<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 20:22:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-404638</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404638</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-404638</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404638</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-126083</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126083</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Action Pack is a framework for handling and responding to web requests. From 8.1 until 8.1.4.1, Since Rails 8.1.0, ActionDispatch::RemoteIp derives request.remote_ip from Rack::Request#forwarded_for, which under Rack 3 reads the RFC 7239 Forwarded header in preference to X-Forwarded-For. When a reverse proxy appends the client address to X-Forwarded-For but passes a client-supplied Forwarded header through unchanged, request.remote_ip returns an address chosen by the client, and the IP spoofing check does not raise, because it compares only Client-Ip with the forwarded addresses. An unauthenticated attacker could therefore spoof request.remote_ip, possibly bypassing IP-based access controls and rate limits keyed on the client address (including the default by: of rate_limit), and falsifying the client address in logs. An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements: Runs Rails 8.1.0 through 8.1.4 with Rack 3. Under Rack 2.2, forwarded_for reads only X-Forwarded-For. Is served behind a proxy that does not remove or overwrite a client-supplied Forwarded header. Relies on request.remote_ip for access control, rate limiting, or auditing. The fix detects a spoofed Forwarded header only when the proxy also sets X-Forwarded-For. An application whose proxy passes a client-supplied Forwarded header through and sets no X-Forwarded-For remains exposed after upgrading, and should configure the proxy to remove or overwrite Forwarded, or apply the workaround below. This i…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Action Pack is a framework for handling and responding to web requests. From 8.1 until 8.1.4.1, Since Rails 8.1.0, ActionDispatch::RemoteIp derives request.remote_ip from Rack::Request#forwarded_for, which under Rack 3 reads the RFC 7239 Forwarded header in preference to X-Forwarded-For. When a reverse proxy appends the client address to X-Forwarded-For but passes a client-supplied Forwarded header through unchanged, request.remote_ip returns an address chosen by the client, and the IP spoofing check does not raise, because it compares only Client-Ip with the forwarded addresses. An unauthenticated attacker could therefore spoof request.remote_ip, possibly bypassing IP-based access controls and rate limits keyed on the client address (including the default by: of rate_limit), and falsifying the client address in logs. An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements: Runs Rails 8.1.0 through 8.1.4 with Rack 3. Under Rack 2.2, forwarded_for reads only X-Forwarded-For. Is served behind a proxy that does not remove or overwrite a client-supplied Forwarded header. Relies on request.remote_ip for access control, rate limiting, or auditing. The fix detects a spoofed Forwarded header only when the proxy also sets X-Forwarded-For. An application whose proxy passes a client-supplied Forwarded header through and sets no X-Forwarded-For remains exposed after upgrading, and should configure the proxy to remove or overwrite Forwarded, or apply the workaround below. This i…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-126083</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2gff-2mmg-m73p — Action Pack: Possible IP spoofing in Action Dispatch RemoteIp</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2gff-2mmg-m73p</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: actionpack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Since Rails 8.1.0, `ActionDispatch::RemoteIp` derives `request.remote_ip` from `Rack::Request#forwarded_for`, which under Rack 3 reads the RFC 7239 `Forwarded` header in preference to `X-Forwarded-For`. When a reverse proxy appends the client address to `X-Forwarded-For` but passes a client-supplied `Forwarded` header through unchanged, `request.remote_ip` returns an address chosen by the client, and the IP spoofing check does not raise, because it compares only `Client-Ip` with the forwarded addresses. An unauthenticated attacker could therefore spoof `request.remote_ip`, possibly bypassing IP-based access controls and rate limits keyed on the client address (including the default `by:` of `rate_limit`), and falsifying the client address in logs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The 8.1.0 change ([2d084af8](https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/2d084af8444a7b6b868c7cbb256172007871e78d)) switched `ActionDispatch::RemoteIp` from reading `X-Forwarded-For` directly to Rack&amp;#39;s `forwarded_for`, in order to reuse Rack&amp;#39;s port handling. Rails continues to honor `Forwarded`, the standard header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the fixed releases, when `config.action_dispatch.ip_spoofing_check` is enabled (the default), `ActionDispatch::RemoteIp` also compares the first untrusted client address in `Forwarded` with the first untrusted client address in `X-Forwarded-For`, as exact strings, and raises `ActionDispatch::RemoteIp::IpSpoofAttackError` when both headers