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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-406492</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-406492</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-406492</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-406492</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-3v2p-hm54-8qcq — OpenTelemetry JavaScript: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File and Exposure of Sensitive Information to an…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3v2p-hm54-8qcq</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @opentelemetry/instrumentation-http&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`@opentelemetry/instrumentation-http` redacts sensitive URL query parameters on **outgoing (client) spans** but not on **incoming (server) spans**. The server-span path writes the raw query string verbatim into the `url.query` attribute, so credentials embedded in inbound request URLs — AWS presigned-URL signatures, Azure SAS tokens (`sig`), GCS signed-URL signatures — are exported in plaintext to the configured tracing backend.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Configuring the `redactedQueryParams` option **does not change this**, as this applies only to outgoing (client) spans.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Information disclosure / credential leakage** (CWE-200; CWE-532, insertion of sensitive information into telemetry data).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Who is impacted:** any Node.js service instrumented with `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-http` — directly or transitively via `@opentelemetry/auto-instrumentations-node` — that receives inbound requests carrying credentials in the query string. Common cases: services fronting presigned S3/GCS downloads, Azure SAS-token URLs, and signature-authenticated webhooks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Consequence:** clients&amp;#39; still-valid credentials are written into server spans and stored by the tracing backend, readable by anyone with span-read access — observability vendor infrastructure, dashboard users, and internal audiences far broader than the credential&amp;#39;s intended scope. Presigned-URL signatures typically remain valid for minutes to days after capture, so this is not merely historical exposure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Severity:**…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @opentelemetry/instrumentation-http&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`@opentelemetry/instrumentation-http` redacts sensitive URL query parameters on **outgoing (client) spans** but not on **incoming (server) spans**. The server-span path writes the raw query string verbatim into the `url.query` attribute, so credentials embedded in inbound request URLs — AWS presigned-URL signatures, Azure SAS tokens (`sig`), GCS signed-URL signatures — are exported in plaintext to the configured tracing backend.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Configuring the `redactedQueryParams` option **does not change this**, as this applies only to outgoing (client) spans.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Information disclosure / credential leakage** (CWE-200; CWE-532, insertion of sensitive information into telemetry data).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Who is impacted:** any Node.js service instrumented with `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-http` — directly or transitively via `@opentelemetry/auto-instrumentations-node` — that receives inbound requests carrying credentials in the query string. Common cases: services fronting presigned S3/GCS downloads, Azure SAS-token URLs, and signature-authenticated webhooks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Consequence:** clients&amp;#39; still-valid credentials are written into server spans and stored by the tracing backend, readable by anyone with span-read access — observability vendor infrastructure, dashboard users, and internal audiences far broader than the credential&amp;#39;s intended scope. Presigned-URL signatures typically remain valid for minutes to days after capture, so this is not merely historical exposure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Severity:**…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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