<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 05:04:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2025-15289</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-15289</link>
      <description>bdu:2025-15289</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-15289</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2025-39828</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2025-39828</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2025-39828</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2025-avi-0825 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provo…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0825</link>
      <description>certfr-2025-avi-0825</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0825</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-317166</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317166</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-317166</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-317166</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-39828</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-39828</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot reported the splat below. [0]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect()
or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel
special message.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length.
Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a
space for an in-kernel pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct atmtcp_control {
  	struct atmtcp_hdr hdr;	/* must be first */
  ...
  	atm_kptr_t vcc;		/* both directions */
  ...
  } __ATM_API_ALIGN;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called
from atmtcp_c_send().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;atmtcp_c_send() is vcc-&amp;gt;dev-&amp;gt;ops-&amp;gt;send() and called from 2 paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc-&amp;gt;send() == atm_send_aal0())
  2. vcc_sendmsg()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and
userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr
by atmtcp_control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let&amp;#39;s add a new -&amp;gt;pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[0]:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gb…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot reported the splat below. [0]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect()
or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel
special message.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length.
Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a
space for an in-kernel pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct atmtcp_control {
  	struct atmtcp_hdr hdr;	/* must be first */
  ...
  	atm_kptr_t vcc;		/* both directions */
  ...
  } __ATM_API_ALIGN;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called
from atmtcp_c_send().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;atmtcp_c_send() is vcc-&amp;gt;dev-&amp;gt;ops-&amp;gt;send() and called from 2 paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc-&amp;gt;send() == atm_send_aal0())
  2. vcc_sendmsg()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and
userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr
by atmtcp_control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let&amp;#39;s add a new -&amp;gt;pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[0]:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gb…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-39828</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2v5c-9mj7-vp9g</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2v5c-9mj7-vp9g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot reported the splat below. [0]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect()
or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel
special message.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length.
Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a
space for an in-kernel pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct atmtcp_control {
  	struct atmtcp_hdr hdr;	/* must be first */
  ...
  	atm_kptr_t vcc;		/* both directions */
  ...
  } __ATM_API_ALIGN;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called
from atmtcp_c_send().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;atmtcp_c_send() is vcc-&amp;gt;dev-&amp;gt;ops-&amp;gt;send() and called from 2 paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc-&amp;gt;send() == atm_send_aal0())
  2. vcc_sendmsg()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and
userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr
by atmtcp_control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let&amp;#39;s add a new -&amp;gt;pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[0]:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gb…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot reported the splat below. [0]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect()
or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel
special message.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length.
Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a
space for an in-kernel pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct atmtcp_control {
  	struct atmtcp_hdr hdr;	/* must be first */
  ...
  	atm_kptr_t vcc;		/* both directions */
  ...
  } __ATM_API_ALIGN;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called
from atmtcp_c_send().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;atmtcp_c_send() is vcc-&amp;gt;dev-&amp;gt;ops-&amp;gt;send() and called from 2 paths:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc-&amp;gt;send() == atm_send_aal0())
  2. vcc_sendmsg()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and
userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr
by atmtcp_control.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let&amp;#39;s add a new -&amp;gt;pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[0]:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gb…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2v5c-9mj7-vp9g</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>ICSA-26-134-10 — Siemens SIMATIC</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/icsa-26-134-10</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&#13;
&#13;
drm/amd/display: Check link_res-&amp;gt;hpo_dp_link_enc before using it&#13;
&#13;
[WHAT &amp;amp; HOW]&#13;
Functions dp_enable_link_phy and dp_disable_link_phy can pass link_res&#13;
without initializing hpo_dp_link_enc and it is necessary to check for&#13;
null before dereferencing.&#13;
&#13;
This fixes 2 FORWARD_NULL issues reported by Coverity. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Encoding file handles is usually performed by a filesystem &amp;gt;encode_fh()
method that may fail for various reasons.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The legacy users of exportfs_encode_fh(), namely, nfsd and
name_to_handle_at(2) syscall are ready to cope with the possibility
of failure to encode a file handle.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are a few other users of exportfs_encode_{fh,fid}() that
currently have a WARN_ON() assertion when -&amp;gt;encode_fh() fails.
