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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 19:27:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BIT-virtualenv-2026-113776 — virtualenv activation scripts run code from a path that contains a placeholder name</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-virtualenv-2026-113776</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. From 20.26.6 until 21.14.2, ViaTemplateActivator.instantiate_template() replaces placeholders one key at a time across the complete activation template, so trigger names such as __VIRTUAL_NAME__, __VIRTUAL_ENV__, or __VIRTUAL_PROMPT__ inside an already substituted and quoted environment path or prompt can be replaced during a later pass. The later value&amp;#39;s quoting can close the earlier literal and execute the remaining path when a user activates the environment through bash, fish, xonsh, or activate_this.py. The distinct csh prompt-display token __VIRTUAL_PROMPT_DISPLAY_TCSH__ can instead break the generated script without establishing command execution. The attacker must influence the destination path or --prompt, and a value without a relevant placeholder name does not trigger this mechanism. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. From 20.26.6 until 21.14.2, ViaTemplateActivator.instantiate_template() replaces placeholders one key at a time across the complete activation template, so trigger names such as __VIRTUAL_NAME__, __VIRTUAL_ENV__, or __VIRTUAL_PROMPT__ inside an already substituted and quoted environment path or prompt can be replaced during a later pass. The later value&amp;#39;s quoting can close the earlier literal and execute the remaining path when a user activates the environment through bash, fish, xonsh, or activate_this.py. The distinct csh prompt-display token __VIRTUAL_PROMPT_DISPLAY_TCSH__ can instead break the generated script without establishing command execution. The attacker must influence the destination path or --prompt, and a value without a relevant placeholder name does not trigger this mechanism. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-virtualenv-2026-113776</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-charm-tools-CVE-2026-113776 — virtualenv activation scripts run code from a path that contains a placeholder name</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-charm-tools-cve-2026-113776</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: charm-tools&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ViaTemplateActivator.instantiate_template` replaces the placeholders in an activation template one key at a time, each across the whole text. When a value that it already substituted and quoted contains the name of a later placeholder, the later pass rewrites that name inside the quoted literal. The inserted value brings its own quotes, which close the outer literal, and the rest of the path runs as code when a user activates the environment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`__VIRTUAL_NAME__` holds the environment&amp;#39;s directory name, so a destination such as `A__VIRTUAL_NAME__B/x&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;y` is enough. In the default `activate` for bash, the `VIRTUAL_ENV` line renders as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```sh
VIRTUAL_ENV=&amp;#39;/tmp/t/A&amp;#39;x&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;y&amp;#39;B/x&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;y&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sourcing that script runs `touch PWNED`. The same payload in a path without the placeholder name runs nothing. `activate.fish` runs the command the same way, and the reporter also showed Python code execution through `activate.xsh` and `bin/activate_this.py`. In `activate.csh`, a directory named after a prompt display placeholder, such as `__VIRTUAL_PROMPT_DISPLAY_TCSH__`, breaks the script with `Unmatched &amp;#39;&amp;#39;&amp;#39;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No change to `quote()` can stop this, because the rewrite happens after `quote()` ran; it defeats `shlex.quote` and `repr()` alike.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker needs to influence the destination path or `--prompt`: a CI job or wrapper tool that builds the path from a branch or project name, or a directory in a cloned repository or unpack…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: charm-tools&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ViaTemplateActivator.instantiate_template` replaces the placeholders in an activation template one key at a time, each across the whole text. When a value that it already substituted and quoted contains the name of a later placeholder, the later pass rewrites that name inside the quoted literal. The inserted value brings its own quotes, which close the outer literal, and the rest of the path runs as code when a user activates the environment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`__VIRTUAL_NAME__` holds the environment&amp;#39;s directory name, so a destination such as `A__VIRTUAL_NAME__B/x&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;y` is enough. In the default `activate` for bash, the `VIRTUAL_ENV` line renders as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```sh
