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bdu:2026-00217

Withdrawn: CLEANSTART-2026-OB13434 — Security fixes in wso2is 7.3.0-r1

Withdrawn by the publisher.

Affected: CleanStart: wso2is

Package wso2is version 7.3.0-r1 fixes 11 vulnerabilities: CVE-2025-59340, CVE-2026-25526, CVE-2025-8671, CVE-2026-54399, CVE-2026-54428...

EUVD-2026-253033

fkie_cve-2025-59340

jinjava is a Java-based template engine based on django template syntax, adapted to render jinja templates. Priori to 2.8.1, by using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals. As a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.

GHSA-m49c-g9wr-hv6v — jinjava has Sandbox Bypass via JavaType-Based Deserialization

Affected: Maven: com.hubspot.jinjava:jinjava

### Summary

jinjava’s current sandbox restrictions prevent direct access to dangerous methods such as `getClass()`, and block instantiation of Class objects. However, these protections can be bypassed.

By using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals.

As a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE).

### Details

jinjava templates expose a built-in variable `____int3rpr3t3r____`, which provides direct access to the jinjavaInterpreter instance. This variable was previously abused and protections were added to prevent call method from `JinjavaInterpreter` instances (see [Add interpreter to blacklist](https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/commit/1b9aaa4b420c58b4a301cf4b7d26207f1c8d1165)). However, interacting with the properties of `JinjavaInterpreter` instances remains [unrestricted](https://github.com/HubSpot/jinjava/blob/jinjava-2.8.0/src/main/java/com/hubspot/jinjava/el/ext/JinjavaBeanELResolver.java#L80-L84).

From `____int3rpr3t3r____`, it is possible to traverse to the `config` field, which exposes an ObjectMa…