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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 19:21:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-mikutter-CVE-2026-126350 — Addressable: Regular Expression Denial of Service in templates with certain exploded expressions</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-mikutter-cve-2026-126350</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: mikutter&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Within the URI template implementation in Addressable, templates using the `*` (explode) modifier with the `/`, `.`, `;`, `?` or `&amp;amp;` operators (e.g., `{/segments*}`, `{.ext*}`, `{;params*}`, `{?query*}`) generate regular expressions vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking. When `Template#match` or `Template#extract` is called with a maliciously crafted URI that starts with the operator&amp;#39;s leading character, matching takes exponential time, leading to uncontrolled resource consumption and denial of service. An input under 60 bytes is enough to occupy a thread for minutes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GHSA-h27x-rffw-24p4 (CVE-2026-35611) reported this pattern as fully remediated in 2.9.0. The 2.9.0 fix only made the joiner between exploded members mandatory for templates without an operator, and its regression specs used inputs that never start with the operator&amp;#39;s leading character, so the vulnerable part of the expression was never reached. This issue was originally reported in #364 by @ebenoist in 2019 but insufficiently investigated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users of the URI parsing capabilities in Addressable but not the URI template matching capabilities are unaffected. Users who only call `Template#expand` are unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability affects Addressable &amp;gt;= 2.3.0 (note: 2.3.0 and 2.3.1 were yanked; the earliest installable release is 2.3.2), including 2.9.0. It is fixed in 2.9.1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is only exploitable on Ruby implementations whose regular expression engine backtrac…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: mikutter&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Within the URI template implementation in Addressable, templates using the `*` (explode) modifier with the `/`, `.`, `;`, `?` or `&amp;amp;` operators (e.g., `{/segments*}`, `{.ext*}`, `{;params*}`, `{?query*}`) generate regular expressions vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking. When `Template#match` or `Template#extract` is called with a maliciously crafted URI that starts with the operator&amp;#39;s leading character, matching takes exponential time, leading to uncontrolled resource consumption and denial of service. An input under 60 bytes is enough to occupy a thread for minutes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GHSA-h27x-rffw-24p4 (CVE-2026-35611) reported this pattern as fully remediated in 2.9.0. The 2.9.0 fix only made the joiner between exploded members mandatory for templates without an operator, and its regression specs used inputs that never start with the operator&amp;#39;s leading character, so the vulnerable part of the expression was never reached. This issue was originally reported in #364 by @ebenoist in 2019 but insufficiently investigated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users of the URI parsing capabilities in Addressable but not the URI template matching capabilities are unaffected. Users who only call `Template#expand` are unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability affects Addressable &amp;gt;= 2.3.0 (note: 2.3.0 and 2.3.1 were yanked; the earliest installable release is 2.3.2), including 2.9.0. It is fixed in 2.9.1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is only exploitable on Ruby implementations whose regular expression engine backtrac…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-mikutter-cve-2026-126350</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-405790</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-405790</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-405790</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-405790</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-126350</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126350</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Addressable is an alternative implementation to the URI implementation that is part of Ruby&amp;#39;s standard library. From 2.3.0 until 2.9.1, URI template expressions using the explode modifier with the slash, dot, semicolon, question-mark, or ampersand operators generate ambiguous regular expressions. When Template#match or Template#extract processes an attacker-controlled URI beginning with the operator&amp;#39;s leading character, optional member separators allow catastrophic backtracking and denial of service on MRI Ruby before 3.2 and JRuby. Addressable 2.9.0 incompletely remediated the earlier template issue because its tests did not reach these operator-prefixed paths. URI parsing and Template#expand are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Addressable is an alternative implementation to the URI implementation that is part of Ruby&amp;#39;s standard library. From 2.3.0 until 2.9.1, URI template expressions using the explode modifier with the slash, dot, semicolon, question-mark, or ampersand operators generate ambiguous regular expressions. When Template#match or Template#extract processes an attacker-controlled URI beginning with the operator&amp;#39;s leading character, optional member separators allow catastrophic backtracking and denial of service on MRI Ruby before 3.2 and JRuby. Addressable 2.9.0 incompletely remediated the earlier template issue because its tests did not reach these operator-prefixed paths. URI parsing and Template#expand are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126350</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-j82w-28jv-3pmj — Addressable: Regular Expression Denial of Service in templates with certain exploded expressions</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j82w-28jv-3pmj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: addressable&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Within the URI template implementation in Addressable, templates using the `*` (explode) modifier with the `/`, `.`, `;`, `?