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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 05:00:24 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-dvc-CVE-2026-106439 — Hydra: Mutable instantiate policy sets allow target blocklist bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-dvc-cve-2026-106439</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: dvc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hydra&amp;#39;s legacy `instantiate()` target blocklists and related execution-policy
collections are stored in mutable module-level state. Because `_locate()` can
resolve attributes on imported objects, a configuration can resolve a mutation
method such as `.discard()`, modify the active policy, and then instantiate a
target that would otherwise be blocked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A configuration controlling multiple sibling `_target_` entries can first
remove an entry from a target blocklist and then invoke the removed target.
Sibling nodes are processed in insertion order and consult the same mutable
module-level policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This affects the legacy/default path without an execution whitelist. The 1.3
blocklist is a defense-in-depth measure rather than a complete security
boundary, and applications must not treat arbitrary untrusted configuration as
safe to instantiate or use for Python logging configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Released `hydra-core` versions 1.3.4 through 1.3.6 and 1.4.0.dev4 through
1.4.0.dev9 are affected. Fixed releases are 1.3.7 and 1.4.0.dev10.
The reported direct mutation path does not bypass an execution whitelist
restricted to intended application targets and supplied by trusted Python
code. During remediation, Hydra additionally hardened generic discovery,
dispatch, introspection, alias, callable-result, and deferred-callable paths
that could otherwise undermine name-only authorization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Technical details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `hydra-core` 1.3.4 and 1.3.5, the mutable blocklist is reachable…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: dvc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hydra&amp;#39;s legacy `instantiate()` target blocklists and related execution-policy
collections are stored in mutable module-level state. Because `_locate()` can
resolve attributes on imported objects, a configuration can resolve a mutation
method such as `.discard()`, modify the active policy, and then instantiate a
target that would otherwise be blocked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A configuration controlling multiple sibling `_target_` entries can first
remove an entry from a target blocklist and then invoke the removed target.
Sibling nodes are processed in insertion order and consult the same mutable
module-level policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This affects the legacy/default path without an execution whitelist. The 1.3
blocklist is a defense-in-depth measure rather than a complete security
boundary, and applications must not treat arbitrary untrusted configuration as
safe to instantiate or use for Python logging configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Released `hydra-core` versions 1.3.4 through 1.3.6 and 1.4.0.dev4 through
1.4.0.dev9 are affected. Fixed releases are 1.3.7 and 1.4.0.dev10.
The reported direct mutation path does not bypass an execution whitelist
restricted to intended application targets and supplied by trusted Python
code. During remediation, Hydra additionally hardened generic discovery,
dispatch, introspection, alias, callable-result, and deferred-callable paths
that could otherwise undermine name-only authorization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Technical details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `hydra-core` 1.3.4 and 1.3.5, the mutable blocklist is reachable…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-dvc-cve-2026-106439</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-383883</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-383883</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-383883</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-383883</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-106439</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-106439</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Hydra is a framework for elegantly configuring complex applications. From 1.3.4 until 1.3.7 and 1.4.0.dev10, Hydra stores legacy instantiate target blocklists and related execution-policy collections in mutable module-level state. An attacker who controls multiple sibling target entries can resolve hydra._internal.target_policy.UNCONTROLLED_EXECUTION_TARGETS.discard through instantiate(), remove a denied target, and then invoke that target because sibling nodes are processed in insertion order against the same modified policy. The mutation persists in process-global state and can enable code execution with the application&amp;#39;s privileges, while a narrow execution whitelist supplied by trusted Python code is not bypassed by the reported direct mutation path. This issue is fixed in versions 1.3.7 and 1.4.0.dev10.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Hydra is a framework for elegantly configuring complex applications. From 1.3.4 until 1.3.7 and 1.4.0.dev10, Hydra stores legacy instantiate target blocklists and related execution-policy collections in mutable module-level state. An attacker who controls multiple sibling target entries can resolve hydra._internal.target_policy.UNCONTROLLED_EXECUTION_TARGETS.discard through instantiate(), remove a denied target, and then invoke that target because sibling nodes are processed in insertion order against the same modified policy. The mutation persists in process-global state and can enable code execution with the application&amp;#39;s privileges, while a narrow execution whitelist supplied by trusted Python code is not bypassed by the reported direct mutation path. This issue is fixed in versions 1.3.7 and 1.4.0.dev10.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-106439</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mwj6-rfh8-7qf4 — Hydra: Mutable instantiate policy sets allow target blocklist bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mwj6-rfh8-7qf4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: hydra-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hydra&amp;#39;s legacy `instantiate()` target blocklists and related execution-policy
collections are stored in mutable module-level state. Because `_locate()` can
resolve attributes on imported objects, a configuration can resolve a mutation
method such as `.discard()`, modify the active policy, and then instantiate a
target that would otherwise be blocked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A configuration controlling multiple sibling `_target_` entries can first
remove an entry from a target blocklist and then invoke the removed target.
