<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 19:15:11 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-387858</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-387858</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-387858</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-387858</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-102946</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102946</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;joserfc is a Python library that provides an implementation of several JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards. Prior to 1.7.4, joserfc.jws.deserialize_json() accepts a JWS General JSON Serialization with an empty signatures array as authenticated. The verify_general_json() loop performs no iterations for the empty array and returns success because no signature check failed, allowing an attacker without a signing key to supply an arbitrary payload that relying applications may treat as authentic. The issue affects the General JSON Serialization path; compact JWS and JWT decoding, Flattened JSON serialization, and JWE JSON processing do not follow this vulnerable path. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;joserfc is a Python library that provides an implementation of several JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards. Prior to 1.7.4, joserfc.jws.deserialize_json() accepts a JWS General JSON Serialization with an empty signatures array as authenticated. The verify_general_json() loop performs no iterations for the empty array and returns success because no signature check failed, allowing an attacker without a signing key to supply an arbitrary payload that relying applications may treat as authentic. The issue affects the General JSON Serialization path; compact JWS and JWT decoding, Flattened JSON serialization, and JWE JSON processing do not follow this vulnerable path. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-102946</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2026:92666 — Red Hat Security Advisory: satellite/foreman-mcp-server-rhel9 container image available as a Technology Preview</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:92666</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;mcp: mcp: Denial of Service via session memory exhaustion in streamable HTTP servers anyio: AnyIO: TLS certificate spoofing via improper internationalized domain name encoding authlib: authlib: Signature verification bypass via deserialize_json urllib3: urllib3: Traffic interception via HTTPS proxy TLS configuration override urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in chunk parser pyjwt: pyjwt: Verification key substitution via unvalidated JWKS redirects pyjwt: PyJWT: Authentication bypass via improper public key validation pyjwt: pyjwt: Token forgery via improper Unicode byte-order mark handling pyjwt: pyjwt: Token forgery via acceptance of public JWK containers as HMAC secrets joserfc: joserfc: Signature verification bypass via empty signatures array mcp: mcp: Denial of Service via unbounded HTTP request body buffering dnspython: dnspython: Denial of Service via excessive DNS compression pointer traversal authlib: Authlib: Authentication bypass via improper asymmetric key validation authlib: authlib: Authentication bypass via zero-length HMAC key authlib: authlib: Authorization bypass via missing client token verification&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;mcp: mcp: Denial of Service via session memory exhaustion in streamable HTTP servers anyio: AnyIO: TLS certificate spoofing via improper internationalized domain name encoding authlib: authlib: Signature verification bypass via deserialize_json urllib3: urllib3: Traffic interception via HTTPS proxy TLS configuration override urllib3: urllib3: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in chunk parser pyjwt: pyjwt: Verification key substitution via unvalidated JWKS redirects pyjwt: PyJWT: Authentication bypass via improper public key validation pyjwt: pyjwt: Token forgery via improper Unicode byte-order mark handling pyjwt: pyjwt: Token forgery via acceptance of public JWK containers as HMAC secrets joserfc: joserfc: Signature verification bypass via empty signatures array mcp: mcp: Denial of Service via unbounded HTTP request body buffering dnspython: dnspython: Denial of Service via excessive DNS compression pointer traversal authlib: Authlib: Authentication bypass via improper asymmetric key validation authlib: authlib: Authentication bypass via zero-length HMAC key authlib: authlib: Authorization bypass via missing client token verification&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2026:92666</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-102946</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-102946</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.10: joserfc, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: joserfc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;joserfc is a Python library that provides an implementation of several JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards. Prior to 1.7.4, joserfc.jws.deserialize_json() accepts a JWS General JSON Serialization with an empty signatures array as authenticated. The verify_general_json() loop performs no iterations for the empty array and returns success because no signature check failed, allowing an attacker without a signing key to supply an arbitrary payload that relying applications may treat as authentic. The issue affects the General JSON Serialization path; compact JWS and JWT decoding, Flattened JSON serialization, and JWE JSON processing do not follow this vulnerable path. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:26.10: joserfc, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: joserfc&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;joserfc is a Python library that provides an implementation of several JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) standards. Prior to 1.7.4, joserfc.jws.deserialize_json() accepts a JWS General JSON Serialization with an empty signatures array as authenticated. The verify_general_json() loop performs no iterations for the empty array and returns success because no signature check failed, allowing an attacker without a signing key to supply an arbitrary payload that relying applications may treat as authentic. The issue affects the General JSON Serialization path; compact JWS and JWT decoding, Flattened JSON serialization, and JWE JSON processing do not follow this vulnerable path. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-102946</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