VIRTUAL_ENV=&amp;#39;/tmp/t/A&amp;#39;x&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;y&amp;#39;B/x&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;y&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sourcing that script runs `touch PWNED`. The same payload in a path without the placeholder name runs nothing. `activate.fish` runs the command the same way, and the reporter also showed Python code execution through `activate.xsh` and `bin/activate_this.py`. In `activate.csh`, a directory named after a prompt display placeholder, such as `__VIRTUAL_PROMPT_DISPLAY_TCSH__`, breaks the script with `Unmatched &amp;#39;&amp;#39;&amp;#39;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No change to `quote()` can stop this, because the rewrite happens after `quote()` ran; it defeats `shlex.quote` and `repr()` alike.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker needs to influence the destination path or `--prompt`: a CI job or wrapper tool that builds the path from a branch or project name, or a directory in a cloned repository or unpack…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-charm-tools-cve-2026-113776</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-394213</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-394213</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-394213</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-394213</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-113776</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-113776</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. From 20.26.6 until 21.14.2, ViaTemplateActivator.instantiate_template() replaces placeholders one key at a time across the complete activation template, so trigger names such as __VIRTUAL_NAME__, __VIRTUAL_ENV__, or __VIRTUAL_PROMPT__ inside an already substituted and quoted environment path or prompt can be replaced during a later pass. The later value&amp;#39;s quoting can close the earlier literal and execute the remaining path when a user activates the environment through bash, fish, xonsh, or activate_this.py. The distinct csh prompt-display token __VIRTUAL_PROMPT_DISPLAY_TCSH__ can instead break the generated script without establishing command execution. The attacker must influence the destination path or --prompt, and a value without a relevant placeholder name does not trigger this mechanism. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. From 20.26.6 until 21.14.2, ViaTemplateActivator.instantiate_template() replaces placeholders one key at a time across the complete activation template, so trigger names such as __VIRTUAL_NAME__, __VIRTUAL_ENV__, or __VIRTUAL_PROMPT__ inside an already substituted and quoted environment path or prompt can be replaced during a later pass. The later value&amp;#39;s quoting can close the earlier literal and execute the remaining path when a user activates the environment through bash, fish, xonsh, or activate_this.py. The distinct csh prompt-display token __VIRTUAL_PROMPT_DISPLAY_TCSH__ can instead break the generated script without establishing command execution. The attacker must influence the destination path or --prompt, and a value without a relevant placeholder name does not trigger this mechanism. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-113776</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8rjx-v5ww-45pp — virtualenv activation scripts run code from a path that contains a placeholder name</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8rjx-v5ww-45pp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ViaTemplateActivator.instantiate_template` replaces the placeholders in an activation template one key at a time, each across the whole text. When a value that it already substituted and quoted contains the name of a later placeholder, the later pass rewrites that name inside the quoted literal. The inserted value brings its own quotes, which close the outer literal, and the rest of the path runs as code when a user activates the environment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`__VIRTUAL_NAME__` holds the environment&amp;#39;s directory name, so a destination such as `A__VIRTUAL_NAME__B/x&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;y` is enough. In the default `activate` for bash, the `VIRTUAL_ENV` line renders as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```sh
VIRTUAL_ENV=&amp;#39;/tmp/t/A&amp;#39;x&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;y&amp;#39;B/x&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;y&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sourcing that script runs `touch PWNED`. The same payload in a path without the placeholder name runs nothing. `activate.fish` runs the command the same way, and the reporter also showed Python code execution through `activate.xsh` and `bin/activate_this.py`. In `activate.csh`, a directory named after a prompt display placeholder, such as `__VIRTUAL_PROMPT_DISPLAY_TCSH__`, breaks the script with `Unmatched &amp;#39;&amp;#39;&amp;#39;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No change to `quote()` can stop this, because the rewrite happens after `quote()` ran; it defeats `shlex.quote` and `repr()` alike.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker needs to influence the destination path or `--prompt`: a CI job or wrapper tool that builds the path from a branch or project name, or a directory in a cloned repository or unpack…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`ViaTemplateActivator.instantiate_template` replaces the placeholders in an activation template one key at a time, each across the whole text. When a value that it already substituted and quoted contains the name of a later placeholder, the later pass rewrites that name inside the quoted literal. The inserted value brings its own quotes, which close the outer literal, and the rest of the path runs as code when a user activates the environment.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`__VIRTUAL_NAME__` holds the environment&amp;#39;s directory name, so a destination such as `A__VIRTUAL_NAME__B/x&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;y` is enough. In the default `activate` for bash, the `VIRTUAL_ENV` line renders as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```sh
VIRTUAL_ENV=&amp;#39;/tmp/t/A&amp;#39;x&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;y&amp;#39;B/x&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;$(touch PWNED)&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;&amp;#34;&amp;#39;y&amp;#39;
