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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 21:21:39 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BIT-pillow-2026-112399 — Pillow: APNG background disposal allocates full canvas before decompression bomb check</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-pillow-2026-112399</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: pillow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 8.1.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow can allocate an APNG disposal background at the full canvas size before applying the decompression-bomb check. A crafted APNG with a small first frame, a very large declared canvas, and background disposal or first-frame OP_PREVIOUS reaches PngImageFile._seek while Image.open() positions frame zero. The full-canvas allocation occurs inside Image.open() without requiring pixel loading or frame iteration. This can exhaust memory and deny service. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Bitnami: pillow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 8.1.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow can allocate an APNG disposal background at the full canvas size before applying the decompression-bomb check. A crafted APNG with a small first frame, a very large declared canvas, and background disposal or first-frame OP_PREVIOUS reaches PngImageFile._seek while Image.open() positions frame zero. The full-canvas allocation occurs inside Image.open() without requiring pixel loading or frame iteration. This can exhaust memory and deny service. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bit-pillow-2026-112399</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-aider-CVE-2026-112399 — Pillow: APNG background disposal allocates full canvas before decompression bomb check</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-112399</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: aider&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
============================================================================
APNG background disposal allocates full canvas before decompression bomb check
Location: src/PIL/PngImagePlugin.py:1000  in PngImageFile._seek()
Commit:   a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6
============================================================================
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A 126-byte animated PNG file makes Pillow&amp;#39;s `Image.open()` allocate and fill memory sized by the image dimensions the file claims, before Pillow&amp;#39;s built-in check for oversized images runs. A file claiming 22000×22000 pixels costs about 1.9 GB. Anyone who can get an application to open an image they supply, with default settings and no further calls such as `load()`, can cause a multi-gigabyte memory spike per file. If the claimed size exceeds the machine&amp;#39;s free memory, the operating system kills the process outright.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug is in `PngImageFile._seek()` in `src/PIL/PngImagePlugin.py` (around line 1000). For any APNG, `_open()` calls `self._seek(0)`. When the first `fcTL` chunk requests `OP_BACKGROUND` disposal, `_seek()` calls `Image.core.fill(self.mode, self.size)` with the full IHDR size, which allocates and zero-fills width×height×4 bytes. `OP_PREVIOUS` takes the same path, because frame 0 rewrites it to `OP_BACKGROUND`. This all happens inside the plugin factory, so `Image.open()`&amp;#39;s `_decompression_bomb_check(im.size)` only runs after the memory has been touched. A 1×1 frame rectangle passes the only checks on the way…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: aider&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
============================================================================
APNG background disposal allocates full canvas before decompression bomb check
Location: src/PIL/PngImagePlugin.py:1000  in PngImageFile._seek()
Commit:   a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6
============================================================================
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A 126-byte animated PNG file makes Pillow&amp;#39;s `Image.open()` allocate and fill memory sized by the image dimensions the file claims, before Pillow&amp;#39;s built-in check for oversized images runs. A file claiming 22000×22000 pixels costs about 1.9 GB. Anyone who can get an application to open an image they supply, with default settings and no further calls such as `load()`, can cause a multi-gigabyte memory spike per file. If the claimed size exceeds the machine&amp;#39;s free memory, the operating system kills the process outright.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug is in `PngImageFile._seek()` in `src/PIL/PngImagePlugin.py` (around line 1000). For any APNG, `_open()` calls `self._seek(0)`. When the first `fcTL` chunk requests `OP_BACKGROUND` disposal, `_seek()` calls `Image.core.fill(self.mode, self.size)` with the full IHDR size, which allocates and zero-fills width×height×4 bytes. `OP_PREVIOUS` takes the same path, because frame 0 rewrites it to `OP_BACKGROUND`. This all happens inside the plugin factory, so `Image.open()`&amp;#39;s `_decompression_bomb_check(im.size)` only runs after the memory has been touched. A 1×1 frame rectangle passes the only checks on the way…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-aider-cve-2026-112399</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1486 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans les produits VMware. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoquer…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1486</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1486</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1486</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CLEANSTART-2026-ES42495 — Pillow is a Python imaging library</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-es42495</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: apache-superset&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security vulnerability affects the apache-superset package. Pillow is a Python imaging library.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: apache-superset&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security vulnerability affects the apache-superset package. Pillow is a Python imaging library.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-es42495</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-394232</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-394232</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-394232</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-394232</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-112399</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-112399</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 8.1.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow can allocate an APNG disposal background at the full canvas size before applying the decompression-bomb check. A crafted APNG with a small first frame, a very large declared canvas, and background disposal or first-frame OP_PREVIOUS reaches PngImageFile._seek while Image.open() positions frame zero. The full-canvas allocation occurs inside Image.open() without requiring pixel loading or frame iteration. This can exhaust memory and deny service. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 8.1.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow can allocate an APNG disposal background at the full canvas size before applying the decompression-bomb check. A crafted APNG with a small first frame, a very large declared canvas, and background disposal or first-frame OP_PREVIOUS reaches PngImageFile._seek while Image.open() positions frame zero. The full-canvas allocation occurs inside Image.open() without requiring pixel loading or frame iteration. This can exhaust memory and deny service. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-112399</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5xm2-6676-qcp9 — Pillow: APNG background disposal allocates full canvas before decompression bomb check</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5xm2-6676-qcp9</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: Pillow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
