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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 09:58:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-406998</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-406998</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-406998</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-406998</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-129235</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-129235</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Kubeshark is an eBPF-powered network observability tool for Kubernetes. From 53.1.0 until 53.4.0, the download_file tool in cmd/mcpRunner.go accepts caller-controlled path and dest values, fetches a selected Kubeshark Hub API response, and writes the returned bytes through os.Create(dest) in callDownloadFile without confining the destination. An attacker who influences arguments through an AI agent driving kubeshark mcp can write Hub-supplied bytes to any path writable by the local MCP user and can read captured network traffic from default auth-disabled Hub deployments. The tool is registered without --allow-destructive; reliable code execution is not demonstrated because the bytes are constrained to Hub API responses. Hub-side default authentication remains outside this remediation, so captured traffic can remain readable in default auth-disabled Hub deployments after the local destination-write fix. The destination-write issue is fixed in version 53.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Kubeshark is an eBPF-powered network observability tool for Kubernetes. From 53.1.0 until 53.4.0, the download_file tool in cmd/mcpRunner.go accepts caller-controlled path and dest values, fetches a selected Kubeshark Hub API response, and writes the returned bytes through os.Create(dest) in callDownloadFile without confining the destination. An attacker who influences arguments through an AI agent driving kubeshark mcp can write Hub-supplied bytes to any path writable by the local MCP user and can read captured network traffic from default auth-disabled Hub deployments. The tool is registered without --allow-destructive; reliable code execution is not demonstrated because the bytes are constrained to Hub API responses. Hub-side default authentication remains outside this remediation, so captured traffic can remain readable in default auth-disabled Hub deployments after the local destination-write fix. The destination-write issue is fixed in version 53.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-129235</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5 — Kubeshark: MCP `download_file` writes fetched bytes to an unvalidated destination path</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gj7r-p794-hhq5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Ecosystem / package:** Go — `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark` (the `kubeshark`
CLI, `kubeshark mcp` subcommand)
**Affected component:** `cmd/mcpRunner.go`, MCP tool `download_file`
**Affected versions:** `&amp;gt;= v53.1.0`, `&amp;lt; v53.4.0` (the flaw shipped with the
tool&amp;#39;s first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release)
**Patched version:** `v53.4.0`
**Credit:** novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
The `download_file` MCP tool fetches a caller-supplied `path` from the Kubeshark
Hub API and writes the response body to a caller-supplied `dest` on the local
filesystem with no validation of `dest`. An attacker who can influence the MCP
tool arguments — e.g. via indirect prompt injection against an AI agent driving
`kubeshark mcp` — can write attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary path
writable by the user running the MCP server (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`,
`~/.kube/config`, `~/.bashrc`), and can request arbitrary Hub API endpoints.
`download_file` is registered unconditionally (available in the default,
non-`--allow-destructive` posture).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Introduced in
Commit `eb7dc42b` — &amp;#34;Add get_file_url and download_file MCP tools (#1853)&amp;#34;,
2026-03-04 — first released in **v53.1.0** (`v53.1.0~1`). An earlier attempt
(`dbfd17d9`) was reverted (`a46f05c4`) before any release, so no tag before
v53.1.0 is affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
In `callDownloadFile` (`cmd/mcpRunner.go`), both `path` and `dest` come straight
from the tool arguments:
- `dest` was passed directly t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Ecosystem / package:** Go — `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark` (the `kubeshark`
CLI, `kubeshark mcp` subcommand)
**Affected component:** `cmd/mcpRunner.go`, MCP tool `download_file`
**Affected versions:** `&amp;gt;= v53.1.0`, `&amp;lt; v53.4.0` (the flaw shipped with the
tool&amp;#39;s first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release)
**Patched version:** `v53.4.0`
**Credit:** novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
The `download_file` MCP tool fetches a caller-supplied `path` from the Kubeshark
Hub API and writes the response body to a caller-supplied `dest` on the local
filesystem with no validation of `dest`. An attacker who can influence the MCP
tool arguments — e.g. via indirect prompt injection against an AI agent driving
`kubeshark mcp` — can write attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary path
writable by the user running the MCP server (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`,
`~/.kube/config`, `~/.bashrc`), and can request arbitrary Hub API endpoints.
`download_file` is registered unconditionally (available in the default,
non-`--allow-destructive` posture).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Introduced in
Commit `eb7dc42b` — &amp;#34;Add get_file_url and download_file MCP tools (#1853)&amp;#34;,
2026-03-04 — first released in **v53.1.0** (`v53.1.0~1`). An earlier attempt
(`dbfd17d9`) was reverted (`a46f05c4`) before any release, so no tag before
v53.1.0 is affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details
In `callDownloadFile` (`cmd/mcpRunner.go`), both `path` and `dest` come straight
from the tool arguments:
- `dest` was passed directly t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gj7r-p794-hhq5</guid>
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