Relax those assertions because they are wrong.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The second linked bug report states commit 16aac5ad1fa9 (&amp;#34;ovl: support
encoding non-decodable file handles&amp;#34;) in v6.6 as the regressing commit,
but this is not accurate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The aforementioned commit only increases the chances of the assertion
and allows triggering the assertion with the reproducer using overlayfs,
inotify and drop_caches.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Triggering this assertion was always possible with other filesystems and
other reasons of -&amp;gt;encode_fh() failures and more particularly, it was
also possible with the exact same reproducer using overlay…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&#13;
&#13;
drm/amd/display: Check link_res-&amp;gt;hpo_dp_link_enc before using it&#13;
&#13;
[WHAT &amp;amp; HOW]&#13;
Functions dp_enable_link_phy and dp_disable_link_phy can pass link_res&#13;
without initializing hpo_dp_link_enc and it is necessary to check for&#13;
null before dereferencing.&#13;
&#13;
This fixes 2 FORWARD_NULL issues reported by Coverity. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Encoding file handles is usually performed by a filesystem &amp;gt;encode_fh()
method that may fail for various reasons.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The legacy users of exportfs_encode_fh(), namely, nfsd and
name_to_handle_at(2) syscall are ready to cope with the possibility
of failure to encode a file handle.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are a few other users of exportfs_encode_{fh,fid}() that
currently have a WARN_ON() assertion when -&amp;gt;encode_fh() fails.
Relax those assertions because they are wrong.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The second linked bug report states commit 16aac5ad1fa9 (&amp;#34;ovl: support
encoding non-decodable file handles&amp;#34;) in v6.6 as the regressing commit,
but this is not accurate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The aforementioned commit only increases the chances of the assertion
and allows triggering the assertion with the reproducer using overlayfs,
inotify and drop_caches.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Triggering this assertion was always possible with other filesystems and
other reasons of -&amp;gt;encode_fh() failures and more particularly, it was
also possible with the exact same reproducer using overlay…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/icsa-26-134-10</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2025-39828 — atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control().</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2025-39828</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2025-39828</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2025-39828</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NCSC-2026-0147 — Kwetsbaarheden verholpen in Siemens-producten</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ncsc-2026-0147</link>
      <description>NCSC-2026-0147</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ncsc-2026-0147</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-1303 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-1303</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ptr_ring: do not block hard interrupts in ptr_ring_resize_multiple()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jakub added a lockdep_assert_no_hardirq() check in __page_pool_put_page()
to increase test coverage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot found a splat caused by hard irq blocking in
ptr_ring_resize_multiple() [1]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As current users of ptr_ring_resize_multiple() do not require
hard irqs being masked, replace it to only block BH.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rename helpers to better reflect they are safe against BH only.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- ptr_ring_resize_multiple() to ptr_ring_resize_multiple_bh()
- skb_array_resize_multiple() to skb_array_resize_multiple_bh()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[1]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9150 at net/core/page_pool.c:709 __page_pool_put_page net/core/page_pool.c:709 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9150 at net/core/page_pool.c:709 page_pool_put_unrefed_netmem+0x157/0xa40 net/core/page_pool.c:780
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9150 Comm: syz.1.1052 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00202-gf8669d7b5f5d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
RIP: 0010:__page_pool_put_page net/core/page_pool.c:709 [inline]
RIP: 0010:page_pool_put_unrefed_netmem+0x157/0xa40 net/core/page_pool.c:780
Code: 74 0e e8 7c aa fb f7 eb 43 e8 75 aa fb f7 eb 3c 65 8b 1d 38 a8 6a 76 31 ff 89 de e8 a3 ae fb f7 85 db 74 0b e8 5a aa fb f7 90 &amp;amp;lt;0f&amp;amp;gt; 0b 90 eb 1d 65 8b 1d 15 a8 6a 76 31 ff 89 de e8 84 ae fb f7 85
RSP:…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ptr_ring: do not block hard interrupts in ptr_ring_resize_multiple()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Jakub added a lockdep_assert_no_hardirq() check in __page_pool_put_page()
to increase test coverage.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;syzbot found a splat caused by hard irq blocking in
ptr_ring_resize_multiple() [1]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As current users of ptr_ring_resize_multiple() do not require
hard irqs being masked, replace it to only block BH.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Rename helpers to better reflect they are safe against BH only.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- ptr_ring_resize_multiple() to ptr_ring_resize_multiple_bh()
- skb_array_resize_multiple() to skb_array_resize_multiple_bh()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;[1]&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9150 at net/core/page_pool.c:709 __page_pool_put_page net/core/page_pool.c:709 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9150 at net/core/page_pool.c:709 page_pool_put_unrefed_netmem+0x157/0xa40 net/core/page_pool.c:780
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9150 Comm: syz.1.1052 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00202-gf8669d7b5f5d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
RIP: 0010:__page_pool_put_page net/core/page_pool.c:709 [inline]
RIP: 0010:page_pool_put_unrefed_netmem+0x157/0xa40 net/core/page_pool.c:780
Code: 74 0e e8 7c aa fb f7 eb 43 e8 75 aa fb f7 eb 3c 65 8b 1d 38 a8 6a 76 31 ff 89 de e8 a3 ae fb f7 85 db 74 0b e8 5a aa fb f7 90 &amp;amp;lt;0f&amp;amp;gt; 0b 90 eb 1d 65 8b 1d 15 a8 6a 76 31 ff 89 de e8 84 ae fb f7 85
RSP:…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-1303</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2025:20081-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2025:20081-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2025:20081-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SSA-032379 — SSA-032379: Multiple Vulnerabilities in SIMATIC CN 4100 Before V5.0</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ssa-032379</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&#13;
&#13;
drm/amd/display: Check link_res-&amp;gt;hpo_dp_link_enc before using it&#13;
&#13;
[WHAT &amp;amp; HOW]&#13;
Functions dp_enable_link_phy and dp_disable_link_phy can pass link_res&#13;
without initializing hpo_dp_link_enc and it is necessary to check for&#13;
null before dereferencing.&#13;
&#13;
This fixes 2 FORWARD_NULL issues reported by Coverity. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Encoding file handles is usually performed by a filesystem &amp;gt;encode_fh()
method that may fail for various reasons.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The legacy users of exportfs_encode_fh(), namely, nfsd and
name_to_handle_at(2) syscall are ready to cope with the possibility
of failure to encode a file handle.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are a few other users of exportfs_encode_{fh,fid}() that
currently have a WARN_ON() assertion when -&amp;gt;encode_fh() fails.
