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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 02:34:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-394417</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-394417</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-394417</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-394417</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-116794</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-116794</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server&amp;#39;s Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server&amp;#39;s Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-116794</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-vp5q-ff62-jwqv — russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vp5q-ff62-jwqv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The agent server in `russh::keys::agent::server` never calls `Agent::confirm` before signing with a key that was added with the confirm constraint. That constraint is `SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM` (RFC 9987 §5.2.7.2), which is what `ssh-add -c` sends.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The call was replaced by a hard-coded `true` in 3e04597 (&amp;#34;Native async traits encore&amp;#34;, #455), first released in 0.50.0-beta.12. Every release since, up to and including 0.64.1, signs requests for confirm-constrained keys without asking the `Agent` implementation. A user who added a key with `-c` is therefore never asked to confirm.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Connection::try_sign` notes that the key needs confirmation, then awaits a ready future instead of the agent ([server.rs L348-L360 at v0.64.1](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/blob/e5d80a07dc554480b6ea3b2e14adfc190407b627/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs#L348-L360)):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
let agent = if needs_confirm {
    let (agent, ok) = {
        let _pk = key.clone();
        Box::new(futures::future::ready((agent, true)))
    }
    .await;
    if !ok {
        return Ok((agent, false));
    }
    agent
} else {
    agent
};
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before [3e04597](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/3e04597dc54e36bfc85c21996f7d8d9d224e9826) the first statement was `let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`try_sign` was checked in the published crates on crates.io:
- Every russh release from 0.50.0-beta.12 to 0.64.1 (52 versions) has the hard-coded `true`.
- russh 0.50.0-beta.8 to be…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The agent server in `russh::keys::agent::server` never calls `Agent::confirm` before signing with a key that was added with the confirm constraint. That constraint is `SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM` (RFC 9987 §5.2.7.2), which is what `ssh-add -c` sends.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The call was replaced by a hard-coded `true` in 3e04597 (&amp;#34;Native async traits encore&amp;#34;, #455), first released in 0.50.0-beta.12. Every release since, up to and including 0.64.1, signs requests for confirm-constrained keys without asking the `Agent` implementation. A user who added a key with `-c` is therefore never asked to confirm.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Connection::try_sign` notes that the key needs confirmation, then awaits a ready future instead of the agent ([server.rs L348-L360 at v0.64.1](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/blob/e5d80a07dc554480b6ea3b2e14adfc190407b627/russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs#L348-L360)):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
let agent = if needs_confirm {
    let (agent, ok) = {
        let _pk = key.clone();
        Box::new(futures::future::ready((agent, true)))
    }
    .await;
    if !ok {
        return Ok((agent, false));
    }
    agent
} else {
    agent
};
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before [3e04597](https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/3e04597dc54e36bfc85c21996f7d8d9d224e9826) the first statement was `let (agent, ok) = agent.confirm(key.clone()).await;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`try_sign` was checked in the published crates on crates.io:
- Every russh release from 0.50.0-beta.12 to 0.64.1 (52 versions) has the hard-coded `true`.
- russh 0.50.0-beta.8 to be…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-vp5q-ff62-jwqv</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:93904 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs Security Update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:93904</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;russh: russh: Denial of Service via resource exhaustion in SSH agent russh: russh: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory consumption in SSH agent russh: russh: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in extension handling russh: russh: Denial of service via zero maximum packet size russh: russh: Unauthorized key signing via SSH agent confirmation bypass&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;russh: russh: Denial of Service via resource exhaustion in SSH agent russh: russh: Denial of Service via uncontrolled memory consumption in SSH agent russh: russh: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in extension handling russh: russh: Denial of service via zero maximum packet size russh: russh: Unauthorized key signing via SSH agent confirmation bypass&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:93904</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0495 — Agent server signs with confirm-constrained keys without calling `Agent::confirm`</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0495</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A key added to an SSH agent with the confirm constraint (what `ssh-add -c` sends) must not be used to sign until the user approves each use. russh&amp;#39;s agent server (`russh::keys::agent::server`) accepted the constraint, but when a sign request arrived for such a key it used a fixed `true` in place of the result of `Agent::confirm`, so the application&amp;#39;s confirmation step never ran. This started in 0.50.0-beta.12; 0.50.0-beta.8 to beta.11 still called `confirm`, and earlier russh releases have no agent server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any process that can reach the agent, including a remote host when the agent is forwarded, can then sign with the protected key without the user&amp;#39;s approval, for example to log in elsewhere as the user. The private key itself is not disclosed. Agents whose `Agent::confirm` keeps the default, which always returns `true`, behave the same before and after the fix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From 0.65.0 the agent server calls `Agent::confirm` for confirm-constrained keys and refuses to sign when it returns `false`. Implementations that left `confirm` unimplemented (for example as `todo!()`) will now reach that code.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A key added to an SSH agent with the confirm constraint (what `ssh-add -c` sends) must not be used to sign until the user approves each use. russh&amp;#39;s agent server (`russh::keys::agent::server`) accepted the constraint, but when a sign request arrived for such a key it used a fixed `true` in place of the result of `Agent::confirm`, so the application&amp;#39;s confirmation step never ran. This started in 0.50.0-beta.12; 0.50.0-beta.8 to beta.11 still called `confirm`, and earlier russh releases have no agent server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any process that can reach the agent, including a remote host when the agent is forwarded, can then sign with the protected key without the user&amp;#39;s approval, for example to log in elsewhere as the user. The private key itself is not disclosed. Agents whose `Agent::confirm` keeps the default, which always returns `true`, behave the same before and after the fix.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;From 0.65.0 the agent server calls `Agent::confirm` for confirm-constrained keys and refuses to sign when it returns `false`. Implementations that left `confirm` unimplemented (for example as `todo!()`) will now reach that code.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0495</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-116794</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-116794</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.10: rust-russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server&amp;#39;s Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.10: rust-russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server&amp;#39;s Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. In applications that override Agent::confirm to require user approval or another policy check, a process that can reach the agent socket, including the remote side of a forwarded agent, can use a key added through ssh-add -c without that check and can authenticate or sign data as the user while the key remains loaded. The separate Agent::confirm_request hook still runs for every signing request, so checks implemented there remain effective, and implementations that retain the default always-successful Agent::confirm do not lose an approval check through this regression. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-116794</guid>
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