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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 20:14:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-389869</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-389869</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-389869</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-389869</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-105299</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-105299</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before version 0.9.0, the HTTP/1 upstream path in pingora-proxy passed the downstream request through upstream_request_filter and wrote it to the upstream without removing the client&amp;#39;s Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in upstream_request_filter (for example, Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go&amp;#39;s net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. The reporter demonstrated access to an IP-restricted endpoint using X-Forwarded-For for IP validation on the origin. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that Cloudflare CDN customers were unaffected, as no such chained deployment as described above exists with internal Pingora services, and Connection headers are…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before version 0.9.0, the HTTP/1 upstream path in pingora-proxy passed the downstream request through upstream_request_filter and wrote it to the upstream without removing the client&amp;#39;s Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in upstream_request_filter (for example, Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go&amp;#39;s net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. The reporter demonstrated access to an IP-restricted endpoint using X-Forwarded-For for IP validation on the origin. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that Cloudflare CDN customers were unaffected, as no such chained deployment as described above exists with internal Pingora services, and Connection headers are…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-105299</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r9g2-75m7-w9wg</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r9g2-75m7-w9wg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before version 0.9.0, the HTTP/1 upstream path in pingora-proxy passed the downstream request through upstream_request_filter and wrote it to the upstream without removing the client&amp;#39;s Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in upstream_request_filter (for example, Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go&amp;#39;s net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. The reporter demonstrated access to an IP-restricted endpoint using X-Forwarded-For for IP validation on the origin. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that Cloudflare CDN customers were unaffected, as no such chained deployment as described above exists with internal Pingora services, and Connection headers are…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Before version 0.9.0, the HTTP/1 upstream path in pingora-proxy passed the downstream request through upstream_request_filter and wrote it to the upstream without removing the client&amp;#39;s Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in upstream_request_filter (for example, Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go&amp;#39;s net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. The reporter demonstrated access to an IP-restricted endpoint using X-Forwarded-For for IP validation on the origin. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that Cloudflare CDN customers were unaffected, as no such chained deployment as described above exists with internal Pingora services, and Connection headers are…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r9g2-75m7-w9wg</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RUSTSEC-2026-0390 — Pingora forwards client-nominated Connection headers to HTTP/1 upstreams, allowing ACL bypass in specific chained deplo…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0390</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: pingora-proxy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pingora versions prior to 0.9.0 passed the downstream request through `upstream_request_filter` and wrote it to HTTP/1 upstreams without removing the client&amp;#39;s Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in `upstream_request_filter` (for example, `Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For`). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go&amp;#39;s `net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy`) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This flaw was corrected in commits 28c18e6b6b04dd0bd937234e5950049e6d74cded and ca23f1668eca8e78be7ba62ef0edbd458b40eeee. By default, Pingora now removes hop-by-hop and Connection-nominated headers from upstream requests, and rejects requests whose Connection header nominates Host, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwar…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: pingora-proxy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pingora versions prior to 0.9.0 passed the downstream request through `upstream_request_filter` and wrote it to HTTP/1 upstreams without removing the client&amp;#39;s Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in `upstream_request_filter` (for example, `Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For`). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go&amp;#39;s `net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy`) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This flaw was corrected in commits 28c18e6b6b04dd0bd937234e5950049e6d74cded and ca23f1668eca8e78be7ba62ef0edbd458b40eeee. By default, Pingora now removes hop-by-hop and Connection-nominated headers from upstream requests, and rejects requests whose Connection header nominates Host, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwar…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rustsec-2026-0390</guid>
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