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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 19:30:11 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-aider-CVE-2026-114145 — GitPython validates a submodule's ".git" path only after cloning into it (RCE)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-114145</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: aider&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`create_submodule(name, path, url)` clones a submodule into the repo&amp;#39;s own `.git`
directory before it rejects the path. A `path` of &amp;#34;.git/hooks&amp;#34; is accepted by the
pre-clone check, so the submodule is cloned straight into the live hooks directory,
and a file named `post-checkout` in the submodule becomes an executable
`.git/hooks/post-checkout`. On 3.2.0+ the later index check does raise `ValueError`,
but only after the clone already wrote to disk, and it does not remove the planted
hook; on 3.1.x there is no such check and the call succeeds silently. Either way the
hook runs on the next git operation (e.g. checkout), giving code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The checkout path is validated too late, after the clone has already mutated disk.
This breaks the &amp;#34;validate before mutation&amp;#34; invariant that commit 43a43cd8 (&amp;#34;Validate
submodule checkout and metadata paths before mutation&amp;#34;) set out to enforce.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Submodule.add() calls the permissive path check before cloning, and the strict check
only reaches the &amp;#34;.git&amp;#34; alias at index time, after _clone_repo has written to disk:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;git/objects/submodule/base.py (Submodule.add)
  599: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)           # accepts &amp;#34;.git/hooks&amp;#34;
  673: mrepo = cls._clone_repo(repo, url, path, name, ...) # clones into &amp;lt;worktree&amp;gt;/.git/hooks
  714: index.add([sm], write=True)                         # strict check only triggers here&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;git/index/base.py (IndexFile._preprocess_add_items)
  732: _validate_repo_path(entry.path)…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: aider&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`create_submodule(name, path, url)` clones a submodule into the repo&amp;#39;s own `.git`
directory before it rejects the path. A `path` of &amp;#34;.git/hooks&amp;#34; is accepted by the
pre-clone check, so the submodule is cloned straight into the live hooks directory,
and a file named `post-checkout` in the submodule becomes an executable
`.git/hooks/post-checkout`. On 3.2.0+ the later index check does raise `ValueError`,
but only after the clone already wrote to disk, and it does not remove the planted
hook; on 3.1.x there is no such check and the call succeeds silently. Either way the
hook runs on the next git operation (e.g. checkout), giving code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The checkout path is validated too late, after the clone has already mutated disk.
This breaks the &amp;#34;validate before mutation&amp;#34; invariant that commit 43a43cd8 (&amp;#34;Validate
submodule checkout and metadata paths before mutation&amp;#34;) set out to enforce.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Submodule.add() calls the permissive path check before cloning, and the strict check
only reaches the &amp;#34;.git&amp;#34; alias at index time, after _clone_repo has written to disk:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;git/objects/submodule/base.py (Submodule.add)
  599: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)           # accepts &amp;#34;.git/hooks&amp;#34;
  673: mrepo = cls._clone_repo(repo, url, path, name, ...) # clones into &amp;lt;worktree&amp;gt;/.git/hooks
  714: index.add([sm], write=True)                         # strict check only triggers here&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;git/index/base.py (IndexFile._preprocess_add_items)
  732: _validate_repo_path(entry.path)…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-114145</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-391648</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-391648</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-391648</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-391648</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-114145</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-114145</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to 3.2.1, create_submodule() in git/objects/submodule/base.py accepts an attacker-influenced submodule path such as .git/hooks and invokes _clone_repo() before safely rejecting the destination. In 3.1.x, _validate_repo_path() does not exist and the call succeeds silently, while in 3.2.0 and later affected revisions the check in git/index/base.py raises ValueError only after the clone has written to disk and does not remove the planted file. An attacker-controlled submodule can therefore place an executable post-checkout hook that a later Git operation executes. Exploitation requires an application to accept an untrusted submodule path and a clone destination such as .git/hooks that is empty enough for Git to clone into it, which commonly means that default sample hooks are absent. This issue is fixed in version 3.2.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to 3.2.1, create_submodule() in git/objects/submodule/base.py accepts an attacker-influenced submodule path such as .git/hooks and invokes _clone_repo() before safely rejecting the destination. In 3.1.x, _validate_repo_path() does not exist and the call succeeds silently, while in 3.2.0 and later affected revisions the check in git/index/base.py raises ValueError only after the clone has written to disk and does not remove the planted file. An attacker-controlled submodule can therefore place an executable post-checkout hook that a later Git operation executes. Exploitation requires an application to accept an untrusted submodule path and a clone destination such as .git/hooks that is empty enough for Git to clone into it, which commonly means that default sample hooks are absent. This issue is fixed in version 3.2.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-114145</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-83vg-56qc-22m7 — GitPython validates a submodule's ".git" path only after cloning into it (RCE)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-83vg-56qc-22m7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: Gitpython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`create_submodule(name, path, url)` clones a submodule into the repo&amp;#39;s own `.git`
directory before it rejects the path. A `path` of &amp;#34;.git/hooks&amp;#34; is accepted by the
pre-clone check, so the submodule is cloned straight into the live hooks directory,
and a file named `post-checkout` in the submodule becomes an executable
`.git/hooks/post-checkout`. On 3.2.0+ the later index check does raise `ValueError`,
but only after the clone already wrote to disk, and it does not remove the planted
hook; on 3.1.x there is no such check and the call succeeds silently. Either way the
hook runs on the next git operation (e.g. checkout), giving code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The checkout path is validated too late, after the clone has already mutated disk.
