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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 20:46:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-401967</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-401967</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-401967</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-401967</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-123594</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123594</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC&amp;#39;s Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC&amp;#39;s Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-123594</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-fg2p-gxqh-hm83</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fg2p-gxqh-hm83</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC&amp;#39;s Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC&amp;#39;s Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fg2p-gxqh-hm83</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-123594 — Hickory DNS through 0.26.0-alpha.1 DNSSEC NSEC Validation Bypass for Empty Non-Terminals</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-123594</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-123594</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-123594</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0511 — NXDOMAIN accepted for a proven empty non-terminal (hickory-proto)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0511</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: hickory-proto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto&amp;#39;s NSEC validation accepted an NXDOMAIN response as secure even when the covering NSEC record&amp;#39;s next domain name was below the queried name, which proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. Because the response code is not signed, someone who can modify DNS responses could turn a genuine signed NODATA response into an accepted NXDOMAIN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: hickory-proto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto&amp;#39;s NSEC validation accepted an NXDOMAIN response as secure even when the covering NSEC record&amp;#39;s next domain name was below the queried name, which proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. Because the response code is not signed, someone who can modify DNS responses could turn a genuine signed NODATA response into an accepted NXDOMAIN.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0511</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-123594</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-123594</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rust-hickory-proto, Ubuntu:26.10: rust-hickory-net, Ubuntu:26.10: rust-hickory-proto, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rust-hickory-proto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC&amp;#39;s Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rust-hickory-proto, Ubuntu:26.10: rust-hickory-net, Ubuntu:26.10: rust-hickory-proto, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rust-hickory-proto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC&amp;#39;s Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-123594</guid>
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