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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 21:21:15 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1486 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans les produits VMware. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoquer…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1486</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1486</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1486</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-394572</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-394572</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-394572</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-394572</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-114138</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-114138</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Django REST framework is a toolkit for building Web APIs. Prior to 3.18.2, DefaultContentNegotiation.get_accept_list in rest_framework/negotiation.py accepts an unbounded number and aggregate size of Accept tokens, while select_renderer in that file repeatedly invokes _MediaType parsing from rest_framework/utils/mediatypes.py for each attacker-controlled token, every renderer, and forced 406 renegotiation. A remote unauthenticated client can send many distinct media types containing large quoted parameter values with numerous semicolons, causing Django&amp;#39;s parameter parser and DRF&amp;#39;s repeated parsing structure to consume disproportionate CPU. Requests to any reachable endpoint can pin synchronous workers for prolonged periods, and concurrent requests can make the service unavailable until the requests stop. This issue is fixed in version 3.18.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Django REST framework is a toolkit for building Web APIs. Prior to 3.18.2, DefaultContentNegotiation.get_accept_list in rest_framework/negotiation.py accepts an unbounded number and aggregate size of Accept tokens, while select_renderer in that file repeatedly invokes _MediaType parsing from rest_framework/utils/mediatypes.py for each attacker-controlled token, every renderer, and forced 406 renegotiation. A remote unauthenticated client can send many distinct media types containing large quoted parameter values with numerous semicolons, causing Django&amp;#39;s parameter parser and DRF&amp;#39;s repeated parsing structure to consume disproportionate CPU. Requests to any reachable endpoint can pin synchronous workers for prolonged periods, and concurrent requests can make the service unavailable until the requests stop. This issue is fixed in version 3.18.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-114138</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-33wh-fxxf-88vv — Django REST framework: Accept header with many large quoted parameters burns ~19s of CPU per request in content negotia…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-33wh-fxxf-88vv</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: djangorestframework&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DRF&amp;#39;s content negotiation parses each Accept token several times per request and never limits the number of tokens or their total size. Each parse ends up in Django&amp;#39;s parse_header_parameters, which takes quadratic time when a quoted parameter value is packed with semicolons. On my machine a single GET with a 780KB Accept header made of 96 such tokens kept one gunicorn worker busy for 18.87 seconds (Django 6.1, djangorestframework 3.18.0, gunicorn 26.0.0, Python 3.13, Docker on macOS). The header is syntactically valid, fits inside gunicorn&amp;#39;s default header limits, and needs no authentication. Two concurrent requests, which is one per sync worker, made a default two worker deployment stop answering for my whole 40 second test window. It recovered half a second after I stopped sending.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### What happens&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;get_accept_list() splits the Accept header on commas with no cap on token count or total size, at rest_framework/negotiation.py:96-97.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For every token, select_renderer() calls media_type_matches() once per renderer, and each call builds fresh _MediaType objects for both sides, at rest_framework/negotiation.py:53-56 and rest_framework/utils/mediatypes.py:22-23. `_MediaType.__init__` calls django.utils.http.parse_header_parameters unconditionally, at rest_framework/utils/mediatypes.py:47.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When nothing matches, DRF raises NotAcceptable (406). Rendering that error response also needs a renderer, so finalize_response() runs the entire negotiation a sec…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: djangorestframework&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DRF&amp;#39;s content negotiation parses each Accept token several times per request and never limits the number of tokens or their total size. Each parse ends up in Django&amp;#39;s parse_header_parameters, which takes quadratic time when a quoted parameter value is packed with semicolons. On my machine a single GET with a 780KB Accept header made of 96 such tokens kept one gunicorn worker busy for 18.87 seconds (Django 6.1, djangorestframework 3.18.0, gunicorn 26.0.0, Python 3.13, Docker on macOS). The header is syntactically valid, fits inside gunicorn&amp;#39;s default header limits, and needs no authentication. Two concurrent requests, which is one per sync worker, made a default two worker deployment stop answering for my whole 40 second test window. It recovered half a second after I stopped sending.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;#### What happens&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;get_accept_list() splits the Accept header on commas with no cap on token count or total size, at rest_framework/negotiation.py:96-97.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For every token, select_renderer() calls media_type_matches() once per renderer, and each call builds fresh _MediaType objects for both sides, at rest_framework/negotiation.py:53-56 and rest_framework/utils/mediatypes.py:22-23. `_MediaType.__init__` calls django.utils.http.parse_header_parameters unconditionally, at rest_framework/utils/mediatypes.py:47.