https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 05 Oct 2026 19:44:41 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-249826 EUVD-2026-249826 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-249826 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-55346 <p>User-controlled input flows to an unsafe implementation of a dynamic Function constructor, allowing network attackers to run arbitrary unsandboxed JS code in the context of the host, by sending a simple POST request.</p> <p>User-controlled input flows to an unsafe implementation of a dynamic Function constructor, allowing network attackers to run arbitrary unsandboxed JS code in the context of the host, by sending a simple POST request.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-55346 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hmgh-466j-fx4c <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: flowise</p> <p>### Summary User-controlled input flows to an unsafe implementaion of a dynamic Function constructor , allowing a malicious actor to run JS code in the context of the host (not sandboxed) leading to RCE.</p> <p>### Details When creating a new `Custom MCP` Chatflow in the platform, the MCP Server Config displays a placeholder hinting at an example of the expected input structure: ```json { &#34;command&#34;: &#34;npx&#34;, &#34;args&#34;: [&#34;-y&#34;, &#34;@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem&#34;, &#34;/path/to/allowed/files&#34;] } ```</p> <p>Behind the scene, a `POST` request to `/api/v1/node-load-method/customMCP` is sent with the provided MCP Server Config, with additional parameters (excluded for brevity): ```json { ...SNIP...</p> <p>&#34;inputs&#34;:{ &#34;mcpServerConfig&#34;:{ &#34;command&#34;:&#34;npx&#34;, &#34;args&#34;:[ &#34;-y&#34;, &#34;@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem&#34;, &#34;/path/to/allowed/files&#34; ] } }, &#34;loadMethod&#34;:&#34;listActions&#34; ...SNIP... } ```</p> <p>Sending the same request with the parameter `mcpServerConfig` equals to a plain value and not an object, for example: ```json { &#34;inputs&#34;:{ &#34;mcpServerConfig&#34;:&#34;test&#34; }, &#34;loadMethod&#34;:&#34;listActions&#34; } ```</p> <p>We enter an interesting code flow that leads to a function named `convertValidJSONString` (Line 103): https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/416e57380ea7ce2e66f89aded61b249ff3eef3b2/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/CustomMCP/CustomMCP.ts#L103</p> <p>```typescript async getTools(nodeData: INodeData): Promise&lt;Tool[]&gt; {…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: flowise</p> <p>### Summary User-controlled input flows to an unsafe implementaion of a dynamic Function constructor , allowing a malicious actor to run JS code in the context of the host (not sandboxed) leading to RCE.</p> <p>### Details When creating a new `Custom MCP` Chatflow in the platform, the MCP Server Config displays a placeholder hinting at an example of the expected input structure: ```json { &#34;command&#34;: &#34;npx&#34;, &#34;args&#34;: [&#34;-y&#34;, &#34;@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem&#34;, &#34;/path/to/allowed/files&#34;] } ```</p> <p>Behind the scene, a `POST` request to `/api/v1/node-load-method/customMCP` is sent with the provided MCP Server Config, with additional parameters (excluded for brevity): ```json { ...SNIP...</p> <p>&#34;inputs&#34;:{ &#34;mcpServerConfig&#34;:{ &#34;command&#34;:&#34;npx&#34;, &#34;args&#34;:[ &#34;-y&#34;, &#34;@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem&#34;, &#34;/path/to/allowed/files&#34; ] } }, &#34;loadMethod&#34;:&#34;listActions&#34; ...SNIP... } ```</p> <p>Sending the same request with the parameter `mcpServerConfig` equals to a plain value and not an object, for example: ```json { &#34;inputs&#34;:{ &#34;mcpServerConfig&#34;:&#34;test&#34; }, &#34;loadMethod&#34;:&#34;listActions&#34; } ```</p> <p>We enter an interesting code flow that leads to a function named `convertValidJSONString` (Line 103): https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/416e57380ea7ce2e66f89aded61b249ff3eef3b2/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/CustomMCP/CustomMCP.ts#L103</p> <p>```typescript async getTools(nodeData: INodeData): Promise&lt;Tool[]&gt; {…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-hmgh-466j-fx4c https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-1836 <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Flowise ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode oder Kommandos auszuführen.</p> <p>Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Flowise ausnutzen, um beliebigen Programmcode oder Kommandos auszuführen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-1836