Sibling nodes are processed in insertion order and consult the same mutable
module-level policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This affects the legacy/default path without an execution whitelist. The 1.3
blocklist is a defense-in-depth measure rather than a complete security
boundary, and applications must not treat arbitrary untrusted configuration as
safe to instantiate or use for Python logging configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Released `hydra-core` versions 1.3.4 through 1.3.6 and 1.4.0.dev4 through
1.4.0.dev9 are affected. Fixed releases are 1.3.7 and 1.4.0.dev10.
The reported direct mutation path does not bypass an execution whitelist
restricted to intended application targets and supplied by trusted Python
code. During remediation, Hydra additionally hardened generic discovery,
dispatch, introspection, alias, callable-result, and deferred-callable paths
that could otherwise undermine name-only authorization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Technical details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `hydra-core` 1.3.4 and 1.3.5, the mutable blocklist is reachable…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: hydra-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hydra&amp;#39;s legacy `instantiate()` target blocklists and related execution-policy
collections are stored in mutable module-level state. Because `_locate()` can
resolve attributes on imported objects, a configuration can resolve a mutation
method such as `.discard()`, modify the active policy, and then instantiate a
target that would otherwise be blocked.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A configuration controlling multiple sibling `_target_` entries can first
remove an entry from a target blocklist and then invoke the removed target.
Sibling nodes are processed in insertion order and consult the same mutable
module-level policy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This affects the legacy/default path without an execution whitelist. The 1.3
blocklist is a defense-in-depth measure rather than a complete security
boundary, and applications must not treat arbitrary untrusted configuration as
safe to instantiate or use for Python logging configuration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Released `hydra-core` versions 1.3.4 through 1.3.6 and 1.4.0.dev4 through
1.4.0.dev9 are affected. Fixed releases are 1.3.7 and 1.4.0.dev10.
The reported direct mutation path does not bypass an execution whitelist
restricted to intended application targets and supplied by trusted Python
code. During remediation, Hydra additionally hardened generic discovery,
dispatch, introspection, alias, callable-result, and deferred-callable paths
that could otherwise undermine name-only authorization.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Technical details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In `hydra-core` 1.3.4 and 1.3.5, the mutable blocklist is reachable…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mwj6-rfh8-7qf4</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:82368 — Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat AI Inference 3.5.2 (cuda)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:82368</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;libxml2: Stack Buffer Overflow in xmllint Interactive Shell Command Handling sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 python: cpython: CPython: tarfile extraction filter bypass allows escaping the destination directory pip: pip: Arbitrary file installation via malicious package indexes GDBusServer: glib2: GDBusServer pre-authentication DoS via unbounded SASL line buffering xdgmime: heap-based buffer overflow in _xdg_mime_magic_parse_magic_line() in xdgmimemagic.c urllib3: urllib3: Information disclosure via cross-origin redirects forwarding sensitive headers urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service due to excessive HTTP response decompression vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns oauthlib: oauthlib: Unsafe JSONP callback injection in RevocationEndpoint allows arbitrary JavaScript response generation oauthlib: oauthlib: Timing attack vulnerability in PKCE code_verifier/code_challenge comparison allows authorization code recovery vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion acl: Symlink traversal privilege escalation via libacl functions linux-pam: Plaintext password recovery via timing discrepancy in pam_userdb module vim: Vim: Out-of-bounds Write in Spell File Word Count vim: Vim: Denial of Service via stack out-of-bounds write in spell_soun…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;libxml2: Stack Buffer Overflow in xmllint Interactive Shell Command Handling sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 python: cpython: CPython: tarfile extraction filter bypass allows escaping the destination directory pip: pip: Arbitrary file installation via malicious package indexes GDBusServer: glib2: GDBusServer pre-authentication DoS via unbounded SASL line buffering xdgmime: heap-based buffer overflow in _xdg_mime_magic_parse_magic_line() in xdgmimemagic.c urllib3: urllib3: Information disclosure via cross-origin redirects forwarding sensitive headers urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service due to excessive HTTP response decompression vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns oauthlib: oauthlib: Unsafe JSONP callback injection in RevocationEndpoint allows arbitrary JavaScript response generation oauthlib: oauthlib: Timing attack vulnerability in PKCE code_verifier/code_challenge comparison allows authorization code recovery vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion acl: Symlink traversal privilege escalation via libacl functions linux-pam: Plaintext password recovery via timing discrepancy in pam_userdb module vim: Vim: Out-of-bounds Write in Spell File Word Count vim: Vim: Denial of Service via stack out-of-bounds write in spell_soun…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:82368</guid>
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