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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 23:36:12 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-382431</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-382431</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-382431</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-382431</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-104861</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-104861</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;probe-image-size gets image dimensions without downloading the entire file. Prior to 7.4.0, lib/parse_sync/svg.js and lib/parse_stream/svg.js use the searching regular expression /&amp;lt;[-_.:a-zA-Z0-9][^&amp;gt;]*&amp;gt;/, which repeatedly scans to the end of input when attacker-controlled data contains many less-than characters without a closing greater-than character. The synchronous parser converts and scans the full supplied buffer without an input cap, while the streaming parser reparses the complete accumulated SVG prefix for every received chunk. The probe.sync(), probe(stream), and probe(url) entry points can therefore block the Node.js event loop at full CPU, and attacker-controlled chunking can amplify the streaming cost. This issue is fixed in version 7.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;probe-image-size gets image dimensions without downloading the entire file. Prior to 7.4.0, lib/parse_sync/svg.js and lib/parse_stream/svg.js use the searching regular expression /&amp;lt;[-_.:a-zA-Z0-9][^&amp;gt;]*&amp;gt;/, which repeatedly scans to the end of input when attacker-controlled data contains many less-than characters without a closing greater-than character. The synchronous parser converts and scans the full supplied buffer without an input cap, while the streaming parser reparses the complete accumulated SVG prefix for every received chunk. The probe.sync(), probe(stream), and probe(url) entry points can therefore block the Node.js event loop at full CPU, and attacker-controlled chunking can amplify the streaming cost. This issue is fixed in version 7.4.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-104861</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gjj5-9665-rwrc — probe-image-size: Quadratic-time Denial of Service in the SVG Parser</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gjj5-9665-rwrc</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: probe-image-size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Overview&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`probe-image-size` scans the SVG header with a searching regular expression, `/&amp;lt;[-_.:a-zA-Z0-9][^&amp;gt;]*&amp;gt;/`. On input that contains many `&amp;lt;` characters but no `&amp;gt;`, the engine restarts the `[^&amp;gt;]*` scan at every `&amp;lt;` position and runs to end of input each time, giving quadratic time complexity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both the synchronous and the streaming parser are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Every entry point that reaches the SVG parser is affected: `probe.sync()`, `probe(stream)` and `probe(url)`. The URL form is the most exposed one — the input is fetched from a remote host, so an attacker only needs to supply a link.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Processing a crafted buffer blocks the Node.js event loop at 100% CPU for the whole duration. In production environments such as upload validators, image proxies or link unfurl services, a small number of concurrent requests is enough to deny service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause Analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two independent problems.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Absence of input size cap in the sync path.** `lib/parse_sync/svg.js` copied the entire buffer into a string and matched against it. There was no size limit at all, so cost scaled with the size of the attacker-supplied buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. **Repeated rescanning in the stream path.** `lib/parse_stream/svg.js` did cap accumulated data at 64 KB, but called `parseSvg(str)` on the whole accumulated string on *every* chunk, giving `O(chunks × N²)`. The cap does not help here: the more chunks the input is split into, the more times the quadratic scan is repeated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Chunk size is influence…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: probe-image-size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Overview&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`probe-image-size` scans the SVG header with a searching regular expression, `/&amp;lt;[-_.:a-zA-Z0-9][^&amp;gt;]*&amp;gt;/`. On input that contains many `&amp;lt;` characters but no `&amp;gt;`, the engine restarts the `[^&amp;gt;]*` scan at every `&amp;lt;` position and runs to end of input each time, giving quadratic time complexity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both the synchronous and the streaming parser are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Every entry point that reaches the SVG parser is affected: `probe.sync()`, `probe(stream)` and `probe(url)`. The URL form is the most exposed one — the input is fetched from a remote host, so an attacker only needs to supply a link.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Processing a crafted buffer blocks the Node.js event loop at 100% CPU for the whole duration. In production environments such as upload validators, image proxies or link unfurl services, a small number of concurrent requests is enough to deny service.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Root Cause Analysis&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Two independent problems.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. **Absence of input size cap in the sync path.** `lib/parse_sync/svg.js` copied the entire buffer into a string and matched against it. There was no size limit at all, so cost scaled with the size of the attacker-supplied buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. **Repeated rescanning in the stream path.** `lib/parse_stream/svg.js` did cap accumulated data at 64 KB, but called `parseSvg(str)` on the whole accumulated string on *every* chunk, giving `O(chunks × N²)`. The cap does not help here: the more chunks the input is split into, the more times the quadratic scan is repeated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Chunk size is influence…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gjj5-9665-rwrc</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:84734 — Red Hat Security Advisory: RHOAI 3.4.5 - Red Hat OpenShift AI</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:84734</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Cohere North AI: Cohere North AI: Arbitrary user information overwrite via incorrect access control Cohere North AI: Cohere North AI: Information disclosure via improper Origin header validation Cohere North AI: Cohere North AI: Information Leak via WebSocket Endpoint urllib3: urllib3 Streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data python-transformers: python-transformers: Arbitrary code execution due to overridden trust_remote_code setting fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling undici: undici: Information disclosure and data integrity issues due to incorrect Socks5ProxyAgent connection routing python-pip: Path traversal via malicious entry point name in pip wheel installation allows arbitrary file overwrite urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service via decompression bomb bypass with Brotli support org.eclipse.parsson/parsson: Eclipse Parsson: Denial of Service via uncontrolled resource consumption in JSON parsing undici: undici: Man-in-the-Middle attack via ignored TLS options with SOCKS5 proxy jetty-security: Eclipse Jetty: Authentication bypass via Digest authentication encoding collision jetty: Eclipse Jetty: Information disclosure due to retained HTTP/1.1 trailers across connections sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 form-data: form-data: Form field override via CRLF injection undici: undici: Denial…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Cohere North AI: Cohere North AI: Arbitrary user information overwrite via incorrect access control Cohere North AI: Cohere North AI: Information disclosure via improper Origin header validation Cohere North AI: Cohere North AI: Information Leak via WebSocket Endpoint urllib3: urllib3 Streaming API improperly handles highly compressed data python-transformers: python-transformers: Arbitrary code execution due to overridden trust_remote_code setting fast-uri: fast-uri: URI authority bypass due to improper delimiter handling undici: undici: Information disclosure and data integrity issues due to incorrect Socks5ProxyAgent connection routing python-pip: Path traversal via malicious entry point name in pip wheel installation allows arbitrary file overwrite urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service via decompression bomb bypass with Brotli support org.eclipse.parsson/parsson: Eclipse Parsson: Denial of Service via uncontrolled resource consumption in JSON parsing undici: undici: Man-in-the-Middle attack via ignored TLS options with SOCKS5 proxy jetty-security: Eclipse Jetty: Authentication bypass via Digest authentication encoding collision jetty: Eclipse Jetty: Information disclosure due to retained HTTP/1.1 trailers across connections sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution via crafted FTS5 full-text search data sqlite: SQLite: Arbitrary code execution and crash via heap-based buffer overflow in FTS5 form-data: form-data: Form field override via CRLF injection undici: undici: Denial…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:84734</guid>
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