============================================================================
APNG background disposal allocates full canvas before decompression bomb check
Location: src/PIL/PngImagePlugin.py:1000  in PngImageFile._seek()
Commit:   a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6
============================================================================
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A 126-byte animated PNG file makes Pillow&amp;#39;s `Image.open()` allocate and fill memory sized by the image dimensions the file claims, before Pillow&amp;#39;s built-in check for oversized images runs. A file claiming 22000×22000 pixels costs about 1.9 GB. Anyone who can get an application to open an image they supply, with default settings and no further calls such as `load()`, can cause a multi-gigabyte memory spike per file. If the claimed size exceeds the machine&amp;#39;s free memory, the operating system kills the process outright.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug is in `PngImageFile._seek()` in `src/PIL/PngImagePlugin.py` (around line 1000). For any APNG, `_open()` calls `self._seek(0)`. When the first `fcTL` chunk requests `OP_BACKGROUND` disposal, `_seek()` calls `Image.core.fill(self.mode, self.size)` with the full IHDR size, which allocates and zero-fills width×height×4 bytes. `OP_PREVIOUS` takes the same path, because frame 0 rewrites it to `OP_BACKGROUND`. This all happens inside the plugin factory, so `Image.open()`&amp;#39;s `_decompression_bomb_check(im.size)` only runs after the memory has been touched. A 1×1 frame rectangle passes the only checks on the way…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: Pillow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```
============================================================================
APNG background disposal allocates full canvas before decompression bomb check
Location: src/PIL/PngImagePlugin.py:1000  in PngImageFile._seek()
Commit:   a707c6b21c313880d0771e54965d142dd42358b6
============================================================================
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A 126-byte animated PNG file makes Pillow&amp;#39;s `Image.open()` allocate and fill memory sized by the image dimensions the file claims, before Pillow&amp;#39;s built-in check for oversized images runs. A file claiming 22000×22000 pixels costs about 1.9 GB. Anyone who can get an application to open an image they supply, with default settings and no further calls such as `load()`, can cause a multi-gigabyte memory spike per file. If the claimed size exceeds the machine&amp;#39;s free memory, the operating system kills the process outright.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The bug is in `PngImageFile._seek()` in `src/PIL/PngImagePlugin.py` (around line 1000). For any APNG, `_open()` calls `self._seek(0)`. When the first `fcTL` chunk requests `OP_BACKGROUND` disposal, `_seek()` calls `Image.core.fill(self.mode, self.size)` with the full IHDR size, which allocates and zero-fills width×height×4 bytes. `OP_PREVIOUS` takes the same path, because frame 0 rewrites it to `OP_BACKGROUND`. This all happens inside the plugin factory, so `Image.open()`&amp;#39;s `_decompression_bomb_check(im.size)` only runs after the memory has been touched. A 1×1 frame rectangle passes the only checks on the way…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-5xm2-6676-qcp9</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:92510 — Red Hat Security Advisory: RHOAI 3.4.6 - Red Hat OpenShift AI</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:92510</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 RHOAI MaaS: llm-d: MaaS/llm-d inference Gateway: default allowedRoutes.namespaces.from: All allows namespace users to hijack shared model-serving traffic (tokens, prompts, outputs) fast-uri: Fast-uri: Security policy bypass due to URL parsing inconsistency github.com/moby/go-archive: moby/go-archive: Arbitrary file write via link following in tar extraction fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion vulnerability via backslash in URI authority golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution via Cross-Site Scripting cryptography: cryptography Subgroup Attack Due to Missing Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves golang.org/x/net/html: golang: golang.org/x/net/html: Cross-Site Scripting via HTML parsing bypass net/http/internal/http2: golang: golang.org/x/net: Go HTTP/2: Denial of Service via malformed SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE frame encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: golang: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Denial of Service due to integer overflow in SSH channel write github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/baggage: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/propagation: OpenTelemetry-Go:…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 RHOAI MaaS: llm-d: MaaS/llm-d inference Gateway: default allowedRoutes.namespaces.from: All allows namespace users to hijack shared model-serving traffic (tokens, prompts, outputs) fast-uri: Fast-uri: Security policy bypass due to URL parsing inconsistency github.com/moby/go-archive: moby/go-archive: Arbitrary file write via link following in tar extraction fast-uri: fast-uri: Host confusion vulnerability via backslash in URI authority golang.org/x/net/html: golang.org/x/net/html: Arbitrary code execution via Cross-Site Scripting cryptography: cryptography Subgroup Attack Due to Missing Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves golang.org/x/net/html: golang: golang.org/x/net/html: Cross-Site Scripting via HTML parsing bypass net/http/internal/http2: golang: golang.org/x/net: Go HTTP/2: Denial of Service via malformed SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE frame encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: golang: golang.org/x/crypto/ssh: Denial of Service due to integer overflow in SSH channel write github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/baggage: go.opentelemetry.io/otel/propagation: OpenTelemetry-Go:…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:92510</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-112399</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-112399</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: pillow-python2, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: pillow, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: pillow, Ubuntu:26.10: pillow, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: pillow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 8.1.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow can allocate an APNG disposal background at the full canvas size before applying the decompression-bomb check. A crafted APNG with a small first frame, a very large declared canvas, and background disposal or first-frame OP_PREVIOUS reaches PngImageFile._seek while Image.open() positions frame zero. The full-canvas allocation occurs inside Image.open() without requiring pixel loading or frame iteration. This can exhaust memory and deny service. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: pillow-python2, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: pillow, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: pillow, Ubuntu:26.10: pillow, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: pillow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 8.1.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow can allocate an APNG disposal background at the full canvas size before applying the decompression-bomb check. A crafted APNG with a small first frame, a very large declared canvas, and background disposal or first-frame OP_PREVIOUS reaches PngImageFile._seek while Image.open() positions frame zero. The full-canvas allocation occurs inside Image.open() without requiring pixel loading or frame iteration. This can exhaust memory and deny service. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-112399</guid>
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