https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sun, 04 Oct 2026 11:31:33 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-12556 bdu:2025-12556 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-12556 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2025-39946 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2025-39946 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0899 certfr-2025-avi-0899 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0899 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-347265 EUVD-2026-347265 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-347265 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-39946 <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus</p> <p>Normally we wait for the socket to buffer up the whole record before we service it. If the socket has a tiny buffer, however, we read out the data sooner, to prevent connection stalls. Make sure that we abort the connection when we find out late that the record is actually invalid. Retrying the parsing is fine in itself but since we copy some more data each time before we parse we can overflow the allocated skb space.</p> <p>Constructing a scenario in which we&#39;re under pressure without enough data in the socket to parse the length upfront is quite hard. syzbot figured out a way to do this by serving us the header in small OOB sends, and then filling in the recvbuf with a large normal send.</p> <p>Make sure that tls_rx_msg_size() aborts strp, if we reach an invalid record there&#39;s really no way to recover.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus</p> <p>Normally we wait for the socket to buffer up the whole record before we service it. If the socket has a tiny buffer, however, we read out the data sooner, to prevent connection stalls. Make sure that we abort the connection when we find out late that the record is actually invalid. Retrying the parsing is fine in itself but since we copy some more data each time before we parse we can overflow the allocated skb space.</p> <p>Constructing a scenario in which we&#39;re under pressure without enough data in the socket to parse the length upfront is quite hard. syzbot figured out a way to do this by serving us the header in small OOB sends, and then filling in the recvbuf with a large normal send.</p> <p>Make sure that tls_rx_msg_size() aborts strp, if we reach an invalid record there&#39;s really no way to recover.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-39946 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cgf5-f6fj-4v5q <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus</p> <p>Normally we wait for the socket to buffer up the whole record before we service it. If the socket has a tiny buffer, however, we read out the data sooner, to prevent connection stalls. Make sure that we abort the connection when we find out late that the record is actually invalid. Retrying the parsing is fine in itself but since we copy some more data each time before we parse we can overflow the allocated skb space.</p> <p>Constructing a scenario in which we&#39;re under pressure without enough data in the socket to parse the length upfront is quite hard. syzbot figured out a way to do this by serving us the header in small OOB sends, and then filling in the recvbuf with a large normal send.</p> <p>Make sure that tls_rx_msg_size() aborts strp, if we reach an invalid record there&#39;s really no way to recover.</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:</p> <p>tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus</p> <p>Normally we wait for the socket to buffer up the whole record before we service it. If the socket has a tiny buffer, however, we read out the data sooner, to prevent connection stalls. Make sure that we abort the connection when we find out late that the record is actually invalid. Retrying the parsing is fine in itself but since we copy some more data each time before we parse we can overflow the allocated skb space.</p> <p>Constructing a scenario in which we&#39;re under pressure without enough data in the socket to parse the length upfront is quite hard. syzbot figured out a way to do this by serving us the header in small OOB sends, and then filling in the recvbuf with a large normal send.</p> <p>Make sure that tls_rx_msg_size() aborts strp, if we reach an invalid record there&#39;s really no way to recover.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cgf5-f6fj-4v5q https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2025-39946 msrc_CVE-2025-39946 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2025-39946 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ncsc-2026-0074 NCSC-2026-0074 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ncsc-2026-0074 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2025:20081-1 <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2025:20081-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2025:21463 <p>kernel: eventpoll: Fix semi-unbounded recursion kernel: wifi: cfg80211: fix use-after-free in cmp_bss() kernel: of_numa: fix uninitialized memory nodes causing kernel panic kernel: tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus</p> <p>kernel: eventpoll: Fix semi-unbounded recursion kernel: wifi: cfg80211: fix use-after-free in cmp_bss() kernel: of_numa: fix uninitialized memory nodes causing kernel panic kernel: tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/rhsa-2025:21463 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2025:21040-1 <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> <p>Security update for the Linux Kernel</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2025:21040-1 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-39946 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 123 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus Normally we wait for the socket to buffer up the whole record before we service it. If the socket has a tiny buffer, however, we read out the data sooner, to prevent connection stalls. Make sure that we abort the connection when we find out late that the record is actually invalid. Retrying the parsing is fine in itself but since we copy some more data each time before we parse we can overflow the allocated skb space. Constructing a scenario in which we&#39;re under pressure without enough data in the socket to parse the length upfront is quite hard. syzbot figured out a way to do this by serving us the header in small OOB sends, and then filling in the recvbuf with a large normal send. Make sure that tls_rx_msg_size() aborts strp, if we reach an invalid record there&#39;s really no way to recover.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 123 more</p> <p>In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus Normally we wait for the socket to buffer up the whole record before we service it. If the socket has a tiny buffer, however, we read out the data sooner, to prevent connection stalls. Make sure that we abort the connection when we find out late that the record is actually invalid. Retrying the parsing is fine in itself but since we copy some more data each time before we parse we can overflow the allocated skb space. Constructing a scenario in which we&#39;re under pressure without enough data in the socket to parse the length upfront is quite hard. syzbot figured out a way to do this by serving us the header in small OOB sends, and then filling in the recvbuf with a large normal send. Make sure that tls_rx_msg_size() aborts strp, if we reach an invalid record there&#39;s really no way to recover.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-39946 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-2194 <p>Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.</p> <p>Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um nicht näher spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-2194