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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-405797</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-405797</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-405797</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-405797</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-126357</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126357</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.13.16, mount() and app.mount() can remove a dynamic mount prefix using the route-pattern length rather than the matched-prefix length, allowing a crafted path to be forwarded as a protected inner route while the outer application routes the original path. Since 4.12.21, rebuilding the forwarded URL from the decoded pathname can also convert a decoded backslash to a slash and collapse parent-directory segments, again causing the mounted application to receive a protected path. An unauthenticated client can use either applicable path transformation to reach a mounted route without authentication or authorization middleware scoped to a subpath inside the mount prefix. This issue is fixed in version 4.13.16.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. Prior to 4.13.16, mount() and app.mount() can remove a dynamic mount prefix using the route-pattern length rather than the matched-prefix length, allowing a crafted path to be forwarded as a protected inner route while the outer application routes the original path. Since 4.12.21, rebuilding the forwarded URL from the decoded pathname can also convert a decoded backslash to a slash and collapse parent-directory segments, again causing the mounted application to receive a protected path. An unauthenticated client can use either applicable path transformation to reach a mounted route without authentication or authorization middleware scoped to a subpath inside the mount prefix. This issue is fixed in version 4.13.16.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126357</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4m76-xfj5-7975 — Hono: `mount()` and `app.mount()` can forward a path that bypasses middleware scoped inside the mount prefix</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4m76-xfj5-7975</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: hono&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`mount()` and `app.mount()` remove the mount prefix from the request path and forward the rest to the mounted application. Two mistakes in that step let a crafted request reach a route of the mounted application that the outer application protects with path-scoped middleware, such as an authentication check on `/app/admin/*`. The outer application routes on the original path, so the middleware does not run.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Dynamic prefix** (all affected versions): for a mount such as `/api/:tenant/*`, the prefix was removed by the length of the route pattern, not of the matched prefix. A request with a longer or shorter first segment is cut in the middle, so `/api/a/xxxxx/admin/secret` reaches the mounted application as `/admin/secret`.
2. **Re-normalization** (since 4.12.21): the forwarded path was built from the decoded request path and assigned to `url.pathname`, which turns a decoded backslash into `/` and collapses `..`. `/app/public%5C..%5Cadmin/secret` reaches the mounted application as `/admin/secret`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix removes the prefix segment by segment from the raw pathname, using the matched parameter values for its length. Route patterns that cannot be handled safely now throw: duplicate parameter names and a wildcard inside the last segment such as `/assets*`. A trailing slash in an `app.mount()` prefix no longer removes an extra segment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated client can reach a route of a mounted application that the outer application protec…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: hono&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`mount()` and `app.mount()` remove the mount prefix from the request path and forward the rest to the mounted application. Two mistakes in that step let a crafted request reach a route of the mounted application that the outer application protects with path-scoped middleware, such as an authentication check on `/app/admin/*`. The outer application routes on the original path, so the middleware does not run.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Dynamic prefix** (all affected versions): for a mount such as `/api/:tenant/*`, the prefix was removed by the length of the route pattern, not of the matched prefix. A request with a longer or shorter first segment is cut in the middle, so `/api/a/xxxxx/admin/secret` reaches the mounted application as `/admin/secret`.
2. **Re-normalization** (since 4.12.21): the forwarded path was built from the decoded request path and assigned to `url.pathname`, which turns a decoded backslash into `/` and collapses `..`. `/app/public%5C..%5Cadmin/secret` reaches the mounted application as `/admin/secret`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix removes the prefix segment by segment from the raw pathname, using the matched parameter values for its length. Route patterns that cannot be handled safely now throw: duplicate parameter names and a wildcard inside the last segment such as `/assets*`. A trailing slash in an `app.mount()` prefix no longer removes an extra segment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An unauthenticated client can reach a route of a mounted application that the outer application protec…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-4m76-xfj5-7975</guid>
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