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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 17:16:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>ALSA-2025:19719 — Important: pcs security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/alsa-2025:19719</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; AlmaLinux:8: pcs, AlmaLinux:8: pcs-snmp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The pcs packages provide a command-line configuration system for the Pacemaker and Corosync utilities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* rubygem-rack: Rack QueryParser has an unsafe default allowing params_limit bypass via semicolon-separated parameters (CVE-2025-59830)
  * rack: Rack&amp;#39;s unbounded multipart preamble buffering enables DoS (memory exhaustion) (CVE-2025-61770)
  * rack: Rack&amp;#39;s multipart parser buffers large non?file fields entirely in memory, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion) (CVE-2025-61771)
  * rack: Rack memory exhaustion denial of service (CVE-2025-61772)
  * rubygem-rack: Unbounded read in `Rack::Request` form parsing can lead to memory exhaustion (CVE-2025-61919)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; AlmaLinux:8: pcs, AlmaLinux:8: pcs-snmp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The pcs packages provide a command-line configuration system for the Pacemaker and Corosync utilities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* rubygem-rack: Rack QueryParser has an unsafe default allowing params_limit bypass via semicolon-separated parameters (CVE-2025-59830)
  * rack: Rack&amp;#39;s unbounded multipart preamble buffering enables DoS (memory exhaustion) (CVE-2025-61770)
  * rack: Rack&amp;#39;s multipart parser buffers large non?file fields entirely in memory, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion) (CVE-2025-61771)
  * rack: Rack memory exhaustion denial of service (CVE-2025-61772)
  * rubygem-rack: Unbounded read in `Rack::Request` form parsing can lead to memory exhaustion (CVE-2025-61919)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/alsa-2025:19719</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2025-13876</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-13876</link>
      <description>bdu:2025-13876</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-13876</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BREW-mailcatcher-CVE-2025-61771 — Rack: Multipart parser buffers large non‑file fields entirely in memory, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-mailcatcher-cve-2025-61771</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: mailcatcher&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Multipart::Parser` stores non-file form fields (parts without a `filename`) entirely in memory as Ruby `String` objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During multipart parsing, file parts are streamed to temporary files, but non-file parts are buffered into memory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
body = String.new  # non-file → in-RAM buffer
@mime_parts[mime_index].body &amp;lt;&amp;lt; content
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no size limit on these in-memory buffers. As a result, any large text field—while technically valid—will be loaded fully into process memory before being added to `params`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* **Upgrade:** Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB).
* **Workarounds:**
  * Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx `client_max_body_size`).
  * Validate and reject unusually large form fields at the application level.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: mailcatcher&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Multipart::Parser` stores non-file form fields (parts without a `filename`) entirely in memory as Ruby `String` objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During multipart parsing, file parts are streamed to temporary files, but non-file parts are buffered into memory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
body = String.new  # non-file → in-RAM buffer
@mime_parts[mime_index].body &amp;lt;&amp;lt; content
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no size limit on these in-memory buffers. As a result, any large text field—while technically valid—will be loaded fully into process memory before being added to `params`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* **Upgrade:** Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB).
* **Workarounds:**
  * Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx `client_max_body_size`).
  * Validate and reject unusually large form fields at the application level.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-mailcatcher-cve-2025-61771</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2025-avi-0967 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans les produits VMware. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoquer…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0967</link>
      <description>certfr-2025-avi-0967</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0967</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Withdrawn: CLEANSTART-2026-GE08280 — Ruby JSON is a JSON implementation for Ruby</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-ge08280</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: logstash-fips&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the logstash-fips package. Ruby JSON is a JSON implementation for Ruby. See references for individual vulnerability details.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; CleanStart: logstash-fips&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Multiple security vulnerabilities affect the logstash-fips package. Ruby JSON is a JSON implementation for Ruby. See references for individual vulnerability details.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cleanstart-2026-ge08280</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-254332</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-254332</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-254332</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-254332</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-61771</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-61771</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. In versions prior to 2.2.19, 3.1.17, and 3.2.2, ``Rack::Multipart::Parser` stores non-file form fields (parts without a `filename`) entirely in memory as Ruby `String` objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS). Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected. Versions 2.2.19, 3.1.17, and 3.2.2 enforce a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB). Workarounds include restricting maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx `client_max_body_size`) and validating and rejecting unusually large form fields at the application level.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. In versions prior to 2.2.19, 3.1.17, and 3.2.2, ``Rack::Multipart::Parser` stores non-file form fields (parts without a `filename`) entirely in memory as Ruby `String` objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS). Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected. Versions 2.2.19, 3.1.17, and 3.2.2 enforce a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB). Workarounds include restricting maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx `client_max_body_size`) and validating and rejecting unusually large form fields at the application level.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-61771</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-w9pc-fmgc-vxvw — Rack: Multipart parser buffers large non‑file fields entirely in memory, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w9pc-fmgc-vxvw</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Multipart::Parser` stores non-file form fields (parts without a `filename`) entirely in memory as Ruby `String` objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During multipart parsing, file parts are streamed to temporary files, but non-file parts are buffered into memory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
body = String.new  # non-file → in-RAM buffer
@mime_parts[mime_index].body &amp;lt;&amp;lt; content
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no size limit on these in-memory buffers. As a result, any large text field—while technically valid—will be loaded fully into process memory before being added to `params`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* **Upgrade:** Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB).
