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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-319112</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-319112</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-319112</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-319112</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-64526</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-64526</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treate…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treate…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-64526</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw — Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keying</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @strapi/plugin-users-permissions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary of CVE-2025-64526 Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- CVE: CVE-2025-64526
- CVSS v3.1 Vector: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` (6.9 — Medium)
- Affected Versions: `@strapi/plugin-users-permissions` &amp;lt;=5.44.0
- How to Patch: Immediately update your Strapi to &amp;gt;=5.45.0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Description of CVE-2025-64526&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the valu…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; npm: @strapi/plugin-users-permissions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary of CVE-2025-64526 Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- CVE: CVE-2025-64526
- CVSS v3.1 Vector: `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N` (6.9 — Medium)
- Affected Versions: `@strapi/plugin-users-permissions` &amp;lt;=5.44.0
- How to Patch: Immediately update your Strapi to &amp;gt;=5.45.0&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Description of CVE-2025-64526&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the valu…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-1552 — Strapi: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1552</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Strapi ausnutzen, um einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen, Administratorrechte zu erlangen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Strapi ausnutzen, um einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen, Administratorrechte zu erlangen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-1552</guid>
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