<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 20:28:41 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-404644</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404644</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-404644</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404644</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-126085</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126085</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Service::GCSService#url_for_direct_upload does not bind the declared content length into the signed direct-upload URL, and #headers_for_direct_upload returns no length constraint, so the URL authorizes an upload body of any size. A direct-upload client could store a file larger than the byte_size it declared, and the resulting blob keeps the declared size, possibly bypassing application file size validations and quotas. This is the weakness that CVE-2020-8162 fixed in the S3 service. Applications that store files in Google Cloud Storage and accept direct uploads are affected. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Service::GCSService#url_for_direct_upload does not bind the declared content length into the signed direct-upload URL, and #headers_for_direct_upload returns no length constraint, so the URL authorizes an upload body of any size. A direct-upload client could store a file larger than the byte_size it declared, and the resulting blob keeps the declared size, possibly bypassing application file size validations and quotas. This is the weakness that CVE-2020-8162 fixed in the S3 service. Applications that store files in Google Cloud Storage and accept direct uploads are affected. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126085</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hfr4-8rjc-97m2 — Active Storage: Possible circumvention of file size limits in Active Storage direct uploads to Google Cloud Storage</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hfr4-8rjc-97m2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: activestorage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
`ActiveStorage::Service::GCSService#url_for_direct_upload` does not bind the declared content length into the signed direct-upload URL, and `#headers_for_direct_upload` returns no length constraint, so the URL authorizes an upload body of any size. A direct-upload client could store a file larger than the `byte_size` it declared, and the resulting blob keeps the declared size, possibly bypassing application file size validations and quotas. This is the weakness that CVE-2020-8162 fixed in the S3 service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications that store files in Google Cloud Storage and accept direct uploads are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The fixed releases sign an `x-goog-content-length-range` header that matches the blob&amp;#39;s declared `byte_size` and return it from `headers_for_direct_upload`, so Cloud Storage rejects an upload body of any other size. Browsers send this header with the direct upload, so a bucket&amp;#39;s CORS configuration must list `x-goog-content-length-range` in `responseHeader`, or browser direct uploads fail after the upgrade. The Active Storage CHANGELOG and the CORS example in the Active Storage guide show the change.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Releases
The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Patches for those who cannot upgrade at once:
- 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/e19916cea31cbfb0030b165ae853b741f8dd57a7.patch
- 8.0: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/7fe85a72a789eae5ee070ce3ee1dad10a8a5f70c.patch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credit
This issue was responsibly reported by HackerOne r…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: activestorage&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
`ActiveStorage::Service::GCSService#url_for_direct_upload` does not bind the declared content length into the signed direct-upload URL, and `#headers_for_direct_upload` returns no length constraint, so the URL authorizes an upload body of any size. A direct-upload client could store a file larger than the `byte_size` it declared, and the resulting blob keeps the declared size, possibly bypassing application file size validations and quotas. This is the weakness that CVE-2020-8162 fixed in the S3 service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Applications that store files in Google Cloud Storage and accept direct uploads are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The fixed releases sign an `x-goog-content-length-range` header that matches the blob&amp;#39;s declared `byte_size` and return it from `headers_for_direct_upload`, so Cloud Storage rejects an upload body of any other size. Browsers send this header with the direct upload, so a bucket&amp;#39;s CORS configuration must list `x-goog-content-length-range` in `responseHeader`, or browser direct uploads fail after the upgrade. The Active Storage CHANGELOG and the CORS example in the Active Storage guide show the change.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Releases
The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Patches for those who cannot upgrade at once:
- 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/e19916cea31cbfb0030b165ae853b741f8dd57a7.patch
- 8.0: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/7fe85a72a789eae5ee070ce3ee1dad10a8a5f70c.patch&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Credit
This issue was responsibly reported by HackerOne r…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hfr4-8rjc-97m2</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-126085</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-126085</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:26.10: rails, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rails&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Service::GCSService#url_for_direct_upload does not bind the declared content length into the signed direct-upload URL, and #headers_for_direct_upload returns no length constraint, so the URL authorizes an upload body of any size. A direct-upload client could store a file larger than the byte_size it declared, and the resulting blob keeps the declared size, possibly bypassing application file size validations and quotas. This is the weakness that CVE-2020-8162 fixed in the S3 service. Applications that store files in Google Cloud Storage and accept direct uploads are affected. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:26.10: rails, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rails&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Active Storage makes it simple to upload and reference files in cloud services and attach those files to Active Record objects. Prior to 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2, ActiveStorage::Service::GCSService#url_for_direct_upload does not bind the declared content length into the signed direct-upload URL, and #headers_for_direct_upload returns no length constraint, so the URL authorizes an upload body of any size. A direct-upload client could store a file larger than the byte_size it declared, and the resulting blob keeps the declared size, possibly bypassing application file size validations and quotas. This is the weakness that CVE-2020-8162 fixed in the S3 service. Applications that store files in Google Cloud Storage and accept direct uploads are affected. This issue is fixed in versions 8.1.4.1 and 8.0.5.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-126085</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
