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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 20:28:44 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-405773</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-405773</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-405773</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-405773</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-126207</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126207</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Loofah is a general library for manipulating and transforming HTML/XML documents and fragments, built on top of Nokogiri. Prior to 2.25.3, Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.scrub_css checks only the first parse of a style attribute, then rebuilds CSS with identifier escapes decoded so escaped parentheses, property names, comments, or quotes can become a live url() without a second safety check. An attacker can use list-style to make a viewer&amp;#39;s browser request an attacker-chosen URL when content renders, or cursor to make the request on hover. The request can disclose the viewer&amp;#39;s IP address, user agent, access timing, and access to internal-network hosts, but no script survives sanitization and the attacker cannot read the response. This issue is fixed in version 2.25.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Loofah is a general library for manipulating and transforming HTML/XML documents and fragments, built on top of Nokogiri. Prior to 2.25.3, Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.scrub_css checks only the first parse of a style attribute, then rebuilds CSS with identifier escapes decoded so escaped parentheses, property names, comments, or quotes can become a live url() without a second safety check. An attacker can use list-style to make a viewer&amp;#39;s browser request an attacker-chosen URL when content renders, or cursor to make the request on hover. The request can disclose the viewer&amp;#39;s IP address, user agent, access timing, and access to internal-network hosts, but no script survives sanitization and the attacker cannot read the response. This issue is fixed in version 2.25.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126207</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-m3x9-938q-5767 — Loofah: CSS url() sanitization bypass via escaped parentheses</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m3x9-938q-5767</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: loofah&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.scrub_css` rejected any property whose top-level Crass tokens included a `:url` or `:bad_url`, and left `url` out of the allowed CSS functions. Both checks ran only against the first parse of the `style` attribute. When `scrub_css` rebuilt each property it emitted identifiers with their CSS escapes decoded, so parentheses written as escapes — `url\28 …\29` — hid the `url` token from the checks, and the rebuilt value was re-parsed into a live `url()` that nothing checked again. An escaped property name, six-digit escapes, escaped comments and escaped quotes all reached the same place.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A sanitized `style` attribute could make a viewer&amp;#39;s browser issue a request to an attacker-chosen URL. `list-style` fetches on render with no interaction, `cursor` on hover. That leaks the viewer&amp;#39;s IP address, user agent and access timing, and can reach hosts routable only from the viewer&amp;#39;s network. No script survives sanitization and the attacker cannot read the response, so the request itself is the whole impact.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications that sanitize user-supplied HTML with Loofah&amp;#39;s default allowlist and display it to other people are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to Loofah &amp;gt;= 2.25.3.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credit&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reported by NotAFlightRisk through GitHub&amp;#39;s private vulnerability reporting.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: loofah&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.scrub_css` rejected any property whose top-level Crass tokens included a `:url` or `:bad_url`, and left `url` out of the allowed CSS functions. Both checks ran only against the first parse of the `style` attribute. When `scrub_css` rebuilt each property it emitted identifiers with their CSS escapes decoded, so parentheses written as escapes — `url\28 …\29` — hid the `url` token from the checks, and the rebuilt value was re-parsed into a live `url()` that nothing checked again. An escaped property name, six-digit escapes, escaped comments and escaped quotes all reached the same place.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A sanitized `style` attribute could make a viewer&amp;#39;s browser issue a request to an attacker-chosen URL. `list-style` fetches on render with no interaction, `cursor` on hover. That leaks the viewer&amp;#39;s IP address, user agent and access timing, and can reach hosts routable only from the viewer&amp;#39;s network. No script survives sanitization and the attacker cannot read the response, so the request itself is the whole impact.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications that sanitize user-supplied HTML with Loofah&amp;#39;s default allowlist and display it to other people are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Upgrade to Loofah &amp;gt;= 2.25.3.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Credit&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reported by NotAFlightRisk through GitHub&amp;#39;s private vulnerability reporting.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-m3x9-938q-5767</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-126207 — Loofah: CSS url() sanitization bypass via escaped parentheses</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-126207</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-126207</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-126207</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-126207</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-126207</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: ruby-loofah, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: ruby-loofah, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: ruby-loofah, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: ruby-loofah, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: ruby-loofah, Ubuntu:26.10: ruby-loofah, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: ruby-loofah&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Loofah is a general library for manipulating and transforming HTML/XML documents and fragments, built on top of Nokogiri. Prior to 2.25.3, Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.scrub_css checks only the first parse of a style attribute, then rebuilds CSS with identifier escapes decoded so escaped parentheses, property names, comments, or quotes can become a live url() without a second safety check. An attacker can use list-style to make a viewer&amp;#39;s browser request an attacker-chosen URL when content renders, or cursor to make the request on hover. The request can disclose the viewer&amp;#39;s IP address, user agent, access timing, and access to internal-network hosts, but no script survives sanitization and the attacker cannot read the response. This issue is fixed in version 2.25.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: ruby-loofah, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: ruby-loofah, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: ruby-loofah, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: ruby-loofah, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: ruby-loofah, Ubuntu:26.10: ruby-loofah, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: ruby-loofah&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Loofah is a general library for manipulating and transforming HTML/XML documents and fragments, built on top of Nokogiri. Prior to 2.25.3, Loofah::HTML5::Scrub.scrub_css checks only the first parse of a style attribute, then rebuilds CSS with identifier escapes decoded so escaped parentheses, property names, comments, or quotes can become a live url() without a second safety check. An attacker can use list-style to make a viewer&amp;#39;s browser request an attacker-chosen URL when content renders, or cursor to make the request on hover. The request can disclose the viewer&amp;#39;s IP address, user agent, access timing, and access to internal-network hosts, but no script survives sanitization and the attacker cannot read the response. This issue is fixed in version 2.25.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-126207</guid>
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