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When nothing matches, DRF raises NotAcceptable (406). Rendering that error response also needs a renderer, so finalize_response() runs the entire negotiation a sec…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-33wh-fxxf-88vv</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:94802 — Red Hat Security Advisory: A Subscription Management tool for finding and reporting Red Hat product usage</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:94802</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;libcurl: libcurl: Security feature bypass due to improper mTLS connection reuse python: python: Arbitrary file deletion via race condition during temporary directory cleanup python: Use-after-free of a server-side SSLContext when sni_callback switches contexts python: python: Certificate verification bypass via missing server_hostname validation in SSLContext.wrap_bio() xz: XZ Utils: Denial of Service via buffer overflow in index decoding openssh: OpenSSH: SFTP security bypass due to command-line argument parsing flaw openssh: OpenSSH: Undocumented GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck behavior impacts security in Windows Active Directory openssh: OpenSSH: Denial of Service via excessive GSSAPI authentication attempts expat: expat: Information disclosure via heap buffer over-read in XML_ParseBuffer libX11: libX11: Heap-based buffer overflow via malicious X server urllib3: urllib3: Traffic interception via HTTPS proxy TLS configuration override urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in chunk parser expat: expat: Denial of Service via integer overflow in expat_realloc brotli: Out-of-Bounds Write in Google Brotli Decoder djangorestframework: djangorestframework: Denial of Service via improper charset handling in JSON parser djangorestframework: djangorestframework: Unauthorized access via improper token revocation in TokenProxy djangorestframework: djangorestframework: Denial of Service via unbounded Accept header parsing ca-certificates: Distrust eMudhra inter…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;libcurl: libcurl: Security feature bypass due to improper mTLS connection reuse python: python: Arbitrary file deletion via race condition during temporary directory cleanup python: Use-after-free of a server-side SSLContext when sni_callback switches contexts python: python: Certificate verification bypass via missing server_hostname validation in SSLContext.wrap_bio() xz: XZ Utils: Denial of Service via buffer overflow in index decoding openssh: OpenSSH: SFTP security bypass due to command-line argument parsing flaw openssh: OpenSSH: Undocumented GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck behavior impacts security in Windows Active Directory openssh: OpenSSH: Denial of Service via excessive GSSAPI authentication attempts expat: expat: Information disclosure via heap buffer over-read in XML_ParseBuffer libX11: libX11: Heap-based buffer overflow via malicious X server urllib3: urllib3: Traffic interception via HTTPS proxy TLS configuration override urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in chunk parser expat: expat: Denial of Service via integer overflow in expat_realloc brotli: Out-of-Bounds Write in Google Brotli Decoder djangorestframework: djangorestframework: Denial of Service via improper charset handling in JSON parser djangorestframework: djangorestframework: Unauthorized access via improper token revocation in TokenProxy djangorestframework: djangorestframework: Denial of Service via unbounded Accept header parsing ca-certificates: Distrust eMudhra inter…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:94802</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-114138</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-114138</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: djangorestframework, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: djangorestframework, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: djangorestframework, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: djangorestframework, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: djangorestframework, Ubuntu:26.10: djangorestframework, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: djangorestframework&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Django REST framework is a toolkit for building Web APIs. Prior to 3.18.2, DefaultContentNegotiation.get_accept_list in rest_framework/negotiation.py accepts an unbounded number and aggregate size of Accept tokens, while select_renderer in that file repeatedly invokes _MediaType parsing from rest_framework/utils/mediatypes.py for each attacker-controlled token, every renderer, and forced 406 renegotiation. A remote unauthenticated client can send many distinct media types containing large quoted parameter values with numerous semicolons, causing Django&amp;#39;s parameter parser and DRF&amp;#39;s repeated parsing structure to consume disproportionate CPU. Requests to any reachable endpoint can pin synchronous workers for prolonged periods, and concurrent requests can make the service unavailable until the requests stop. This issue is fixed in version 3.18.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: djangorestframework, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: djangorestframework, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: djangorestframework, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: djangorestframework, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: djangorestframework, Ubuntu:26.10: djangorestframework, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: djangorestframework&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Django REST framework is a toolkit for building Web APIs. Prior to 3.18.2, DefaultContentNegotiation.get_accept_list in rest_framework/negotiation.py accepts an unbounded number and aggregate size of Accept tokens, while select_renderer in that file repeatedly invokes _MediaType parsing from rest_framework/utils/mediatypes.py for each attacker-controlled token, every renderer, and forced 406 renegotiation. A remote unauthenticated client can send many distinct media types containing large quoted parameter values with numerous semicolons, causing Django&amp;#39;s parameter parser and DRF&amp;#39;s repeated parsing structure to consume disproportionate CPU. Requests to any reachable endpoint can pin synchronous workers for prolonged periods, and concurrent requests can make the service unavailable until the requests stop. This issue is fixed in version 3.18.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-114138</guid>
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