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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 21:47:03 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-392482</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392482</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-392482</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-392482</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-115910</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115910</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Python Social Auth is a social authentication and registration mechanism. Prior to 6.2.0, OpenIdConnectAuth in social_core/backends/open_id_connect.py uses get_and_store_nonce to place the OpenID Connect nonce in a shared OpenIdConnectAssociation table, and get_nonce and validate_claims verify only that the nonce exists and has not expired rather than binding it to the browser session and OAuth state that initiated the login. An attacker who obtains a victim&amp;#39;s unused authorization code can start a separate login to obtain valid state for the attacker&amp;#39;s browser, submit the victim&amp;#39;s code with that state, and pass nonce validation because the victim nonce is globally available. With DEFAULT_USE_PKCE disabled in the default OpenIdConnectAuth configuration, the attacker can be logged in as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Python Social Auth is a social authentication and registration mechanism. Prior to 6.2.0, OpenIdConnectAuth in social_core/backends/open_id_connect.py uses get_and_store_nonce to place the OpenID Connect nonce in a shared OpenIdConnectAssociation table, and get_nonce and validate_claims verify only that the nonce exists and has not expired rather than binding it to the browser session and OAuth state that initiated the login. An attacker who obtains a victim&amp;#39;s unused authorization code can start a separate login to obtain valid state for the attacker&amp;#39;s browser, submit the victim&amp;#39;s code with that state, and pass nonce validation because the victim nonce is globally available. With DEFAULT_USE_PKCE disabled in the default OpenIdConnectAuth configuration, the attacker can be logged in as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115910</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-h2r5-x5m7-3935 — Python Social Auth: OpenID Connect nonce is not bound to the browser session, so a stolen authorization code logs the a…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h2r5-x5m7-3935</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: social-auth-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The generic OpenID Connect backend (`OpenIdConnectAuth` and every backend built on it) stores the `nonce` in the shared Association table, not in the user&amp;#39;s session. When the ID token comes back, `validate_claims` only checks that the nonce exists in that table and is not expired. It does not check that the nonce was issued to the browser that is finishing the login.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So the nonce does not do its job. OIDC Core (section 15.5.2) and RFC 9700 (section 4.5) use the nonce to stop authorization code injection: an attacker who gets hold of a victim&amp;#39;s unused authorization code should not be able to redeem it in the attacker&amp;#39;s own browser. With social-auth-core, the attacker can. They start their own login to get a valid `state` for their session, then hit the callback with the victim&amp;#39;s `code` and their own `state`. `state` passes because it belongs to the attacker&amp;#39;s session, and the nonce in the victim&amp;#39;s ID token passes because it is in the global table. The attacker&amp;#39;s browser is now logged in as the victim.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PKCE would block this, but `OpenIdConnectAuth` sets `DEFAULT_USE_PKCE = False` (the OAuth2 base class defaults to `True`), so the nonce is the only binding in the default setup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Tested versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;social-auth-core 6.1.1 (latest), 6.1.0 and 5.2.0, with social-auth-app-django 7.1.0 and Django 6.1.2, Python 3.14. The same code is on master (098ef399c1).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`social_core/backends/open_id_connect.py` in 6.1.1:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- line 252: `auth_params` calls `get_and_stor…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: social-auth-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The generic OpenID Connect backend (`OpenIdConnectAuth` and every backend built on it) stores the `nonce` in the shared Association table, not in the user&amp;#39;s session. When the ID token comes back, `validate_claims` only checks that the nonce exists in that table and is not expired. It does not check that the nonce was issued to the browser that is finishing the login.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So the nonce does not do its job. OIDC Core (section 15.5.2) and RFC 9700 (section 4.5) use the nonce to stop authorization code injection: an attacker who gets hold of a victim&amp;#39;s unused authorization code should not be able to redeem it in the attacker&amp;#39;s own browser. With social-auth-core, the attacker can. They start their own login to get a valid `state` for their session, then hit the callback with the victim&amp;#39;s `code` and their own `state`. `state` passes because it belongs to the attacker&amp;#39;s session, and the nonce in the victim&amp;#39;s ID token passes because it is in the global table. The attacker&amp;#39;s browser is now logged in as the victim.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PKCE would block this, but `OpenIdConnectAuth` sets `DEFAULT_USE_PKCE = False` (the OAuth2 base class defaults to `True`), so the nonce is the only binding in the default setup.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Tested versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;social-auth-core 6.1.1 (latest), 6.1.0 and 5.2.0, with social-auth-app-django 7.1.0 and Django 6.1.2, Python 3.14. The same code is on master (098ef399c1).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`social_core/backends/open_id_connect.py` in 6.1.1:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- line 252: `auth_params` calls `get_and_stor…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-h2r5-x5m7-3935</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-115910</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-115910</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: social-auth-core, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: social-auth-core, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: social-auth-core, Ubuntu:26.10: social-auth-core, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: social-auth-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Python Social Auth is a social authentication and registration mechanism. Prior to 6.2.0, OpenIdConnectAuth in social_core/backends/open_id_connect.py uses get_and_store_nonce to place the OpenID Connect nonce in a shared OpenIdConnectAssociation table, and get_nonce and validate_claims verify only that the nonce exists and has not expired rather than binding it to the browser session and OAuth state that initiated the login. An attacker who obtains a victim&amp;#39;s unused authorization code can start a separate login to obtain valid state for the attacker&amp;#39;s browser, submit the victim&amp;#39;s code with that state, and pass nonce validation because the victim nonce is globally available. With DEFAULT_USE_PKCE disabled in the default OpenIdConnectAuth configuration, the attacker can be logged in as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: social-auth-core, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: social-auth-core, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: social-auth-core, Ubuntu:26.10: social-auth-core, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: social-auth-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Python Social Auth is a social authentication and registration mechanism. Prior to 6.2.0, OpenIdConnectAuth in social_core/backends/open_id_connect.py uses get_and_store_nonce to place the OpenID Connect nonce in a shared OpenIdConnectAssociation table, and get_nonce and validate_claims verify only that the nonce exists and has not expired rather than binding it to the browser session and OAuth state that initiated the login. An attacker who obtains a victim&amp;#39;s unused authorization code can start a separate login to obtain valid state for the attacker&amp;#39;s browser, submit the victim&amp;#39;s code with that state, and pass nonce validation because the victim nonce is globally available. With DEFAULT_USE_PKCE disabled in the default OpenIdConnectAuth configuration, the attacker can be logged in as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-115910</guid>
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