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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-264533</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-264533</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-264533</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-264533</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-69200</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-69200</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. In versions prior to 4.0.16, an unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger generation of a configuration backup ZIP via `POST /api/setup/backup` and then download the generated ZIP from a web-accessible location. The ZIP contains sensitive configuration files (e.g., `database.php` with database credentials), leading to high-impact information disclosure and potential follow-on compromise. Version 4.0.16 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. In versions prior to 4.0.16, an unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger generation of a configuration backup ZIP via `POST /api/setup/backup` and then download the generated ZIP from a web-accessible location. The ZIP contains sensitive configuration files (e.g., `database.php` with database credentials), leading to high-impact information disclosure and potential follow-on compromise. Version 4.0.16 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-69200</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-9cg9-4h4f-j6fg — phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated config backup download via /api/setup/backup</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9cg9-4h4f-j6fg</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: thorsten/phpmyfaq&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger generation of a configuration backup ZIP via `POST /api/setup/backup` and then download the generated ZIP from a web-accessible location. The ZIP contains sensitive configuration files (e.g., `database.php` with database credentials), leading to high-impact information disclosure and potential follow-on compromise.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The endpoint `/api/setup/backup` is reachable via default rewrite rules and does not enforce authentication/authorization or API token verification. When called with any non-empty body (used as an “installed version” string), the server creates a ZIP archive inside the configuration directory and returns a direct URL to the generated ZIP file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant code paths:
- Rewrite rule exposing the endpoint:
  - `phpmyfaq/.htaccess`: `RewriteRule ^api/setup/(check|backup|update-database) api/index.php [L,QSA]`
- Controller implementation:
  - `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/SetupController.php` → `backup()`
    - No call to `hasValidToken()`, `userIsAuthenticated()`, or any permission check
- Backup creation:
  - `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Update.php` → `createConfigBackup()`
    - Writes the ZIP into the config directory and returns a public URL under `content/core/config/`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Replace `BASE_URL` with your instance URL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) Trigger config backup generation without authentication:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
BASE_URL=&amp;#34;http://localhost&amp;#34;
curl -i -X POST &amp;#34;${BASE_URL}/api/setup/backup&amp;#34; \
  -H &amp;#34;Content-Type: t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Packagist: thorsten/phpmyfaq&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger generation of a configuration backup ZIP via `POST /api/setup/backup` and then download the generated ZIP from a web-accessible location. The ZIP contains sensitive configuration files (e.g., `database.php` with database credentials), leading to high-impact information disclosure and potential follow-on compromise.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The endpoint `/api/setup/backup` is reachable via default rewrite rules and does not enforce authentication/authorization or API token verification. When called with any non-empty body (used as an “installed version” string), the server creates a ZIP archive inside the configuration directory and returns a direct URL to the generated ZIP file.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Relevant code paths:
- Rewrite rule exposing the endpoint:
  - `phpmyfaq/.htaccess`: `RewriteRule ^api/setup/(check|backup|update-database) api/index.php [L,QSA]`
- Controller implementation:
  - `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/SetupController.php` → `backup()`
    - No call to `hasValidToken()`, `userIsAuthenticated()`, or any permission check
- Backup creation:
  - `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Update.php` → `createConfigBackup()`
    - Writes the ZIP into the config directory and returns a public URL under `content/core/config/`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
Replace `BASE_URL` with your instance URL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) Trigger config backup generation without authentication:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```bash
BASE_URL=&amp;#34;http://localhost&amp;#34;
curl -i -X POST &amp;#34;${BASE_URL}/api/setup/backup&amp;#34; \
  -H &amp;#34;Content-Type: t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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