<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 21 Nov 2026 18:07:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-407395</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407395</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-407395</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-407395</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-107853</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107853</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;tiny-secp256k1 is a tiny secp256k1 native/JS wrapper. From 2.1.0 until 2.2.5 for tiny-secp256k1 and from 2.2.2 until 2.2.5 for @bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs, the three-argument xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck path ignores the backend failure return from xOnlyPointAddTweak when a tweak produces the point at infinity. The shared X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT buffer then still contains the original point, so a caller-controlled resultToCheck equal to that point can make the stale-buffer comparison return true even though no tweaked key exists. Protocols that rely on this helper to validate caller-controlled internal keys, tweaks, and comparison values can accept an invalid derived key. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;tiny-secp256k1 is a tiny secp256k1 native/JS wrapper. From 2.1.0 until 2.2.5 for tiny-secp256k1 and from 2.2.2 until 2.2.5 for @bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs, the three-argument xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck path ignores the backend failure return from xOnlyPointAddTweak when a tweak produces the point at infinity. The shared X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT buffer then still contains the original point, so a caller-controlled resultToCheck equal to that point can make the stale-buffer comparison return true even though no tweaked key exists. Protocols that rely on this helper to validate caller-controlled internal keys, tweaks, and comparison values can accept an invalid derived key. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-107853</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hj9c-qx2w-g7mh — tiny-secp256k1: Stale buffer after ignored wasm failure accepts invalid infinity tweak</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hj9c-qx2w-g7mh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: tiny-secp256k1, npm: @bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The three-argument `xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` path ignores the wasm failure return and compares an unchanged input buffer. When the tweak result is the point at infinity, this stale-buffer comparison can return `true` for an invalid derivation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` in `index.ts` has two code paths. The path taken when the caller omits `tweakParity` discards the return value of the wasm call and compares whatever the shared input buffer holds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
try {
    X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.set(point);
    X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT2.set(resultToCheck);
    TWEAK_INPUT.set(tweak);
    if (hasParity) {
      return wasm.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(tweakParity) === 1;
    } else {
      wasm.xOnlyPointAddTweak();
      const newKey = X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.slice(
        0,
        validate.X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE
      );
      return compare(newKey, resultToCheck) === 0;
    }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`x_only_point_add_tweak` in `lib.rs` returns `-1` and leaves `X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT` untouched when the tweak addition fails.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
pub extern &amp;#34;C&amp;#34; fn x_only_point_add_tweak() -&amp;gt; i32 {
    unsafe {
        let mut xonly_pk = jstry!(x_only_pubkey_parse(X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.as_ptr()), 0);
        let mut pubkey = PublicKey::new();
        if secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(
            get_context(),
            &amp;amp;mut pubkey,
            &amp;amp;xonly_pk,
            TWEAK_INPUT.as_ptr(),
        ) != 1
        {
            // infinity point
            return -1;
        }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The b…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: tiny-secp256k1, npm: @bitcoin-js/tiny-secp256k1-asmjs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The three-argument `xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` path ignores the wasm failure return and compares an unchanged input buffer. When the tweak result is the point at infinity, this stale-buffer comparison can return `true` for an invalid derivation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
`xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck` in `index.ts` has two code paths. The path taken when the caller omits `tweakParity` discards the return value of the wasm call and compares whatever the shared input buffer holds.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ts
try {
    X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.set(point);
    X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT2.set(resultToCheck);
    TWEAK_INPUT.set(tweak);
    if (hasParity) {
      return wasm.xOnlyPointAddTweakCheck(tweakParity) === 1;
    } else {
      wasm.xOnlyPointAddTweak();
      const newKey = X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.slice(
        0,
        validate.X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE
      );
      return compare(newKey, resultToCheck) === 0;
    }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`x_only_point_add_tweak` in `lib.rs` returns `-1` and leaves `X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT` untouched when the tweak addition fails.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```rust
pub extern &amp;#34;C&amp;#34; fn x_only_point_add_tweak() -&amp;gt; i32 {
    unsafe {
        let mut xonly_pk = jstry!(x_only_pubkey_parse(X_ONLY_PUBLIC_KEY_INPUT.as_ptr()), 0);
        let mut pubkey = PublicKey::new();
        if secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add(
            get_context(),
            &amp;amp;mut pubkey,
            &amp;amp;xonly_pk,
            TWEAK_INPUT.as_ptr(),
        ) != 1
        {
            // infinity point
            return -1;
        }
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The b…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hj9c-qx2w-g7mh</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