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sourcing that script runs `touch PWNED`. The same payload in a path without the placeholder name runs nothing. `activate.fish` runs the command the same way, and the reporter also showed Python code execution through `activate.xsh` and `bin/activate_this.py`. In `activate.csh`, a directory named after a prompt display placeholder, such as `__VIRTUAL_PROMPT_DISPLAY_TCSH__`, breaks the script with `Unmatched &amp;#39;&amp;#39;&amp;#39;`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No change to `quote()` can stop this, because the rewrite happens after `quote()` ran; it defeats `shlex.quote` and `repr()` alike.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An attacker needs to influence the destination path or `--prompt`: a CI job or wrapper tool that builds the path from a branch or project name, or a directory in a cloned repository or unpack…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8rjx-v5ww-45pp</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:95659 — Red Hat Security Advisory: General availability of the satellite/iop-yuptoo-rhel9 container image</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:95659</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;confluent-kafka: confluent-kafka: Information disclosure via improper TLS certificate validation in HashiCorp Vault integration virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via crafted paths in activation scripts virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via unverified downloaded seed wheels virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via unescaped prompt in Windows activation script virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via configuration injection in prompt values virtualenv: virtualenv: arbitrary code execution via improper quoting in xonsh activation scripts virtualenv: virtualenv: arbitrary code execution via improperly quoted interpreter paths in script launchers virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via malicious prompt text virtualenv: virtualenv: arbitrary code execution via crafted environment name virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary command execution via unescaped prompt variables in zsh virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via improperly quoted Fish activation scripts virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary command execution via sequential placeholder substitution in activation templates virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via unescaped prompt in bash activation script&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;confluent-kafka: confluent-kafka: Information disclosure via improper TLS certificate validation in HashiCorp Vault integration virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via crafted paths in activation scripts virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via unverified downloaded seed wheels virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via unescaped prompt in Windows activation script virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via configuration injection in prompt values virtualenv: virtualenv: arbitrary code execution via improper quoting in xonsh activation scripts virtualenv: virtualenv: arbitrary code execution via improperly quoted interpreter paths in script launchers virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via malicious prompt text virtualenv: virtualenv: arbitrary code execution via crafted environment name virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary command execution via unescaped prompt variables in zsh virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via improperly quoted Fish activation scripts virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary command execution via sequential placeholder substitution in activation templates virtualenv: virtualenv: Arbitrary code execution via unescaped prompt in bash activation script&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:95659</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-113776</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-113776</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:14.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:26.10: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: python-virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. From 20.26.6 until 21.14.2, ViaTemplateActivator.instantiate_template() replaces placeholders one key at a time across the complete activation template, so trigger names such as __VIRTUAL_NAME__, __VIRTUAL_ENV__, or __VIRTUAL_PROMPT__ inside an already substituted and quoted environment path or prompt can be replaced during a later pass. The later value&amp;#39;s quoting can close the earlier literal and execute the remaining path when a user activates the environment through bash, fish, xonsh, or activate_this.py. The distinct csh prompt-display token __VIRTUAL_PROMPT_DISPLAY_TCSH__ can instead break the generated script without establishing command execution. The attacker must influence the destination path or --prompt, and a value without a relevant placeholder name does not trigger this mechanism. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:14.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:26.10: python-virtualenv, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: python-virtualenv&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;virtualenv is a tool for creating isolated virtual python environments. From 20.26.6 until 21.14.2, ViaTemplateActivator.instantiate_template() replaces placeholders one key at a time across the complete activation template, so trigger names such as __VIRTUAL_NAME__, __VIRTUAL_ENV__, or __VIRTUAL_PROMPT__ inside an already substituted and quoted environment path or prompt can be replaced during a later pass. The later value&amp;#39;s quoting can close the earlier literal and execute the remaining path when a user activates the environment through bash, fish, xonsh, or activate_this.py. The distinct csh prompt-display token __VIRTUAL_PROMPT_DISPLAY_TCSH__ can instead break the generated script without establishing command execution. The attacker must influence the destination path or --prompt, and a value without a relevant placeholder name does not trigger this mechanism. This issue is fixed in version 21.14.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-113776</guid>
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