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      <title>EUVD-2026-407075</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407075</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407075</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407075</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-120699</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-120699</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;CubeSandbox is an instant, concurrent, secure, and lightweight sandbox for AI agents. Prior to 0.5.1, any authenticated tenant permitted to call POST /sandboxes can supply metadata[&amp;#34;host-mount&amp;#34;] with an arbitrary existing host path because the control plane performs no authorization check or allowed-prefix validation for the path. injectHostDirMounts forwards the path to prepareHostDirVolume, where Cubelet uses mount --rbind through the function to perform a recursive bind mount as root and exposes the host subtree to the tenant&amp;#39;s MicroVM through virtio-fs, read-write by default. This allows host-root file access and modification, host code execution, access to the container runtime, and compromise of co-resident tenants without a kernel or virtual-machine-monitor flaw. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;CubeSandbox is an instant, concurrent, secure, and lightweight sandbox for AI agents. Prior to 0.5.1, any authenticated tenant permitted to call POST /sandboxes can supply metadata[&amp;#34;host-mount&amp;#34;] with an arbitrary existing host path because the control plane performs no authorization check or allowed-prefix validation for the path. injectHostDirMounts forwards the path to prepareHostDirVolume, where Cubelet uses mount --rbind through the function to perform a recursive bind mount as root and exposes the host subtree to the tenant&amp;#39;s MicroVM through virtio-fs, read-write by default. This allows host-root file access and modification, host code execution, access to the container runtime, and compromise of co-resident tenants without a kernel or virtual-machine-monitor flaw. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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