Relax those assertions because they are wrong.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The second linked bug report states commit 16aac5ad1fa9 (&amp;#34;ovl: support
encoding non-decodable file handles&amp;#34;) in v6.6 as the regressing commit,
but this is not accurate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The aforementioned commit only increases the chances of the assertion
and allows triggering the assertion with the reproducer using overlayfs,
inotify and drop_caches.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Triggering this assertion was always possible with other filesystems and
other reasons of -&amp;gt;encode_fh() failures and more particularly, it was
also possible with the exact same reproducer using overlay…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&#13;
&#13;
drm/amd/display: Check link_res-&amp;gt;hpo_dp_link_enc before using it&#13;
&#13;
[WHAT &amp;amp; HOW]&#13;
Functions dp_enable_link_phy and dp_disable_link_phy can pass link_res&#13;
without initializing hpo_dp_link_enc and it is necessary to check for&#13;
null before dereferencing.&#13;
&#13;
This fixes 2 FORWARD_NULL issues reported by Coverity. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Encoding file handles is usually performed by a filesystem &amp;gt;encode_fh()
method that may fail for various reasons.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The legacy users of exportfs_encode_fh(), namely, nfsd and
name_to_handle_at(2) syscall are ready to cope with the possibility
of failure to encode a file handle.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;There are a few other users of exportfs_encode_{fh,fid}() that
currently have a WARN_ON() assertion when -&amp;gt;encode_fh() fails.
Relax those assertions because they are wrong.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The second linked bug report states commit 16aac5ad1fa9 (&amp;#34;ovl: support
encoding non-decodable file handles&amp;#34;) in v6.6 as the regressing commit,
but this is not accurate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The aforementioned commit only increases the chances of the assertion
and allows triggering the assertion with the reproducer using overlayfs,
inotify and drop_caches.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Triggering this assertion was always possible with other filesystems and
other reasons of -&amp;gt;encode_fh() failures and more particularly, it was
also possible with the exact same reproducer using overlay…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ssa-032379</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2025:03634-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2025:03634-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2025:03634-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2025-39828</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-39828</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 215 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control(). syzbot reported the splat below. [0] When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect() or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel special message. The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length. Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc. The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a space for an in-kernel pointer.   struct atmtcp_control {   	struct atmtcp_hdr hdr;	/* must be first */   ...   	atm_kptr_t vcc;		/* both directions */   ...   } __ATM_API_ALIGN;   typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t; The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called from atmtcp_c_send(). atmtcp_c_send() is vcc-&amp;gt;dev-&amp;gt;ops-&amp;gt;send() and called from 2 paths:   1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc-&amp;gt;send() == atm_send_aal0())   2. vcc_sendmsg() The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr by atmtcp_control. Let&amp;#39;s add a new -&amp;gt;pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg(). [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gbab3ce404553 #…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 215 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control(). syzbot reported the splat below. [0] When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect() or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel special message. The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length. Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc. The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a space for an in-kernel pointer.   struct atmtcp_control {   	struct atmtcp_hdr hdr;	/* must be first */   ...   	atm_kptr_t vcc;		/* both directions */   ...   } __ATM_API_ALIGN;   typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t; The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called from atmtcp_c_send(). atmtcp_c_send() is vcc-&amp;gt;dev-&amp;gt;ops-&amp;gt;send() and called from 2 paths:   1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc-&amp;gt;send() == atm_send_aal0())   2. vcc_sendmsg() The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr by atmtcp_control. Let&amp;#39;s add a new -&amp;gt;pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg(). [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gbab3ce404553 #…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-39828</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2025-2077 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-2077</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder nicht näher beschriebene Auswirkungen zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder nicht näher beschriebene Auswirkungen zu erzielen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-2077</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
