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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 20:54:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2026-avi-0281 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans les produits Splunk. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un attaq…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0281</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-0281</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-0281</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>cnvd-2025-24796</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2025-24796</link>
      <description>cnvd-2025-24796</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2025-24796</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-248884</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-248884</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-248884</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-248884</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-48074</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-48074</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In version 3.3.2, applications trust unvalidated dataWindow size values from file headers, which can lead to excessive memory allocation and performance degradation when processing malicious files. This is fixed in version 3.3.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In version 3.3.2, applications trust unvalidated dataWindow size values from file headers, which can lead to excessive memory allocation and performance degradation when processing malicious files. This is fixed in version 3.3.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-48074</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-x22w-82jp-8rvf — OpenEXR Out-Of-Memory via Unbounded File Header Values</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x22w-82jp-8rvf</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: OpenEXR&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The OpenEXR file format defines many information about the final image inside of the file header, such as the size of data/display window.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The application trusts the value of `dataWindow` size provided in the header of the input file, and performs computations based on this value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This may result in unintended behaviors, such as excessively large number of iterations and/or huge memory allocations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
A concrete example of this issue is present in the function `readScanline()` in `ImfCheckFile.cpp` at line 235, that performs a for-loop using the `dataWindow min.y` and `max.y` coordinates that can be arbitrarily large.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```cpp
in.setFrameBuffer (i);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;int step = 1;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;//
// try reading scanlines. Continue reading scanlines
// even if an exception is encountered
//
for (int y = dw.min.y; y &amp;lt;= dw.max.y; y += step) // &amp;lt;-- THIS LOOP IS EXCESSIVE BECAUSE OF DW.MAX
{
    try
    {
        in.readPixels (y);
    }
    catch (...)
    {
        threw = true;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;//
        // in reduceTime mode, fail immediately - the file is corrupt
        //
        if (reduceTime) { return threw; }
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Another example occurs in the `EnvmapImage::resize` function that in turn calls `Array2D&amp;lt;T&amp;gt;::resizeEraseUnsafe` passing the `dataWindow` X and Y coordinates and perform a huge allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On some system, the allocator will simply return `std::bad_alloc` and crash. On other systems such as macOS, the allocator will happily continue with a &amp;#34;small&amp;#34; pre-allocation a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: OpenEXR&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The OpenEXR file format defines many information about the final image inside of the file header, such as the size of data/display window.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The application trusts the value of `dataWindow` size provided in the header of the input file, and performs computations based on this value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This may result in unintended behaviors, such as excessively large number of iterations and/or huge memory allocations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
A concrete example of this issue is present in the function `readScanline()` in `ImfCheckFile.cpp` at line 235, that performs a for-loop using the `dataWindow min.y` and `max.y` coordinates that can be arbitrarily large.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```cpp
in.setFrameBuffer (i);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;int step = 1;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;//
// try reading scanlines. Continue reading scanlines
// even if an exception is encountered
//
for (int y = dw.min.y; y &amp;lt;= dw.max.y; y += step) // &amp;lt;-- THIS LOOP IS EXCESSIVE BECAUSE OF DW.MAX
{
    try
    {
        in.readPixels (y);
    }
    catch (...)
    {
        threw = true;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;//
        // in reduceTime mode, fail immediately - the file is corrupt
        //
        if (reduceTime) { return threw; }
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Another example occurs in the `EnvmapImage::resize` function that in turn calls `Array2D&amp;lt;T&amp;gt;::resizeEraseUnsafe` passing the `dataWindow` X and Y coordinates and perform a huge allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On some system, the allocator will simply return `std::bad_alloc` and crash. On other systems such as macOS, the allocator will happily continue with a &amp;#34;small&amp;#34; pre-allocation a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-x22w-82jp-8rvf</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2025:15415-1 — libIex-3_3-32-3.3.5-1.1 on GA media</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2025:15415-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;libIex-3_3-32-3.3.5-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;libIex-3_3-32-3.3.5-1.1 on GA media&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2025:15415-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-1749 — OpenEXR Out-Of-Memory via Unbounded File Header Values</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-1749</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: openexr&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The OpenEXR file format defines many information about the final image inside of the file header, such as the size of data/display window.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The application trusts the value of `dataWindow` size provided in the header of the input file, and performs computations based on this value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This may result in unintended behaviors, such as excessively large number of iterations and/or huge memory allocations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
A concrete example of this issue is present in the function `readScanline()` in `ImfCheckFile.cpp` at line 235, that performs a for-loop using the `dataWindow min.y` and `max.y` coordinates that can be arbitrarily large.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```cpp
in.setFrameBuffer (i);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;int step = 1;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;//
// try reading scanlines. Continue reading scanlines
// even if an exception is encountered
//
for (int y = dw.min.y; y &amp;lt;= dw.max.y; y += step) // &amp;lt;-- THIS LOOP IS EXCESSIVE BECAUSE OF DW.MAX
{
    try
    {
        in.readPixels (y);
    }
    catch (...)
    {
        threw = true;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;//
        // in reduceTime mode, fail immediately - the file is corrupt
        //
        if (reduceTime) { return threw; }
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Another example occurs in the `EnvmapImage::resize` function that in turn calls `Array2D&amp;lt;T&amp;gt;::resizeEraseUnsafe` passing the `dataWindow` X and Y coordinates and perform a huge allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On some system, the allocator will simply return `std::bad_alloc` and crash. On other systems such as macOS, the allocator will happily continue with a &amp;#34;small&amp;#34; pre-allocation a…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: openexr&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
The OpenEXR file format defines many information about the final image inside of the file header, such as the size of data/display window.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The application trusts the value of `dataWindow` size provided in the header of the input file, and performs computations based on this value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This may result in unintended behaviors, such as excessively large number of iterations and/or huge memory allocations.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
A concrete example of this issue is present in the function `readScanline()` in `ImfCheckFile.cpp` at line 235, that performs a for-loop using the `dataWindow min.y` and `max.y` coordinates that can be arbitrarily large.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```cpp
in.setFrameBuffer (i);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;int step = 1;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;//
// try reading scanlines. Continue reading scanlines
// even if an exception is encountered
//
for (int y = dw.min.y; y &amp;lt;= dw.max.y; y += step) // &amp;lt;-- THIS LOOP IS EXCESSIVE BECAUSE OF DW.MAX
{
    try
    {
        in.readPixels (y);
    }
    catch (...)
    {
        threw = true;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;//
        // in reduceTime mode, fail immediately - the file is corrupt
        //
        if (reduceTime) { return threw; }
    }
}
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Another example occurs in the `EnvmapImage::resize` function that in turn calls `Array2D&amp;lt;T&amp;gt;::resizeEraseUnsafe` passing the `dataWindow` X and Y coordinates and perform a huge allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On some system, the allocator will simply return `std::bad_alloc` and crash. On other systems such as macOS, the allocator will happily continue with a &amp;#34;small&amp;#34; pre-allocation a…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-1749</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Withdrawn: UBUNTU-CVE-2025-48074</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-48074</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:25.10: openexr&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In version 3.3.2, applications trust unvalidated dataWindow size values from file headers, which can lead to excessive memory allocation and performance degradation when processing malicious files. This is fixed in version 3.3.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Withdrawn by the publisher.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: openexr, Ubuntu:25.10: openexr&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenEXR provides the specification and reference implementation of the EXR file format, an image storage format for the motion picture industry. In version 3.3.2, applications trust unvalidated dataWindow size values from file headers, which can lead to excessive memory allocation and performance degradation when processing malicious files. This is fixed in version 3.3.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-48074</guid>
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