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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-330667</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330667</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-330667</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-330667</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-10097</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-10097</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL&amp;#39;s AVX2-optimized ML-KEM implementation (mlkem_cmp_avx2) compares only 1536 of the 1568 ciphertext bytes during the Fujisaki-Okamoto re-encryption check in ML-KEM-1024 decapsulation. Ciphertexts that differ from the expected re-encryption solely in bytes 1536-1567 bypass implicit rejection and are accepted as valid, breaking IND-CCA2 security. An attacker able to submit chosen ciphertexts to a decapsulation oracle that uses a static ML-KEM-1024 key, and to observe whether the genuine shared secret or the implicit-rejection secret was produced, can use this as a plaintext-checking oracle to recover the private key. A proof of concept recovered a full ML-KEM-1024 private key with approximately 98% success using roughly 350 chosen ciphertexts. The flaw is a deterministic logic error and does not rely on timing measurements.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL&amp;#39;s AVX2-optimized ML-KEM implementation (mlkem_cmp_avx2) compares only 1536 of the 1568 ciphertext bytes during the Fujisaki-Okamoto re-encryption check in ML-KEM-1024 decapsulation. Ciphertexts that differ from the expected re-encryption solely in bytes 1536-1567 bypass implicit rejection and are accepted as valid, breaking IND-CCA2 security. An attacker able to submit chosen ciphertexts to a decapsulation oracle that uses a static ML-KEM-1024 key, and to observe whether the genuine shared secret or the implicit-rejection secret was produced, can use this as a plaintext-checking oracle to recover the private key. A proof of concept recovered a full ML-KEM-1024 private key with approximately 98% success using roughly 350 chosen ciphertexts. The flaw is a deterministic logic error and does not rely on timing measurements.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-10097</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-hcgc-hfp6-58v4</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hcgc-hfp6-58v4</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ML-KEM-1024 x64 AVX2 implicit rejection failure in the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform breaks IND-CCA2 security, allowing decapsulation to deviate from the implicit-rejection behavior required by the standard. The AVX2 constant-time ciphertext comparison used during decapsulation never compared the final 32-byte block of the 1568-byte ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext, so a ciphertext manipulated only in those final bytes would compare as equal and decapsulation returned the real shared secret instead of performing the required implicit rejection.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ML-KEM-1024 x64 AVX2 implicit rejection failure in the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform breaks IND-CCA2 security, allowing decapsulation to deviate from the implicit-rejection behavior required by the standard. The AVX2 constant-time ciphertext comparison used during decapsulation never compared the final 32-byte block of the 1568-byte ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext, so a ciphertext manipulated only in those final bytes would compare as equal and decapsulation returned the real shared secret instead of performing the required implicit rejection.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hcgc-hfp6-58v4</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-10097 — ML-KEM-1024 x64 AVX2 incomplete cipher text comparison enables IND-CCA2 break and static private-key recovery</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-10097</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-10097</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-10097</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-10097</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-10097</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:25.10: wolfssl, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: wolfssl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL&amp;#39;s AVX2-optimized ML-KEM implementation (mlkem_cmp_avx2) compares only 1536 of the 1568 ciphertext bytes during the Fujisaki-Okamoto re-encryption check in ML-KEM-1024 decapsulation. Ciphertexts that differ from the expected re-encryption solely in bytes 1536-1567 bypass implicit rejection and are accepted as valid, breaking IND-CCA2 security. An attacker able to submit chosen ciphertexts to a decapsulation oracle that uses a static ML-KEM-1024 key, and to observe whether the genuine shared secret or the implicit-rejection secret was produced, can use this as a plaintext-checking oracle to recover the private key. A proof of concept recovered a full ML-KEM-1024 private key with approximately 98% success using roughly 350 chosen ciphertexts. The flaw is a deterministic logic error and does not rely on timing measurements.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: wolfssl, Ubuntu:25.10: wolfssl, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: wolfssl&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;wolfSSL&amp;#39;s AVX2-optimized ML-KEM implementation (mlkem_cmp_avx2) compares only 1536 of the 1568 ciphertext bytes during the Fujisaki-Okamoto re-encryption check in ML-KEM-1024 decapsulation. Ciphertexts that differ from the expected re-encryption solely in bytes 1536-1567 bypass implicit rejection and are accepted as valid, breaking IND-CCA2 security. An attacker able to submit chosen ciphertexts to a decapsulation oracle that uses a static ML-KEM-1024 key, and to observe whether the genuine shared secret or the implicit-rejection secret was produced, can use this as a plaintext-checking oracle to recover the private key. A proof of concept recovered a full ML-KEM-1024 private key with approximately 98% success using roughly 350 chosen ciphertexts. The flaw is a deterministic logic error and does not rely on timing measurements.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-10097</guid>
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