile attachment aborts `write_attachments()` and silently drops the rest of the batch</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8cgq-x343-p74c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mail-parser&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`write_attachments()` called `_safe_attachment_filename()` and `write_sample()` inside its loop
with no guard, so a single crafted attachment raised out of the whole save. Every attachment
**after** the malicious one was silently never written, with no error surfaced to a caller that
catches only `MailParserError`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That is an evasion primitive as much as an availability bug: a sender puts one poisoned part
first and the real payload second, and the payload never reaches the extraction directory that
a downstream scanner or sandbox reads — while it still reaches the recipient&amp;#39;s mail client
intact. The tool&amp;#39;s output diverges from the bytes actually in the message, which is the same
failure mode as the filename-sanitizing bypass in
[GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496](https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three shapes were reachable, all from attacker-controlled MIME metadata:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **NUL smuggled through RFC 2231** — `filename*=us-ascii&amp;#39;&amp;#39;evil%00.bin` decodes to a NUL in the
  filename during parsing and raised `ValueError` out of the name check;
- **overlong basename** — a filename longer than `NAME_MAX` (e.g. 300 characters) raised
  `OSError: File name too long` from `open()`, *after* creating a zero-byte stub on disk;
- **undecodable payload** — a body that is not valid base64 raised `binascii.Error` (a
  `ValueError` subclass) from the decode performed inside the `open()` block.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import tempfile, mailparser&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;raw = (&amp;#34;Conten…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mail-parser&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`write_attachments()` called `_safe_attachment_filename()` and `write_sample()` inside its loop
with no guard, so a single crafted attachment raised out of the whole save. Every attachment
**after** the malicious one was silently never written, with no error surfaced to a caller that
catches only `MailParserError`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That is an evasion primitive as much as an availability bug: a sender puts one poisoned part
first and the real payload second, and the payload never reaches the extraction directory that
a downstream scanner or sandbox reads — while it still reaches the recipient&amp;#39;s mail client
intact. The tool&amp;#39;s output diverges from the bytes actually in the message, which is the same
failure mode as the filename-sanitizing bypass in
[GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496](https://github.com/SpamScope/mail-parser/security/advisories/GHSA-fr3h-cpq2-9496).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Three shapes were reachable, all from attacker-controlled MIME metadata:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **NUL smuggled through RFC 2231** — `filename*=us-ascii&amp;#39;&amp;#39;evil%00.bin` decodes to a NUL in the
  filename during parsing and raised `ValueError` out of the name check;
- **overlong basename** — a filename longer than `NAME_MAX` (e.g. 300 characters) raised
  `OSError: File name too long` from `open()`, *after* creating a zero-byte stub on disk;
- **undecodable payload** — a body that is not valid base64 raised `binascii.Error` (a
  `ValueError` subclass) from the decode performed inside the `open()` block.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import tempfile, mailparser&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;raw = (&amp;#34;Conten…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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