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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 22 Nov 2026 18:30:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-410062</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-410062</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-410062</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-410062</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-103033</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-103033</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ALTCHA is a Go library for creating and verifying ALTCHA challenges. Prior to 2.1.0, parseServerSignature can leave ServerSignatureVerificationData.Extra uninitialized when url.ParseQuery returns partial values and an error for a malformed percent escape in VerificationData. A later write of an unknown parsed key to the nil map panics before VerifyServerSignature or VerifyServerSignatureSafe completes signature verification, so an unauthenticated client can abort a request. Standard net/http recovers the request goroutine, while application goroutines or frameworks without recovery can crash the process. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ALTCHA is a Go library for creating and verifying ALTCHA challenges. Prior to 2.1.0, parseServerSignature can leave ServerSignatureVerificationData.Extra uninitialized when url.ParseQuery returns partial values and an error for a malformed percent escape in VerificationData. A later write of an unknown parsed key to the nil map panics before VerifyServerSignature or VerifyServerSignatureSafe completes signature verification, so an unauthenticated client can abort a request. Standard net/http recovers the request goroutine, while application goroutines or frameworks without recovery can crash the process. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-103033</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-gfwj-45pc-w6r5 — ALTCHA: Nil-map panic (pre-verification DoS) in v1 parseServerSignature on malformed VerificationData</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gfwj-45pc-w6r5</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`parseServerSignature` in the v1 module only initializes `ServerSignatureVerificationData.Extra` inside the `if err == nil` branch after `url.ParseQuery(parsedPayload.VerificationData)`. Go&amp;#39;s `url.ParseQuery` returns the successfully-parsed pairs together with a non-nil error when the query string contains a malformed percent-escape. A subsequent loop unconditionally writes unknown keys into `Extra`, regardless of `err`, causing a nil-map write panic (assignment to entry in nil map) whenever an attacker supplies a `VerificationData` string with a bad %-escape (e.g. `x=1&amp;amp;%zz=2`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is reachable pre-authentication: `parseServerSignature` is called by the exported `VerifyServerSignature` / `VerifyServerSignatureSafe` before any HMAC/signature check, and `VerificationData` is attacker-controlled data forwarded by the client as part of the ALTCHA server-signature payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any application calling `VerifyServerSignature` or `VerifyServerSignatureSafe` on unauthenticated input can be made to panic by submitting a crafted payload. Under standard net/http, the per-request goroutine panic is recovered and the request aborts (a log-flood / per-request DoS); it escalates to a full process crash if verification runs in an application-spawned goroutine or a non-recovering framework.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof Of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
payload, _ := json.Marshal(ServerSignaturePayload{
    Algorithm:        SHA256,
    VerificationData: &amp;#34;x=1&amp;amp;%zz=2&amp;#34;,
    Signature:        &amp;#34;irrelevant&amp;#34;,…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Go: github.com/altcha-org/altcha-lib-go/v2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`parseServerSignature` in the v1 module only initializes `ServerSignatureVerificationData.Extra` inside the `if err == nil` branch after `url.ParseQuery(parsedPayload.VerificationData)`. Go&amp;#39;s `url.ParseQuery` returns the successfully-parsed pairs together with a non-nil error when the query string contains a malformed percent-escape. A subsequent loop unconditionally writes unknown keys into `Extra`, regardless of `err`, causing a nil-map write panic (assignment to entry in nil map) whenever an attacker supplies a `VerificationData` string with a bad %-escape (e.g. `x=1&amp;amp;%zz=2`).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is reachable pre-authentication: `parseServerSignature` is called by the exported `VerifyServerSignature` / `VerifyServerSignatureSafe` before any HMAC/signature check, and `VerificationData` is attacker-controlled data forwarded by the client as part of the ALTCHA server-signature payload.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Any application calling `VerifyServerSignature` or `VerifyServerSignatureSafe` on unauthenticated input can be made to panic by submitting a crafted payload. Under standard net/http, the per-request goroutine panic is recovered and the request aborts (a log-flood / per-request DoS); it escalates to a full process crash if verification runs in an application-spawned goroutine or a non-recovering framework.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Proof Of Concept&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```go
payload, _ := json.Marshal(ServerSignaturePayload{
    Algorithm:        SHA256,
    VerificationData: &amp;#34;x=1&amp;amp;%zz=2&amp;#34;,
    Signature:        &amp;#34;irrelevant&amp;#34;,…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-gfwj-45pc-w6r5</guid>
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