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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 17:44:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-moto-CVE-2026-119286 — GraphQL-core has denial of service via memory leak in aborted validations</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-moto-cve-2026-119286</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: moto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a validation was aborted because the document contained more errors than allowed by `max_errors` (100 by default), `validate()` raised a single module-level `ValidationAbortedError` instance. Python appends the frames of every `raise` to the existing `__traceback__` of an exception that is raised again, so every aborted validation extended the traceback of this shared error. That traceback kept the frames, and with them the document, the validation context and all errors of every aborted validation, alive for the lifetime of the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any client can trigger an aborted validation by sending a small document with more than 100 validation errors, e.g. 101 unknown fields. No authentication is required, and since validation runs before execution, depth limiters and complexity analyzers do not prevent it. Each such request permanently retained about 124 KiB on CPython 3.12, without an upper limit, so memory grew with every request until the process was restarted or killed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GraphQL.js uses a shared error object at the same place, but JavaScript errors capture their stack trace only once when they are created, so it is not affected. GraphQL-core 3.2 creates a new error for each aborted validation and is not affected either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof of concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import gc
import tracemalloc
from graphql import build_schema, parse, validate&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;schema = build_schema(&amp;#34;type Query { a: Int }&amp;#34;)
document = parse(&amp;#34;{ &amp;#34; + &amp;#34; &amp;#34;.join(f&amp;#34;f{i}&amp;#34; for i in range(101)) + &amp;#34; }…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: moto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a validation was aborted because the document contained more errors than allowed by `max_errors` (100 by default), `validate()` raised a single module-level `ValidationAbortedError` instance. Python appends the frames of every `raise` to the existing `__traceback__` of an exception that is raised again, so every aborted validation extended the traceback of this shared error. That traceback kept the frames, and with them the document, the validation context and all errors of every aborted validation, alive for the lifetime of the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any client can trigger an aborted validation by sending a small document with more than 100 validation errors, e.g. 101 unknown fields. No authentication is required, and since validation runs before execution, depth limiters and complexity analyzers do not prevent it. Each such request permanently retained about 124 KiB on CPython 3.12, without an upper limit, so memory grew with every request until the process was restarted or killed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GraphQL.js uses a shared error object at the same place, but JavaScript errors capture their stack trace only once when they are created, so it is not affected. GraphQL-core 3.2 creates a new error for each aborted validation and is not affected either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof of concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import gc
import tracemalloc
from graphql import build_schema, parse, validate&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;schema = build_schema(&amp;#34;type Query { a: Int }&amp;#34;)
document = parse(&amp;#34;{ &amp;#34; + &amp;#34; &amp;#34;.join(f&amp;#34;f{i}&amp;#34; for i in range(101)) + &amp;#34; }…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-moto-cve-2026-119286</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-396510</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-396510</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-396510</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-396510</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-119286</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-119286</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.3.0a3 until 3.3.1, validate() reuses a module-level ValidationAbortedError when a document exceeds max_errors. Python appends frames to the reused exception&amp;#39;s traceback on every raise, retaining each document, validation context, and error set for the process lifetime. An unauthenticated client can repeatedly submit a small document with more than 100 validation errors to cause unbounded memory growth before query execution, eventually exhausting worker memory without disclosing or modifying data. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.3.0a3 until 3.3.1, validate() reuses a module-level ValidationAbortedError when a document exceeds max_errors. Python appends frames to the reused exception&amp;#39;s traceback on every raise, retaining each document, validation context, and error set for the process lifetime. An unauthenticated client can repeatedly submit a small document with more than 100 validation errors to cause unbounded memory growth before query execution, eventually exhausting worker memory without disclosing or modifying data. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-119286</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mpqx-q82w-9x46 — GraphQL-core has denial of service via memory leak in aborted validations</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mpqx-q82w-9x46</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: graphql-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a validation was aborted because the document contained more errors than allowed by `max_errors` (100 by default), `validate()` raised a single module-level `ValidationAbortedError` instance. Python appends the frames of every `raise` to the existing `__traceback__` of an exception that is raised again, so every aborted validation extended the traceback of this shared error. That traceback kept the frames, and with them the document, the validation context and all errors of every aborted validation, alive for the lifetime of the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any client can trigger an aborted validation by sending a small document with more than 100 validation errors, e.g. 101 unknown fields. No authentication is required, and since validation runs before execution, depth limiters and complexity analyzers do not prevent it. Each such request permanently retained about 124 KiB on CPython 3.12, without an upper limit, so memory grew with every request until the process was restarted or killed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GraphQL.js uses a shared error object at the same place, but JavaScript errors capture their stack trace only once when they are created, so it is not affected. GraphQL-core 3.2 creates a new error for each aborted validation and is not affected either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof of concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import gc
import tracemalloc