` or `&amp;amp;` operators (e.g., `{/segments*}`, `{.ext*}`, `{;params*}`, `{?query*}`) generate regular expressions vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking. When `Template#match` or `Template#extract` is called with a maliciously crafted URI that starts with the operator&amp;#39;s leading character, matching takes exponential time, leading to uncontrolled resource consumption and denial of service. An input under 60 bytes is enough to occupy a thread for minutes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GHSA-h27x-rffw-24p4 (CVE-2026-35611) reported this pattern as fully remediated in 2.9.0. The 2.9.0 fix only made the joiner between exploded members mandatory for templates without an operator, and its regression specs used inputs that never start with the operator&amp;#39;s leading character, so the vulnerable part of the expression was never reached. This issue was originally reported in #364 by @ebenoist in 2019 but insufficiently investigated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users of the URI parsing capabilities in Addressable but not the URI template matching capabilities are unaffected. Users who only call `Template#expand` are unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability affects Addressable &amp;gt;= 2.3.0 (note: 2.3.0 and 2.3.1 were yanked; the earliest installable release is 2.3.2), including 2.9.0. It is fixed in 2.9.1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is only exploitable on Ruby implementations whose regular expression engine backtrac…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: addressable&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Within the URI template implementation in Addressable, templates using the `*` (explode) modifier with the `/`, `.`, `;`, `?` or `&amp;amp;` operators (e.g., `{/segments*}`, `{.ext*}`, `{;params*}`, `{?query*}`) generate regular expressions vulnerable to catastrophic backtracking. When `Template#match` or `Template#extract` is called with a maliciously crafted URI that starts with the operator&amp;#39;s leading character, matching takes exponential time, leading to uncontrolled resource consumption and denial of service. An input under 60 bytes is enough to occupy a thread for minutes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GHSA-h27x-rffw-24p4 (CVE-2026-35611) reported this pattern as fully remediated in 2.9.0. The 2.9.0 fix only made the joiner between exploded members mandatory for templates without an operator, and its regression specs used inputs that never start with the operator&amp;#39;s leading character, so the vulnerable part of the expression was never reached. This issue was originally reported in #364 by @ebenoist in 2019 but insufficiently investigated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users of the URI parsing capabilities in Addressable but not the URI template matching capabilities are unaffected. Users who only call `Template#expand` are unaffected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability affects Addressable &amp;gt;= 2.3.0 (note: 2.3.0 and 2.3.1 were yanked; the earliest installable release is 2.3.2), including 2.9.0. It is fixed in 2.9.1.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability is only exploitable on Ruby implementations whose regular expression engine backtrac…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-j82w-28jv-3pmj</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-126350 — Addressable: Regular Expression Denial of Service in Addressable templates with certain exploded expressions</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-126350</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-126350</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-126350</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-126350</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-126350</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: ruby-addressable, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: ruby-addressable, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: ruby-addressable, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: ruby-addressable, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: ruby-addressable, Ubuntu:26.10: ruby-addressable, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: ruby-addressable&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Addressable is an alternative implementation to the URI implementation that is part of Ruby&amp;#39;s standard library. From 2.3.0 until 2.9.1, URI template expressions using the explode modifier with the slash, dot, semicolon, question-mark, or ampersand operators generate ambiguous regular expressions. When Template#match or Template#extract processes an attacker-controlled URI beginning with the operator&amp;#39;s leading character, optional member separators allow catastrophic backtracking and denial of service on MRI Ruby before 3.2 and JRuby. Addressable 2.9.0 incompletely remediated the earlier template issue because its tests did not reach these operator-prefixed paths. URI parsing and Template#expand are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: ruby-addressable, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: ruby-addressable, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: ruby-addressable, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: ruby-addressable, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: ruby-addressable, Ubuntu:26.10: ruby-addressable, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: ruby-addressable&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Addressable is an alternative implementation to the URI implementation that is part of Ruby&amp;#39;s standard library. From 2.3.0 until 2.9.1, URI template expressions using the explode modifier with the slash, dot, semicolon, question-mark, or ampersand operators generate ambiguous regular expressions. When Template#match or Template#extract processes an attacker-controlled URI beginning with the operator&amp;#39;s leading character, optional member separators allow catastrophic backtracking and denial of service on MRI Ruby before 3.2 and JRuby. Addressable 2.9.0 incompletely remediated the earlier template issue because its tests did not reach these operator-prefixed paths. URI parsing and Template#expand are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-126350</guid>
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