are present and the addresses differ. Deployments whose prox…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: actionpack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Since Rails 8.1.0, `ActionDispatch::RemoteIp` derives `request.remote_ip` from `Rack::Request#forwarded_for`, which under Rack 3 reads the RFC 7239 `Forwarded` header in preference to `X-Forwarded-For`. When a reverse proxy appends the client address to `X-Forwarded-For` but passes a client-supplied `Forwarded` header through unchanged, `request.remote_ip` returns an address chosen by the client, and the IP spoofing check does not raise, because it compares only `Client-Ip` with the forwarded addresses. An unauthenticated attacker could therefore spoof `request.remote_ip`, possibly bypassing IP-based access controls and rate limits keyed on the client address (including the default `by:` of `rate_limit`), and falsifying the client address in logs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The 8.1.0 change ([2d084af8](https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/2d084af8444a7b6b868c7cbb256172007871e78d)) switched `ActionDispatch::RemoteIp` from reading `X-Forwarded-For` directly to Rack&amp;#39;s `forwarded_for`, in order to reuse Rack&amp;#39;s port handling. Rails continues to honor `Forwarded`, the standard header.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the fixed releases, when `config.action_dispatch.ip_spoofing_check` is enabled (the default), `ActionDispatch::RemoteIp` also compares the first untrusted client address in `Forwarded` with the first untrusted client address in `X-Forwarded-For`, as exact strings, and raises `ActionDispatch::RemoteIp::IpSpoofAttackError` when both headers are present and the addresses differ. Deployments whose prox…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2gff-2mmg-m73p</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-126083</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-126083</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:26.10: rails, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rails&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Action Pack is a framework for handling and responding to web requests. From 8.1 until 8.1.4.1, Since Rails 8.1.0, ActionDispatch::RemoteIp derives request.remote_ip from Rack::Request#forwarded_for, which under Rack 3 reads the RFC 7239 Forwarded header in preference to X-Forwarded-For. When a reverse proxy appends the client address to X-Forwarded-For but passes a client-supplied Forwarded header through unchanged, request.remote_ip returns an address chosen by the client, and the IP spoofing check does not raise, because it compares only Client-Ip with the forwarded addresses. An unauthenticated attacker could therefore spoof request.remote_ip, possibly bypassing IP-based access controls and rate limits keyed on the client address (including the default by: of rate_limit), and falsifying the client address in logs. An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements: Runs Rails 8.1.0 through 8.1.4 with Rack 3. Under Rack 2.2, forwarded_for reads only X-Forwarded-For. Is served behind a proxy that does not remove or overwrite a client-supplied Forwarded header. Relies on request.remote_ip for access control, rate limiting, or auditing. The fix detects a spoofed Forwarded header only when the proxy also sets X-Forwarded-For. An application whose proxy passes a client-supplied Forwarded header through and sets no X-Forwarded-For remains exposed after upgrading, and should configure the proxy to remove or overwrite Forwarded, or apply the workaround below. This i…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rails, Ubuntu:26.10: rails, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rails&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Action Pack is a framework for handling and responding to web requests. From 8.1 until 8.1.4.1, Since Rails 8.1.0, ActionDispatch::RemoteIp derives request.remote_ip from Rack::Request#forwarded_for, which under Rack 3 reads the RFC 7239 Forwarded header in preference to X-Forwarded-For. When a reverse proxy appends the client address to X-Forwarded-For but passes a client-supplied Forwarded header through unchanged, request.remote_ip returns an address chosen by the client, and the IP spoofing check does not raise, because it compares only Client-Ip with the forwarded addresses. An unauthenticated attacker could therefore spoof request.remote_ip, possibly bypassing IP-based access controls and rate limits keyed on the client address (including the default by: of rate_limit), and falsifying the client address in logs. An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements: Runs Rails 8.1.0 through 8.1.4 with Rack 3. Under Rack 2.2, forwarded_for reads only X-Forwarded-For. Is served behind a proxy that does not remove or overwrite a client-supplied Forwarded header. Relies on request.remote_ip for access control, rate limiting, or auditing. The fix detects a spoofed Forwarded header only when the proxy also sets X-Forwarded-For. An application whose proxy passes a client-supplied Forwarded header through and sets no X-Forwarded-For remains exposed after upgrading, and should configure the proxy to remove or overwrite Forwarded, or apply the workaround below. This i…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-126083</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
