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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 17:49:10 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BIT-pillow-2026-112401 — Pillow: Quadratic GIF comment concatenation allows DoS in Image.open()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-pillow-2026-112401</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: pillow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 5.4.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow performs quadratic copying while parsing GIF comments. GifImageFile._seek() repeatedly appends immutable bytes for comment sub-blocks and multiple comment extensions, and frame zero is parsed during Image.open(). An attacker can submit a small-dimension GIF containing many comment extensions to any application that opens the file. This can consume excessive CPU and deny service before the application can inspect the image. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: pillow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 5.4.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow performs quadratic copying while parsing GIF comments. GifImageFile._seek() repeatedly appends immutable bytes for comment sub-blocks and multiple comment extensions, and frame zero is parsed during Image.open(). An attacker can submit a small-dimension GIF containing many comment extensions to any application that opens the file. This can consume excessive CPU and deny service before the application can inspect the image. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-pillow-2026-112401</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-aider-CVE-2026-112401 — Pillow: Quadratic GIF comment concatenation allows DoS in Image.open()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-112401</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: aider&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
============================================================================
Quadratic GIF comment concatenation allows DoS in Image.open()
Location: src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py:266  in GifImageFile._seek()
Commit:   a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6
============================================================================
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Opening a crafted GIF file with `Image.open()` takes time that grows with the square of the file&amp;#39;s size, so anyone who can submit an image to a service that uses Pillow can keep one worker busy at full processor load for a long time with a small file. A 2 MB file takes about 5 seconds to open, a 4 MB file about 35 seconds, and an 8 MB file about 3 minutes. An ordinary GIF of the same size opens in well under a second. The cost is paid inside `Image.open()` itself, with default settings, before the application has seen the image&amp;#39;s size or format.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug is in `GifImageFile._seek()` in `src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py`, which builds `info[&amp;#34;comment&amp;#34;]` by appending to an immutable `bytes` object with no size limit. It appends once per 255-byte sub-block (`comment += block`, line 261) and once per comment extension (`info[&amp;#34;comment&amp;#34;] += b&amp;#34;\n&amp;#34; + comment`, line 266). Each append copies everything collected so far. A file made of many tiny comment extensions forces a full re-copy for each one. Because `_open()` ends with `self._seek(0)`, any code that only opens an uploaded file to identify it, read its dimensions, or make a thumbnail pays the full cos…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: aider&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
============================================================================
Quadratic GIF comment concatenation allows DoS in Image.open()
Location: src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py:266  in GifImageFile._seek()
Commit:   a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6
============================================================================
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Opening a crafted GIF file with `Image.open()` takes time that grows with the square of the file&amp;#39;s size, so anyone who can submit an image to a service that uses Pillow can keep one worker busy at full processor load for a long time with a small file. A 2 MB file takes about 5 seconds to open, a 4 MB file about 35 seconds, and an 8 MB file about 3 minutes. An ordinary GIF of the same size opens in well under a second. The cost is paid inside `Image.open()` itself, with default settings, before the application has seen the image&amp;#39;s size or format.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug is in `GifImageFile._seek()` in `src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py`, which builds `info[&amp;#34;comment&amp;#34;]` by appending to an immutable `bytes` object with no size limit. It appends once per 255-byte sub-block (`comment += block`, line 261) and once per comment extension (`info[&amp;#34;comment&amp;#34;] += b&amp;#34;\n&amp;#34; + comment`, line 266). Each append copies everything collected so far. A file made of many tiny comment extensions forces a full re-copy for each one. Because `_open()` ends with `self._seek(0)`, any code that only opens an uploaded file to identify it, read its dimensions, or make a thumbnail pays the full cos…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-112401</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1486 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans les produits VMware. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoquer…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1486</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1486</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1486</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CLEANSTART-2026-GZ19261 — Pillow is a Python imaging library</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-gz19261</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: apache-superset&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security vulnerability affects the apache-superset package. Pillow is a Python imaging library.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: apache-superset&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security vulnerability affects the apache-superset package. Pillow is a Python imaging library.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-gz19261</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-389712</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-389712</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-389712</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-389712</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-112401</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-112401</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 5.4.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow performs quadratic copying while parsing GIF comments. GifImageFile._seek() repeatedly appends immutable bytes for comment sub-blocks and multiple comment extensions, and frame zero is parsed during Image.open(). An attacker can submit a small-dimension GIF containing many comment extensions to any application that opens the file. This can consume excessive CPU and deny service before the application can inspect the image. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 5.4.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow performs quadratic copying while parsing GIF comments. GifImageFile._seek() repeatedly appends immutable bytes for comment sub-blocks and multiple comment extensions, and frame zero is parsed during Image.open(). An attacker can submit a small-dimension GIF containing many comment extensions to any application that opens the file. This can consume excessive CPU and deny service before the application can inspect the image. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-112401</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-74r2-7ff9-mjj2 — Pillow: Quadratic GIF comment concatenation allows DoS in Image.open()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-74r2-7ff9-mjj2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: Pillow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
============================================================================
Quadratic GIF comment concatenation allows DoS in Image.open()
Location: src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py:266  in GifImageFile._seek()
Commit:   a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6
============================================================================
