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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 11:22:36 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-404503</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404503</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-404503</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404503</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-125337</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125337</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Winter CMS is a content management system built on the Laravel PHP framework. Prior to 1.2.14, the ImportExportController behavior applies userHasAccess() only to the import() and export() page actions, while Backend\Classes\Controller::execAjaxHandlers() dispatches onImport(), onImportLoadForm(), onImportLoadColumnSampleForm(), onExport(), and onExportLoadForm() before those gated actions run, and the separately reachable download() action also lacks the granular export check. An authenticated backend user with a valid session and coarse access through $requiredPermissions, but without the configured import[permissions] or export[permissions], can use the import handlers to write or overwrite records and can use onExport() followed by download() to retrieve the complete dataset exposed by the export model. Controllers without granular permission keys are unaffected because userHasAccess() is intentionally default-permissive. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.14.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Winter CMS is a content management system built on the Laravel PHP framework. Prior to 1.2.14, the ImportExportController behavior applies userHasAccess() only to the import() and export() page actions, while Backend\Classes\Controller::execAjaxHandlers() dispatches onImport(), onImportLoadForm(), onImportLoadColumnSampleForm(), onExport(), and onExportLoadForm() before those gated actions run, and the separately reachable download() action also lacks the granular export check. An authenticated backend user with a valid session and coarse access through $requiredPermissions, but without the configured import[permissions] or export[permissions], can use the import handlers to write or overwrite records and can use onExport() followed by download() to retrieve the complete dataset exposed by the export model. Controllers without granular permission keys are unaffected because userHasAccess() is intentionally default-permissive. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.14.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125337</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fm29-4mq3-phg6 — Winter: ImportExportController AJAX handlers bypass granular import/export permission gate</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fm29-4mq3-phg6</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: winter/wn-backend-module&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions of Winter CMS did not enforce the `ImportExportController` behavior&amp;#39;s granular access control on the handlers that actually perform the work.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The behavior supports per-operation access control through the `import[permissions]` and `export[permissions]` configuration keys, enforced by `userHasAccess()`. That check was applied only to the `import()` and `export()` page actions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Backend\Classes\Controller::execAjaxHandlers()` dispatches AJAX handlers and returns *before* `execPageAction()` runs, and the behavior binds its import and export form widgets in its constructor on every request to the controller. The handlers were therefore fully functional without the gated page action ever executing, and none of them carried the check:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `onImport()` — reaches `$model-&amp;gt;import()` with attacker-supplied column mappings
- `onImportLoadForm()`
- `onImportLoadColumnSampleForm()`
- `onExport()` — reaches `$model-&amp;gt;export()`
- `onExportLoadForm()`
- `download()` — streams a completed export file&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated backend user who could reach such a controller through its coarse `$requiredPermissions`, but who was denied the granular import or export permission, could therefore:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **exfiltrate** the entire dataset exposed by the export model, via `onExport()` followed by `download()`; and
- **write or overwrite** records through the import model, via `onImport()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`userHasAccess()` is default-permissive — it returns `true` unless the corresponding `permiss…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: winter/wn-backend-module&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions of Winter CMS did not enforce the `ImportExportController` behavior&amp;#39;s granular access control on the handlers that actually perform the work.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The behavior supports per-operation access control through the `import[permissions]` and `export[permissions]` configuration keys, enforced by `userHasAccess()`. That check was applied only to the `import()` and `export()` page actions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Backend\Classes\Controller::execAjaxHandlers()` dispatches AJAX handlers and returns *before* `execPageAction()` runs, and the behavior binds its import and export form widgets in its constructor on every request to the controller. The handlers were therefore fully functional without the gated page action ever executing, and none of them carried the check:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `onImport()` — reaches `$model-&amp;gt;import()` with attacker-supplied column mappings
- `onImportLoadForm()`
- `onImportLoadColumnSampleForm()`
- `onExport()` — reaches `$model-&amp;gt;export()`
- `onExportLoadForm()`
- `download()` — streams a completed export file&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated backend user who could reach such a controller through its coarse `$requiredPermissions`, but who was denied the granular import or export permission, could therefore:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- **exfiltrate** the entire dataset exposed by the export model, via `onExport()` followed by `download()`; and
- **write or overwrite** records through the import model, via `onImport()`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`userHasAccess()` is default-permissive — it returns `true` unless the corresponding `permiss…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fm29-4mq3-phg6</guid>
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