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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-377629</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-377629</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-377629</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-377629</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-100708</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100708</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Froxlor before 2.3.13 returns the ssl_key_file column — which stores the raw PEM TLS private-key content — verbatim in the JSON responses of the Certificates.get and Certificates.listing API commands, because the results of the underlying domain_ssl_settings queries are passed through ApiCommand::response() without any field stripping or allowlist. A low-privileged authenticated customer API caller can retrieve the private keys of their own domains&amp;#39; certificates, including Let&amp;#39;s Encrypt keys that Froxlor generates server-side and stores root-only (0600) and to which the customer otherwise has no filesystem access; reseller and customers_see_all admin accounts can dump the private keys of other principals through the same sink. Disclosed keys enable domain impersonation, passive decryption of captured TLS traffic, and active machine-in-the-middle attacks.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Froxlor before 2.3.13 returns the ssl_key_file column — which stores the raw PEM TLS private-key content — verbatim in the JSON responses of the Certificates.get and Certificates.listing API commands, because the results of the underlying domain_ssl_settings queries are passed through ApiCommand::response() without any field stripping or allowlist. A low-privileged authenticated customer API caller can retrieve the private keys of their own domains&amp;#39; certificates, including Let&amp;#39;s Encrypt keys that Froxlor generates server-side and stores root-only (0600) and to which the customer otherwise has no filesystem access; reseller and customers_see_all admin accounts can dump the private keys of other principals through the same sink. Disclosed keys enable domain impersonation, passive decryption of captured TLS traffic, and active machine-in-the-middle attacks.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-100708</guid>
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      <title>GHSA-wq4p-x9fv-rhvg</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wq4p-x9fv-rhvg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Froxlor before 2.3.13 returns the ssl_key_file column — which stores the raw PEM TLS private-key content — verbatim in the JSON responses of the Certificates.get and Certificates.listing API commands, because the results of the underlying domain_ssl_settings queries are passed through ApiCommand::response() without any field stripping or allowlist. A low-privileged authenticated customer API caller can retrieve the private keys of their own domains&amp;#39; certificates, including Let&amp;#39;s Encrypt keys that Froxlor generates server-side and stores root-only (0600) and to which the customer otherwise has no filesystem access; reseller and customers_see_all admin accounts can dump the private keys of other principals through the same sink. Disclosed keys enable domain impersonation, passive decryption of captured TLS traffic, and active machine-in-the-middle attacks.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Froxlor before 2.3.13 returns the ssl_key_file column — which stores the raw PEM TLS private-key content — verbatim in the JSON responses of the Certificates.get and Certificates.listing API commands, because the results of the underlying domain_ssl_settings queries are passed through ApiCommand::response() without any field stripping or allowlist. A low-privileged authenticated customer API caller can retrieve the private keys of their own domains&amp;#39; certificates, including Let&amp;#39;s Encrypt keys that Froxlor generates server-side and stores root-only (0600) and to which the customer otherwise has no filesystem access; reseller and customers_see_all admin accounts can dump the private keys of other principals through the same sink. Disclosed keys enable domain impersonation, passive decryption of captured TLS traffic, and active machine-in-the-middle attacks.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-3200 — Froxlor: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-3200</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Froxlor ausnutzen, um Administratorrechte zu erlangen, um Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen, sowie um Sicherheitsmechanismen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Froxlor ausnutzen, um Administratorrechte zu erlangen, um Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen, sowie um Sicherheitsmechanismen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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