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Opening a crafted GIF file with `Image.open()` takes time that grows with the square of the file&amp;#39;s size, so anyone who can submit an image to a service that uses Pillow can keep one worker busy at full processor load for a long time with a small file. A 2 MB file takes about 5 seconds to open, a 4 MB file about 35 seconds, and an 8 MB file about 3 minutes. An ordinary GIF of the same size opens in well under a second. The cost is paid inside `Image.open()` itself, with default settings, before the application has seen the image&amp;#39;s size or format.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug is in `GifImageFile._seek()` in `src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py`, which builds `info[&amp;#34;comment&amp;#34;]` by appending to an immutable `bytes` object with no size limit. It appends once per 255-byte sub-block (`comment += block`, line 261) and once per comment extension (`info[&amp;#34;comment&amp;#34;] += b&amp;#34;\n&amp;#34; + comment`, line 266). Each append copies everything collected so far. A file made of many tiny comment extensions forces a full re-copy for each one. Because `_open()` ends with `self._seek(0)`, any code that only opens an uploaded file to identify it, read its dimensions, or make a thumbnail pays the full cos…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: Pillow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
============================================================================
Quadratic GIF comment concatenation allows DoS in Image.open()
Location: src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py:266  in GifImageFile._seek()
Commit:   a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6
============================================================================
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Opening a crafted GIF file with `Image.open()` takes time that grows with the square of the file&amp;#39;s size, so anyone who can submit an image to a service that uses Pillow can keep one worker busy at full processor load for a long time with a small file. A 2 MB file takes about 5 seconds to open, a 4 MB file about 35 seconds, and an 8 MB file about 3 minutes. An ordinary GIF of the same size opens in well under a second. The cost is paid inside `Image.open()` itself, with default settings, before the application has seen the image&amp;#39;s size or format.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug is in `GifImageFile._seek()` in `src/PIL/GifImagePlugin.py`, which builds `info[&amp;#34;comment&amp;#34;]` by appending to an immutable `bytes` object with no size limit. It appends once per 255-byte sub-block (`comment += block`, line 261) and once per comment extension (`info[&amp;#34;comment&amp;#34;] += b&amp;#34;\n&amp;#34; + comment`, line 266). Each append copies everything collected so far. A file made of many tiny comment extensions forces a full re-copy for each one. Because `_open()` ends with `self._seek(0)`, any code that only opens an uploaded file to identify it, read its dimensions, or make a thumbnail pays the full cos…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-74r2-7ff9-mjj2</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:94702 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat AI Inference 3.5.3 (CPU)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:94702</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;mcp: mcp: Denial of Service via session memory exhaustion in streamable HTTP servers vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via Regular Expression processing vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via negative token ID input vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via unbounded P2P KV offloading sessions pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via decompression bomb check bypass in multi-frame images pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via decompression bomb bypass in SPIDER images pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via crafted RLE BMP image pillow: Pillow multi-frame loaders can reuse stale native image storage after mode transitions pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via duplicate page references in PDF files pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via integer overflow in text-width calculation pillow: Pillow: Denial of Service via negative archive member size in TarIO pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via repeated EXIF headers pillow: Pillow: Denial of Service via out-of-bounds read in metafile parser pillow: pillow: Arbitrary code execution via JPEG encoder buffer overflow vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via unbounded media ingestion aiohttp: aiohttp: Information disclosure via unenforced Secure attribute on shared cookies aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via missing initial request timeout aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via Max-Age processing overflow aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via file descriptor exhaustion in multipart request processing aiohttp: aiohttp: Security control bypass via request schem…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;mcp: mcp: Denial of Service via session memory exhaustion in streamable HTTP servers vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via Regular Expression processing vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via negative token ID input vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via unbounded P2P KV offloading sessions pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via decompression bomb check bypass in multi-frame images pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via decompression bomb bypass in SPIDER images pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via crafted RLE BMP image pillow: Pillow multi-frame loaders can reuse stale native image storage after mode transitions pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via duplicate page references in PDF files pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via integer overflow in text-width calculation pillow: Pillow: Denial of Service via negative archive member size in TarIO pillow: pillow: Denial of Service via repeated EXIF headers pillow: Pillow: Denial of Service via out-of-bounds read in metafile parser pillow: pillow: Arbitrary code execution via JPEG encoder buffer overflow vllm: vLLM: Denial of Service via unbounded media ingestion aiohttp: aiohttp: Information disclosure via unenforced Secure attribute on shared cookies aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via missing initial request timeout aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via Max-Age processing overflow aiohttp: aiohttp: Denial of Service via file descriptor exhaustion in multipart request processing aiohttp: aiohttp: Security control bypass via request schem…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:94702</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-112401</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-112401</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: pillow, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: pillow-python2, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: pillow, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: pillow, Ubuntu:26.10: pillow, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: pillow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 5.4.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow performs quadratic copying while parsing GIF comments. GifImageFile._seek() repeatedly appends immutable bytes for comment sub-blocks and multiple comment extensions, and frame zero is parsed during Image.open(). An attacker can submit a small-dimension GIF containing many comment extensions to any application that opens the file. This can consume excessive CPU and deny service before the application can inspect the image. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: pillow, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: pillow-python2, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: pillow, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: pillow, Ubuntu:26.10: pillow, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: pillow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 5.4.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow performs quadratic copying while parsing GIF comments. GifImageFile._seek() repeatedly appends immutable bytes for comment sub-blocks and multiple comment extensions, and frame zero is parsed during Image.open(). An attacker can submit a small-dimension GIF containing many comment extensions to any application that opens the file. This can consume excessive CPU and deny service before the application can inspect the image. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-112401</guid>
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