* **Workarounds:**
  * Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx `client_max_body_size`).
  * Validate and reject unusually large form fields at the application level.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RubyGems: rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`Rack::Multipart::Parser` stores non-file form fields (parts without a `filename`) entirely in memory as Ruby `String` objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During multipart parsing, file parts are streamed to temporary files, but non-file parts are buffered into memory:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```ruby
body = String.new  # non-file → in-RAM buffer
@mime_parts[mime_index].body &amp;lt;&amp;lt; content
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There is no size limit on these in-memory buffers. As a result, any large text field—while technically valid—will be loaded fully into process memory before being added to `params`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Mitigation&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;* **Upgrade:** Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB).
* **Workarounds:**
  * Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx `client_max_body_size`).
  * Validate and reject unusually large form fields at the application level.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-w9pc-fmgc-vxvw</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2025:15621-1 — ruby3.4-rubygem-rack-2.2-2.2.19-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2025:15621-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;ruby3.4-rubygem-rack-2.2-2.2.19-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;ruby3.4-rubygem-rack-2.2-2.2.19-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2025:15621-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>RHSA-2025:19513 — Red Hat Security Advisory: pcs security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2025:19513</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;rubygem-rack: Rack QueryParser has an unsafe default allowing params_limit bypass via semicolon-separated parameters rack: Rack&amp;#39;s unbounded multipart preamble buffering enables DoS (memory exhaustion) rack: Rack&amp;#39;s multipart parser buffers large non‑file fields entirely in memory, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion) rack: Rack memory exhaustion denial of service rubygem-rack: Unbounded read in `Rack::Request` form parsing can lead to memory exhaustion&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;rubygem-rack: Rack QueryParser has an unsafe default allowing params_limit bypass via semicolon-separated parameters rack: Rack&amp;#39;s unbounded multipart preamble buffering enables DoS (memory exhaustion) rack: Rack&amp;#39;s multipart parser buffers large non‑file fields entirely in memory, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion) rack: Rack memory exhaustion denial of service rubygem-rack: Unbounded read in `Rack::Request` form parsing can lead to memory exhaustion&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2025:19513</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2025-61771</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-61771</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:25.10: ruby-rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. In versions prior to 2.2.19, 3.1.17, and 3.2.2, ``Rack::Multipart::Parser` stores non-file form fields (parts without a `filename`) entirely in memory as Ruby `String` objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS). Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected. Versions 2.2.19, 3.1.17, and 3.2.2 enforce a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB). Workarounds include restricting maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx `client_max_body_size`) and validating and rejecting unusually large form fields at the application level.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:22.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: ruby-rack, Ubuntu:25.10: ruby-rack&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rack is a modular Ruby web server interface. In versions prior to 2.2.19, 3.1.17, and 3.2.2, ``Rack::Multipart::Parser` stores non-file form fields (parts without a `filename`) entirely in memory as Ruby `String` objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS). Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected. Versions 2.2.19, 3.1.17, and 3.2.2 enforce a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB). Workarounds include restricting maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx `client_max_body_size`) and validating and rejecting unusually large form fields at the application level.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-61771</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2025-2482 — Red Hat Enterprise Linux: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Denial of Service</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-2482</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Red Hat Enterprise Linux ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Red Hat Enterprise Linux ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-2482</guid>
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