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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 18:25:48 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-407446</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407446</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407446</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407446</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-121716</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-121716</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;fzf is a command-line fuzzy finder. Prior to 0.74.5, bin/fzf-tmux validates separately supplied layout sizes but does not validate attached -l and -u layout values before Bash arithmetic expansion, allowing command substitution in a crafted operand to execute as the invoking user during option parsing. The same validation failure lets space-bearing popup geometry options -x, -y, -w, -h, and -p reach an unquoted tmux popup option string and inject additional tmux flags. Exploitation requires less-trusted project configuration, a wrapper, or a plugin to supply the poisoned value and requires the victim to invoke fzf-tmux; normal values are usually trusted, and the script has been superseded by built-in tmux options. This issue is fixed in version 0.74.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;fzf is a command-line fuzzy finder. Prior to 0.74.5, bin/fzf-tmux validates separately supplied layout sizes but does not validate attached -l and -u layout values before Bash arithmetic expansion, allowing command substitution in a crafted operand to execute as the invoking user during option parsing. The same validation failure lets space-bearing popup geometry options -x, -y, -w, -h, and -p reach an unquoted tmux popup option string and inject additional tmux flags. Exploitation requires less-trusted project configuration, a wrapper, or a plugin to supply the poisoned value and requires the victim to invoke fzf-tmux; normal values are usually trusted, and the script has been superseded by built-in tmux options. This issue is fixed in version 0.74.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-121716</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-w6x2-f5m4-xw82 — fzf: Arbitrary command execution via bash arithmetic expansion on unvalidated layout size in fzf-tmux (-l/-u attached v…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w6x2-f5m4-xw82</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/junegunn/fzf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`bin/fzf-tmux` fails to validate layout size values given in the *attached* form (e.g. `-l50`). For `-l`/`-u` these values reach bash arithmetic expansion (`$(( max - size ))`), where an operand like `a[$(cmd)]` executes `cmd` as the invoking user during option parsing — before any tmux interaction and even outside tmux. A second sink embeds unvalidated popup geometry (`-x/-y/-w/-h/-p`) into an unquoted `tmux popup ... $opt ...` invocation, allowing injection of tmux flags such as `-e BASH_ENV=&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;` (command execution via non-interactive bash sourcing `$BASH_ENV`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Reporter / Credits:
Sai Sreewathsa Kovalluri, Shon Babu and Kannan K (Researchers), Innspark Solutions https://innspark.in/&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `bin/fzf-tmux` (tag 0.74.4, commit a140afeb), the option parser validates size values with a regex (`^[0-9%,]+$` / `^[A-Z]$`) only for the separate-argument form (line 82). The attached form is captured unvalidated at line 80:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
if [[ ${#arg} -gt 2 ]]; then
  size=&amp;#34;${arg:2}&amp;#34;                       # no validation
else
  if [[ $1 =~ ^[0-9%,]+$ ]] || [[ $1 =~ ^[A-Z]$ ]]; then   # only separate form validated
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For `-l` and `-u`, `swap` is non-empty (lines 68/75), so `size` reaches arithmetic evaluation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- line 120: `size=$((max - size))` (non-percent values)
- line 102: `opt=&amp;#34;$opt -l $((100 - size))%&amp;#34;` (percent, tmux &amp;gt;= 3.2)
- line 108: `opt=&amp;#34;$opt -p $((100 - size))&amp;#34;` (percent, tmux &amp;lt; 3.2)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bash arithmetic expands array subscripts, so `a[$(command)…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/junegunn/fzf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`bin/fzf-tmux` fails to validate layout size values given in the *attached* form (e.g. `-l50`). For `-l`/`-u` these values reach bash arithmetic expansion (`$(( max - size ))`), where an operand like `a[$(cmd)]` executes `cmd` as the invoking user during option parsing — before any tmux interaction and even outside tmux. A second sink embeds unvalidated popup geometry (`-x/-y/-w/-h/-p`) into an unquoted `tmux popup ... $opt ...` invocation, allowing injection of tmux flags such as `-e BASH_ENV=&amp;lt;path&amp;gt;` (command execution via non-interactive bash sourcing `$BASH_ENV`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Reporter / Credits:
Sai Sreewathsa Kovalluri, Shon Babu and Kannan K (Researchers), Innspark Solutions https://innspark.in/&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `bin/fzf-tmux` (tag 0.74.4, commit a140afeb), the option parser validates size values with a regex (`^[0-9%,]+$` / `^[A-Z]$`) only for the separate-argument form (line 82). The attached form is captured unvalidated at line 80:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
if [[ ${#arg} -gt 2 ]]; then
  size=&amp;#34;${arg:2}&amp;#34;                       # no validation
else
  if [[ $1 =~ ^[0-9%,]+$ ]] || [[ $1 =~ ^[A-Z]$ ]]; then   # only separate form validated
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For `-l` and `-u`, `swap` is non-empty (lines 68/75), so `size` reaches arithmetic evaluation:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- line 120: `size=$((max - size))` (non-percent values)
- line 102: `opt=&amp;#34;$opt -l $((100 - size))%&amp;#34;` (percent, tmux &amp;gt;= 3.2)
- line 108: `opt=&amp;#34;$opt -p $((100 - size))&amp;#34;` (percent, tmux &amp;lt; 3.2)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bash arithmetic expands array subscripts, so `a[$(command)…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w6x2-f5m4-xw82</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-121716</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-121716</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: fzf, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: fzf, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: fzf, Ubuntu:26.10: fzf, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: fzf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[GHSA-w6x2-f5m4-xw82: Arbitrary command execution via bash arithmetic expansion on unvalidated layout size in fzf-tmux (-l/-u attached value)]&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: fzf, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: fzf, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: fzf, Ubuntu:26.10: fzf, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: fzf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[GHSA-w6x2-f5m4-xw82: Arbitrary command execution via bash arithmetic expansion on unvalidated layout size in fzf-tmux (-l/-u attached value)]&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-121716</guid>
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