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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-407392</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407392</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407392</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407392</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-110789</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-110789</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;libp2p is a JavaScript implementation of the libp2p networking stack. Prior to 5.1.22, the @libp2p/crypto code reached by the default Identify service accepts a remote peer’s crafted publicKey before peer-id or signature verification and passes it through publicKeyFromProtobuf to the ASN.1 DER decoder. readLength in packages/crypto/src/keys/rsa/der.ts accepts long-form element lengths larger than the remaining buffer, causing readInteger and related readers to loop synchronously over an attacker-claimed length from a very small key blob. Because decoding occurs in one event-loop tick before the remotePeer equality check in packages/protocol-identify/src/identify.ts, the Identify timeout cannot interrupt it, allowing repeated unauthenticated connections to stall all timers and peers and transiently exhaust memory. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.22.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;libp2p is a JavaScript implementation of the libp2p networking stack. Prior to 5.1.22, the @libp2p/crypto code reached by the default Identify service accepts a remote peer’s crafted publicKey before peer-id or signature verification and passes it through publicKeyFromProtobuf to the ASN.1 DER decoder. readLength in packages/crypto/src/keys/rsa/der.ts accepts long-form element lengths larger than the remaining buffer, causing readInteger and related readers to loop synchronously over an attacker-claimed length from a very small key blob. Because decoding occurs in one event-loop tick before the remotePeer equality check in packages/protocol-identify/src/identify.ts, the Identify timeout cannot interrupt it, allowing repeated unauthenticated connections to stall all timers and peers and transiently exhaust memory. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.22.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-110789</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rvfr-cqwq-rc4j — libp2p: ASN.1 DER decoder drives an unbounded synchronous loop on attacker-controlled length fields, stalling the Node…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rvfr-cqwq-rc4j</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @libp2p/crypto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A remote peer can stall a js-libp2p node&amp;#39;s entire event loop for ~4–5 seconds per connection (and transiently allocate ~2 GB) by sending a ~15-byte crafted `publicKey` inside an Identify message. The malformed key reaches the DER decoder before any peer-id/signature check, so the attack is pre-auth and repeatable indefinitely by reconnecting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`packages/crypto/src/keys/rsa/der.ts` `readLength()` parses DER long-form lengths with no comparison to `buf.byteLength`, and `readInteger()` then loops over the attacker-claimed length:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
function readInteger (buf, context) {
  const length = readLength(buf, context)   // attacker-controlled, claims up to 2^64
  const end = context.offset + length
  for (let i = context.offset; i &amp;lt; end; i++) // runs far past buf.byteLength
    vals.push(buf[i])                         // pushes `undefined` past the end
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The blob reaches the parser pre-auth: Identify runs on every `connection:open` and calls `publicKeyFromProtobuf(publicKey)` (`packages/protocol-identify/src/identify.ts:85`) before the `connection.remotePeer.equals(id)` check at `identify.ts:88`. The `MAX_RSA_JWK_SIZE` guard in `pkixToRSAPublicKey` only bounds the total blob size, not the inner length field, so a 15-byte payload defeats it; the ECDSA path (`unmarshalECDSAPublicKey`) has no cap at all. The decode runs in a single synchronous tick, so no `AbortSignal` — including Identify&amp;#39;s 5 s timeout — can interrupt it. Verified on js-libp2p commit `a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @libp2p/crypto&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A remote peer can stall a js-libp2p node&amp;#39;s entire event loop for ~4–5 seconds per connection (and transiently allocate ~2 GB) by sending a ~15-byte crafted `publicKey` inside an Identify message. The malformed key reaches the DER decoder before any peer-id/signature check, so the attack is pre-auth and repeatable indefinitely by reconnecting.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`packages/crypto/src/keys/rsa/der.ts` `readLength()` parses DER long-form lengths with no comparison to `buf.byteLength`, and `readInteger()` then loops over the attacker-claimed length:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
function readInteger (buf, context) {
  const length = readLength(buf, context)   // attacker-controlled, claims up to 2^64
  const end = context.offset + length
  for (let i = context.offset; i &amp;lt; end; i++) // runs far past buf.byteLength
    vals.push(buf[i])                         // pushes `undefined` past the end
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The blob reaches the parser pre-auth: Identify runs on every `connection:open` and calls `publicKeyFromProtobuf(publicKey)` (`packages/protocol-identify/src/identify.ts:85`) before the `connection.remotePeer.equals(id)` check at `identify.ts:88`. The `MAX_RSA_JWK_SIZE` guard in `pkixToRSAPublicKey` only bounds the total blob size, not the inner length field, so a 15-byte payload defeats it; the ECDSA path (`unmarshalECDSAPublicKey`) has no cap at all. The decode runs in a single synchronous tick, so no `AbortSignal` — including Identify&amp;#39;s 5 s timeout — can interrupt it. Verified on js-libp2p commit `a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rvfr-cqwq-rc4j</guid>
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