This breaks the &amp;#34;validate before mutation&amp;#34; invariant that commit 43a43cd8 (&amp;#34;Validate
submodule checkout and metadata paths before mutation&amp;#34;) set out to enforce.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Submodule.add() calls the permissive path check before cloning, and the strict check
only reaches the &amp;#34;.git&amp;#34; alias at index time, after _clone_repo has written to disk:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;git/objects/submodule/base.py (Submodule.add)
  599: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)           # accepts &amp;#34;.git/hooks&amp;#34;
  673: mrepo = cls._clone_repo(repo, url, path, name, ...) # clones into &amp;lt;worktree&amp;gt;/.git/hooks
  714: index.add([sm], write=True)                         # strict check only triggers here&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;git/index/base.py (IndexFile._preprocess_add_items)
  732: _validate_repo_path(entry.path)…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: Gitpython&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`create_submodule(name, path, url)` clones a submodule into the repo&amp;#39;s own `.git`
directory before it rejects the path. A `path` of &amp;#34;.git/hooks&amp;#34; is accepted by the
pre-clone check, so the submodule is cloned straight into the live hooks directory,
and a file named `post-checkout` in the submodule becomes an executable
`.git/hooks/post-checkout`. On 3.2.0+ the later index check does raise `ValueError`,
but only after the clone already wrote to disk, and it does not remove the planted
hook; on 3.1.x there is no such check and the call succeeds silently. Either way the
hook runs on the next git operation (e.g. checkout), giving code execution.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The checkout path is validated too late, after the clone has already mutated disk.
This breaks the &amp;#34;validate before mutation&amp;#34; invariant that commit 43a43cd8 (&amp;#34;Validate
submodule checkout and metadata paths before mutation&amp;#34;) set out to enforce.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Submodule.add() calls the permissive path check before cloning, and the strict check
only reaches the &amp;#34;.git&amp;#34; alias at index time, after _clone_repo has written to disk:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;git/objects/submodule/base.py (Submodule.add)
  599: path = cls._to_relative_path(repo, path)           # accepts &amp;#34;.git/hooks&amp;#34;
  673: mrepo = cls._clone_repo(repo, url, path, name, ...) # clones into &amp;lt;worktree&amp;gt;/.git/hooks
  714: index.add([sm], write=True)                         # strict check only triggers here&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;git/index/base.py (IndexFile._preprocess_add_items)
  732: _validate_repo_path(entry.path)…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-83vg-56qc-22m7</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:92510 — Red Hat Security Advisory: RHOAI 3.4.6 - Red Hat OpenShift AI</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:92510</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 RHOAI MaaS: llm-d: MaaS/llm-d inference Gateway: default allowedRoutes.namespaces.from: All allows namespace users to hijack shared model-serving traffic (tokens, prompts, outputs) fast-uri: Fast-uri: Security policy bypass due to URL parsing inconsistency github.com/moby/go-archive: moby/go-archive: Arbitrary file write via link following in tar extraction fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion vulnerability via backslash in URI authority golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution via Cross-Site Scripting cryptography: cryptography Subgroup Attack Due to Missing Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves golang.org/x/net/html: golang: golang.org/x/net/html: Cross-Site Scripting via HTML parsing bypass net/http/internal/http2: golang: golang.org/x/net: Go HTTP/2: Denial of Service via malformed SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE frame encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: golang: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Denial of Service due to integer overflow in SSH channel write github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/baggage: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/propagation: OpenTelemetry-Go:…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 RHOAI MaaS: llm-d: MaaS/llm-d inference Gateway: default allowedRoutes.namespaces.from: All allows namespace users to hijack shared model-serving traffic (tokens, prompts, outputs) fast-uri: Fast-uri: Security policy bypass due to URL parsing inconsistency github.com/moby/go-archive: moby/go-archive: Arbitrary file write via link following in tar extraction fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion vulnerability via backslash in URI authority golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution via Cross-Site Scripting cryptography: cryptography Subgroup Attack Due to Missing Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves golang.org/x/net/html: golang: golang.org/x/net/html: Cross-Site Scripting via HTML parsing bypass net/http/internal/http2: golang: golang.org/x/net: Go HTTP/2: Denial of Service via malformed SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE frame encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: golang: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Denial of Service due to integer overflow in SSH channel write github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/baggage: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/propagation: OpenTelemetry-Go:…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:92510</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-114145</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-114145</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:26.10: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: python-git&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to 3.2.1, create_submodule() in git/objects/submodule/base.py accepts an attacker-influenced submodule path such as .git/hooks and invokes _clone_repo() before safely rejecting the destination. In 3.1.x, _validate_repo_path() does not exist and the call succeeds silently, while in 3.2.0 and later affected revisions the check in git/index/base.py raises ValueError only after the clone has written to disk and does not remove the planted file. An attacker-controlled submodule can therefore place an executable post-checkout hook that a later Git operation executes. Exploitation requires an application to accept an untrusted submodule path and a clone destination such as .git/hooks that is empty enough for Git to clone into it, which commonly means that default sample hooks are absent. This issue is fixed in version 3.2.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: python-git, Ubuntu:26.10: python-git, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: python-git&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;GitPython is a python library used to interact with Git repositories. Prior to 3.2.1, create_submodule() in git/objects/submodule/base.py accepts an attacker-influenced submodule path such as .git/hooks and invokes _clone_repo() before safely rejecting the destination. In 3.1.x, _validate_repo_path() does not exist and the call succeeds silently, while in 3.2.0 and later affected revisions the check in git/index/base.py raises ValueError only after the clone has written to disk and does not remove the planted file. An attacker-controlled submodule can therefore place an executable post-checkout hook that a later Git operation executes. Exploitation requires an application to accept an untrusted submodule path and a clone destination such as .git/hooks that is empty enough for Git to clone into it, which commonly means that default sample hooks are absent. This issue is fixed in version 3.2.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-114145</guid>
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