<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 11:21:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-404510</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404510</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-404510</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404510</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-125339</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125339</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Winter CMS is a content management system built on the Laravel PHP framework. From 1.0.319 until 1.2.14, Backend\Classes\Controller::actionExists() accepts public handler-shaped methods as page actions, so a top-level GET request can invoke state-changing backend AJAX handlers without a CSRF token. Because backend routes use Route::any, CSRF validation skips GET, and the default SameSite=Lax session cookie is sent on cross-site navigation, an unauthenticated attacker can induce an authorized backend user to follow a link such as /backend/system/eventlogs/index_onEmptyLog. Affected handlers in the backend, CMS, and system modules can truncate logs, reset settings, alter backend user state, or delete CMS templates, while URL path segments can select a target record. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.14.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Winter CMS is a content management system built on the Laravel PHP framework. From 1.0.319 until 1.2.14, Backend\Classes\Controller::actionExists() accepts public handler-shaped methods as page actions, so a top-level GET request can invoke state-changing backend AJAX handlers without a CSRF token. Because backend routes use Route::any, CSRF validation skips GET, and the default SameSite=Lax session cookie is sent on cross-site navigation, an unauthenticated attacker can induce an authorized backend user to follow a link such as /backend/system/eventlogs/index_onEmptyLog. Affected handlers in the backend, CMS, and system modules can truncate logs, reset settings, alter backend user state, or delete CMS templates, while URL path segments can select a target record. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.14.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125339</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-p2ch-c2c3-4xm5 — Winter: CSRF through AJAX handler names reachable as backend page actions</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p2ch-c2c3-4xm5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: winter/wn-backend-module&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions of Winter CMS allow a backend AJAX handler to be invoked by a plain top-level `GET` navigation with no CSRF token. `Backend\Classes\Controller::actionExists()` accepted any public method on a controller as a page action, so handler-shaped names were never reserved from URL dispatch: an authenticated and authorized request to `/backend/system/eventlogs/index_onEmptyLog` reached the handler of the same name and truncated the system event log. Backend paths are routed through `Route::any`, and CSRF validation is skipped for `HEAD`, `GET` and `OPTIONS` requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The default `SameSite=Lax` session cookie is sent on top-level cross-site navigation, so a link on an attacker-controlled page is sufficient — no form, no script and no token. Handler arguments are taken from URL path segments, so the attacker also chooses the target record. Affected handlers across the `backend`, `cms` and `system` modules cover log truncation, resetting settings to their defaults, altering backend user state, and deleting CMS templates. None of them disclose data to the attacker or write attacker-controlled content, so the impact is destructive and state-changing rather than confidential.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To actively exploit this issue, an attacker would need no account of their own, but would need an authenticated backend user holding the relevant permission to follow an attacker-supplied link. The permissions guarding the affected handlers, `system.access_logs` included, are by default…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: winter/wn-backend-module&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions of Winter CMS allow a backend AJAX handler to be invoked by a plain top-level `GET` navigation with no CSRF token. `Backend\Classes\Controller::actionExists()` accepted any public method on a controller as a page action, so handler-shaped names were never reserved from URL dispatch: an authenticated and authorized request to `/backend/system/eventlogs/index_onEmptyLog` reached the handler of the same name and truncated the system event log. Backend paths are routed through `Route::any`, and CSRF validation is skipped for `HEAD`, `GET` and `OPTIONS` requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The default `SameSite=Lax` session cookie is sent on top-level cross-site navigation, so a link on an attacker-controlled page is sufficient — no form, no script and no token. Handler arguments are taken from URL path segments, so the attacker also chooses the target record. Affected handlers across the `backend`, `cms` and `system` modules cover log truncation, resetting settings to their defaults, altering backend user state, and deleting CMS templates. None of them disclose data to the attacker or write attacker-controlled content, so the impact is destructive and state-changing rather than confidential.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To actively exploit this issue, an attacker would need no account of their own, but would need an authenticated backend user holding the relevant permission to follow an attacker-supplied link. The permissions guarding the affected handlers, `system.access_logs` included, are by default…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p2ch-c2c3-4xm5</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
