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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>EUVD-2026-239725</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-239725</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-239725</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-239725</guid>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2025-47928</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-47928</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Spotipy is a Python library for the Spotify Web API. As of commit 4f5759dbfb4506c7b6280572a4db1aabc1ac778d, using `pull_request_target` on `.github/workflows/integration_tests.yml` followed by the checking out the head.sha of a forked PR can be exploited by attackers, since untrusted code can be executed having full access to secrets (from the base repo). By exploiting the vulnerability is possible to exfiltrate `GITHUB_TOKEN` and secrets `SPOTIPY_CLIENT_ID`,  `SPOTIPY_CLIENT_SECRET`. In particular `GITHUB_TOKEN` which can be used to completely overtake the repo since the token has content write privileges. The `pull_request_target` in GitHub Actions is a major security concern—especially in public repositories—because it executes untrusted code from a PR, but with the context of the base repository, including access to its secrets. Commit 9dfb7177b8d7bb98a5a6014f8e6436812a47576f reverted the change that caused the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Spotipy is a Python library for the Spotify Web API. As of commit 4f5759dbfb4506c7b6280572a4db1aabc1ac778d, using `pull_request_target` on `.github/workflows/integration_tests.yml` followed by the checking out the head.sha of a forked PR can be exploited by attackers, since untrusted code can be executed having full access to secrets (from the base repo). By exploiting the vulnerability is possible to exfiltrate `GITHUB_TOKEN` and secrets `SPOTIPY_CLIENT_ID`,  `SPOTIPY_CLIENT_SECRET`. In particular `GITHUB_TOKEN` which can be used to completely overtake the repo since the token has content write privileges. The `pull_request_target` in GitHub Actions is a major security concern—especially in public repositories—because it executes untrusted code from a PR, but with the context of the base repository, including access to its secrets. Commit 9dfb7177b8d7bb98a5a6014f8e6436812a47576f reverted the change that caused the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-47928</guid>
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      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2025-47928</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-47928</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:25.10: spotipy, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: spotipy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Spotipy is a Python library for the Spotify Web API. As of commit 4f5759dbfb4506c7b6280572a4db1aabc1ac778d, using `pull_request_target` on `.github/workflows/integration_tests.yml` followed by the checking out the head.sha of a forked PR can be exploited by attackers, since untrusted code can be executed having full access to secrets (from the base repo). By exploiting the vulnerability is possible to exfiltrate `GITHUB_TOKEN` and secrets `SPOTIPY_CLIENT_ID`,  `SPOTIPY_CLIENT_SECRET`. In particular `GITHUB_TOKEN` which can be used to completely overtake the repo since the token has content write privileges. The `pull_request_target` in GitHub Actions is a major security concern—especially in public repositories—because it executes untrusted code from a PR, but with the context of the base repository, including access to its secrets. Commit 9dfb7177b8d7bb98a5a6014f8e6436812a47576f reverted the change that caused the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:25.10: spotipy, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: spotipy&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Spotipy is a Python library for the Spotify Web API. As of commit 4f5759dbfb4506c7b6280572a4db1aabc1ac778d, using `pull_request_target` on `.github/workflows/integration_tests.yml` followed by the checking out the head.sha of a forked PR can be exploited by attackers, since untrusted code can be executed having full access to secrets (from the base repo). By exploiting the vulnerability is possible to exfiltrate `GITHUB_TOKEN` and secrets `SPOTIPY_CLIENT_ID`,  `SPOTIPY_CLIENT_SECRET`. In particular `GITHUB_TOKEN` which can be used to completely overtake the repo since the token has content write privileges. The `pull_request_target` in GitHub Actions is a major security concern—especially in public repositories—because it executes untrusted code from a PR, but with the context of the base repository, including access to its secrets. Commit 9dfb7177b8d7bb98a5a6014f8e6436812a47576f reverted the change that caused the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-47928</guid>
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