from graphql import build_schema, parse, validate&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;schema = build_schema(&amp;#34;type Query { a: Int }&amp;#34;)
document = parse(&amp;#34;{ &amp;#34; + &amp;#34; &amp;#34;.join(f&amp;#34;f{i}&amp;#34; for i in range(101)) + &amp;#34; }…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: graphql-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When a validation was aborted because the document contained more errors than allowed by `max_errors` (100 by default), `validate()` raised a single module-level `ValidationAbortedError` instance. Python appends the frames of every `raise` to the existing `__traceback__` of an exception that is raised again, so every aborted validation extended the traceback of this shared error. That traceback kept the frames, and with them the document, the validation context and all errors of every aborted validation, alive for the lifetime of the process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any client can trigger an aborted validation by sending a small document with more than 100 validation errors, e.g. 101 unknown fields. No authentication is required, and since validation runs before execution, depth limiters and complexity analyzers do not prevent it. Each such request permanently retained about 124 KiB on CPython 3.12, without an upper limit, so memory grew with every request until the process was restarted or killed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GraphQL.js uses a shared error object at the same place, but JavaScript errors capture their stack trace only once when they are created, so it is not affected. GraphQL-core 3.2 creates a new error for each aborted validation and is not affected either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof of concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
import gc
import tracemalloc
from graphql import build_schema, parse, validate&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;schema = build_schema(&amp;#34;type Query { a: Int }&amp;#34;)
document = parse(&amp;#34;{ &amp;#34; + &amp;#34; &amp;#34;.join(f&amp;#34;f{i}&amp;#34; for i in range(101)) + &amp;#34; }…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mpqx-q82w-9x46</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:95872 — Red Hat Security Advisory: RHOAI 3.5.3 - Red Hat OpenShift AI</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:95872</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;markdown: python-markdown: Denial of Service via inefficient inline link parsing undici: undici: Information disclosure and Denial of Service via malformed Cache-Control directives @fastify/static: @fastify/static: Information disclosure via route guard bypass fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion vulnerability via backslash in URI authority undici: undici: Denial of Service via unrequested WebSocket subprotocol extract-zip: extract-zip: Arbitrary file write via symlink in archive encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal find-my-way: find-my-way: Denial of Service vulnerability in HTTP/2 server systeminformation: systeminformation: Arbitrary Command Execution via OS Command Injection mlflow: mlflow: Arbitrary file write via FileStore path traversal mcp: mcp: Denial of Service via session memory exhaustion in streamable HTTP servers nltk: NLTK: Information Disclosure via Symlink Sandbox Bypass github.com/klauspost/compress: klauspost/compress: Denial of Service via integer overflow in dictionary processing com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core: tools.jackson.core/jackson-core: jackson-core: Denial of Service via excessively long JSON property names accelerate: Hugging Face Accelerate: Path Traversal and Denial of Service via weight_map brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded intermediate arrays, bypassing the CVE-2026-14257 mitigation aiohttp: AIOHTTP: HTTP Request Smuggling via WebSocket Upgrade aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Denial of Ser…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;markdown: python-markdown: Denial of Service via inefficient inline link parsing undici: undici: Information disclosure and Denial of Service via malformed Cache-Control directives @fastify/static: @fastify/static: Information disclosure via route guard bypass fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion vulnerability via backslash in URI authority undici: undici: Denial of Service via unrequested WebSocket subprotocol extract-zip: extract-zip: Arbitrary file write via symlink in archive encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal find-my-way: find-my-way: Denial of Service vulnerability in HTTP/2 server systeminformation: systeminformation: Arbitrary Command Execution via OS Command Injection mlflow: mlflow: Arbitrary file write via FileStore path traversal mcp: mcp: Denial of Service via session memory exhaustion in streamable HTTP servers nltk: NLTK: Information Disclosure via Symlink Sandbox Bypass github.com/klauspost/compress: klauspost/compress: Denial of Service via integer overflow in dictionary processing com.fasterxml.jackson.core/jackson-core: tools.jackson.core/jackson-core: jackson-core: Denial of Service via excessively long JSON property names accelerate: Hugging Face Accelerate: Path Traversal and Denial of Service via weight_map brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded intermediate arrays, bypassing the CVE-2026-14257 mitigation aiohttp: AIOHTTP: HTTP Request Smuggling via WebSocket Upgrade aiohttp: AIOHTTP: Denial of Ser…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:95872</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-119286</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-119286</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: graphql-core, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: graphql-core, Ubuntu:26.10: graphql-core, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: graphql-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.3.0a3 until 3.3.1, validate() reuses a module-level ValidationAbortedError when a document exceeds max_errors. Python appends frames to the reused exception&amp;#39;s traceback on every raise, retaining each document, validation context, and error set for the process lifetime. An unauthenticated client can repeatedly submit a small document with more than 100 validation errors to cause unbounded memory growth before query execution, eventually exhausting worker memory without disclosing or modifying data. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: graphql-core, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: graphql-core, Ubuntu:26.10: graphql-core, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: graphql-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GraphQL-core is a Python port of the GraphQL.js reference implementation. From 3.3.0a3 until 3.3.1, validate() reuses a module-level ValidationAbortedError when a document exceeds max_errors. Python appends frames to the reused exception&amp;#39;s traceback on every raise, retaining each document, validation context, and error set for the process lifetime. An unauthenticated client can repeatedly submit a small document with more than 100 validation errors to cause unbounded memory growth before query execution, eventually exhausting worker memory without disclosing or modifying data. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-119286</guid>
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