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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-269066</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-269066</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-269066</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-269066</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-68472</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-68472</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;MindsDB is a platform for building artificial intelligence from enterprise data. Prior to version 25.11.1, an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data. The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and source_type is not &amp;#34;url&amp;#34;. Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to clear_filename or equivalent checks. This vulnerability is fixed in 25.11.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;MindsDB is a platform for building artificial intelligence from enterprise data. Prior to version 25.11.1, an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data. The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and source_type is not &amp;#34;url&amp;#34;. Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to clear_filename or equivalent checks. This vulnerability is fixed in 25.11.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-68472</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-qqhf-pm3j-96g7 — MindsDB has improper sanitation of filepath that leads to information disclosure and DOS</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qqhf-pm3j-96g7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: MindsDB&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[BlueRock](https://bluerock.io/) discovered an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and `source_type` is not `&amp;#34;url&amp;#34;`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `data = request.json` (line ~104) accepts attacker input without validation.
- `file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data[&amp;#34;file&amp;#34;])` (line ~178) creates the path inside a temporary directory, but if `data[&amp;#34;file&amp;#34;]` is absolute (e.g., `/home/secret.csv`), `os.path.join` ignores `temp_dir_path` and targets the attacker-specified location.
- The resulting path is handed to `ca.file_controller.save_file(...)`, which wraps `FileReader(path=source_path)` (`mindsdb/interfaces/file/file_controller.py:66`), causing the application to read the contents of that arbitrary file. The subsequent `shutil.move(file_path, ...)` call also relocates the victim file into MindsDB’s managed storage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to `clear_filename` or equivalent checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
1. Run MindsDB in Docker:
   ```bash
   docker pull mindsdb/mindsdb:latest
   docker run --rm -it -p 47334:47334 --name mindsdb-poc mindsdb/mindsdb:latest
   ```
2. Execute the exploit from the host (save as poc.py and run with `python poc.py`):
   ```pyth…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: MindsDB&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[BlueRock](https://bluerock.io/) discovered an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and `source_type` is not `&amp;#34;url&amp;#34;`:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- `data = request.json` (line ~104) accepts attacker input without validation.
- `file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data[&amp;#34;file&amp;#34;])` (line ~178) creates the path inside a temporary directory, but if `data[&amp;#34;file&amp;#34;]` is absolute (e.g., `/home/secret.csv`), `os.path.join` ignores `temp_dir_path` and targets the attacker-specified location.
- The resulting path is handed to `ca.file_controller.save_file(...)`, which wraps `FileReader(path=source_path)` (`mindsdb/interfaces/file/file_controller.py:66`), causing the application to read the contents of that arbitrary file. The subsequent `shutil.move(file_path, ...)` call also relocates the victim file into MindsDB’s managed storage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to `clear_filename` or equivalent checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
1. Run MindsDB in Docker:
   ```bash
   docker pull mindsdb/mindsdb:latest
   docker run --rm -it -p 47334:47334 --name mindsdb-poc mindsdb/mindsdb:latest
   ```
2. Execute the exploit from the host (save as poc.py and run with `python poc.py`):
   ```pyth…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-qqhf-pm3j-96g7</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-90</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-90</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mindsdb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MindsDB is a platform for building artificial intelligence from enterprise data. Prior to version 25.11.1, an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data. The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and source_type is not &amp;#34;url&amp;#34;. Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to clear_filename or equivalent checks. This vulnerability is fixed in 25.11.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: mindsdb&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MindsDB is a platform for building artificial intelligence from enterprise data. Prior to version 25.11.1, an unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data. The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and source_type is not &amp;#34;url&amp;#34;. Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to clear_filename or equivalent checks. This vulnerability is fixed in 25.11.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-90</guid>
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