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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 21:33:35 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-404326</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404326</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-404326</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-404326</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-125335</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125335</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.3, ed25519.verify() decodes a public key in crypto_sign_open() without rejecting small-order points or their non-canonical encodings. With S = 0 and a small-order R value, an attacker who can choose the public key can produce signatures that verify for many messages, or all messages with the identity key, without a private key. This can defeat proof-of-possession, attribution, non-repudiation, or deduplication checks that rely on a signature being bound to the message. Keys produced by normal Ed25519 key generation are not small-order, so applications that verify only trusted or internally generated public keys are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.3, ed25519.verify() decodes a public key in crypto_sign_open() without rejecting small-order points or their non-canonical encodings. With S = 0 and a small-order R value, an attacker who can choose the public key can produce signatures that verify for many messages, or all messages with the identity key, without a private key. This can defeat proof-of-possession, attribution, non-repudiation, or deduplication checks that rely on a signature being bound to the message. Keys produced by normal Ed25519 key generation are not small-order, so applications that verify only trusted or internally generated public keys are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-125335</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-6889-vf6x-f3g5 — Forge: Ed25519 signature verification accepts small-order public keys</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6889-vf6x-f3g5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: node-forge&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
`ed25519.verify()` does not reject public keys of small order, such as the identity point. Under such a key, a signature with `S = 0` and a small-order `R` verifies for many messages, or for every message with the identity key, without any private key. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`crypto_sign_open()` in `lib/ed25519.js` decodes the public key `A` with `unpackneg()`, which only checks that the point is on the curve, and then checks `R == [S]B - [k]A` with `k = SHA-512(R || A || M)`. Nothing rejects public keys of small order: the identity point, the other 7 points of order 2, 4 or 8, and their non-canonical encodings with `y &amp;gt;= p`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With `S = 0`, the check becomes `R == [k](-A)`. For a small-order `A`, `[k](-A)` is one of at most 8 small-order points, so an attacker can make a valid signature by trying the small-order values of `R`. For the identity key (`01 00 … 00`), `R = identity` and `S = 0` verifies for every message. For the other small-order keys, a given message can be forged with high probability. No private key is involved. The `S &amp;lt; L` check added for CVE-2026-33895 (GHSA-q67f-28xg-22rw) doesn&amp;#39;t apply, because `S = 0` is canonical.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Keys produced by Ed25519 key generation (`ed25519.generateKeyPair()` or any RFC 8032 implementation) are never small-order, so signatures under them cannot be forged this way. Applications are affected when they verify signatures against a public key an attacker can choose (for example a key included with the sign…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: node-forge&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
`ed25519.verify()` does not reject public keys of small order, such as the identity point. Under such a key, a signature with `S = 0` and a small-order `R` verifies for many messages, or for every message with the identity key, without any private key. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`crypto_sign_open()` in `lib/ed25519.js` decodes the public key `A` with `unpackneg()`, which only checks that the point is on the curve, and then checks `R == [S]B - [k]A` with `k = SHA-512(R || A || M)`. Nothing rejects public keys of small order: the identity point, the other 7 points of order 2, 4 or 8, and their non-canonical encodings with `y &amp;gt;= p`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With `S = 0`, the check becomes `R == [k](-A)`. For a small-order `A`, `[k](-A)` is one of at most 8 small-order points, so an attacker can make a valid signature by trying the small-order values of `R`. For the identity key (`01 00 … 00`), `R = identity` and `S = 0` verifies for every message. For the other small-order keys, a given message can be forged with high probability. No private key is involved. The `S &amp;lt; L` check added for CVE-2026-33895 (GHSA-q67f-28xg-22rw) doesn&amp;#39;t apply, because `S = 0` is canonical.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Keys produced by Ed25519 key generation (`ed25519.generateKeyPair()` or any RFC 8032 implementation) are never small-order, so signatures under them cannot be forged this way. Applications are affected when they verify signatures against a public key an attacker can choose (for example a key included with the sign…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6889-vf6x-f3g5</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-125335 — Forge: Ed25519 signature verification accepts small-order public keys</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-125335</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-125335</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-125335</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-125335</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-125335</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: node-node-forge, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-node-forge&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.3, ed25519.verify() decodes a public key in crypto_sign_open() without rejecting small-order points or their non-canonical encodings. With S = 0 and a small-order R value, an attacker who can choose the public key can produce signatures that verify for many messages, or all messages with the identity key, without a private key. This can defeat proof-of-possession, attribution, non-repudiation, or deduplication checks that rely on a signature being bound to the message. Keys produced by normal Ed25519 key generation are not small-order, so applications that verify only trusted or internally generated public keys are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: node-node-forge, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-node-forge&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Forge (also called node-forge) is a native implementation of Transport Layer Security in JavaScript. Prior to 1.4.3, ed25519.verify() decodes a public key in crypto_sign_open() without rejecting small-order points or their non-canonical encodings. With S = 0 and a small-order R value, an attacker who can choose the public key can produce signatures that verify for many messages, or all messages with the identity key, without a private key. This can defeat proof-of-possession, attribution, non-repudiation, or deduplication checks that rely on a signature being bound to the message. Keys produced by normal Ed25519 key generation are not small-order, so applications that verify only trusted or internally generated public keys are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-125335</guid>
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