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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 06:05:48 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2025-11860</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-11860</link>
      <description>bdu:2025-11860</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-11860</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2025-39735</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2025-39735</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2025-39735</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2025-avi-0368 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provo…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0368</link>
      <description>certfr-2025-avi-0368</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0368</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-347193</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-347193</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-347193</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-347193</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-39735</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-39735</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During the &amp;#34;size_check&amp;#34; label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended
attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs
&amp;#34;ea_get: invalid extended attribute&amp;#34; and calls print_hex_dump().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf-&amp;gt;xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds
INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf-&amp;gt;xattr));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper
limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads
&amp;#34;size&amp;#34; to wrap around and become negative (-184549328).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &amp;#34;size&amp;#34; is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called &amp;#34;len&amp;#34; in
print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned
type), this is then stored inside a variable called
&amp;#34;int remaining&amp;#34;, which is then assigned to &amp;#34;int linelen&amp;#34; which
is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump()
the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is
18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer()
on each iteration:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;for (i = 0; i &amp;lt; len; i += rowsize) {
		linelen = min(remaining, rowsize);
		remaining -= rowsize;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize,
				   linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;...
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The expected stopping condition (i &amp;lt; len) is effectively broken
since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to
the &amp;#34;ptr+i&amp;#34; being passed t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During the &amp;#34;size_check&amp;#34; label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended
attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs
&amp;#34;ea_get: invalid extended attribute&amp;#34; and calls print_hex_dump().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf-&amp;gt;xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds
INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf-&amp;gt;xattr));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper
limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads
&amp;#34;size&amp;#34; to wrap around and become negative (-184549328).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &amp;#34;size&amp;#34; is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called &amp;#34;len&amp;#34; in
print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned
type), this is then stored inside a variable called
&amp;#34;int remaining&amp;#34;, which is then assigned to &amp;#34;int linelen&amp;#34; which
is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump()
the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is
18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer()
on each iteration:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;for (i = 0; i &amp;lt; len; i += rowsize) {
		linelen = min(remaining, rowsize);
		remaining -= rowsize;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize,
				   linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;...
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The expected stopping condition (i &amp;lt; len) is effectively broken
since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to
the &amp;#34;ptr+i&amp;#34; being passed t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-39735</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rh6v-853j-mqjh</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rh6v-853j-mqjh</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During the &amp;#34;size_check&amp;#34; label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended
attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs
&amp;#34;ea_get: invalid extended attribute&amp;#34; and calls print_hex_dump().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf-&amp;gt;xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds
INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf-&amp;gt;xattr));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper
limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads
&amp;#34;size&amp;#34; to wrap around and become negative (-184549328).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &amp;#34;size&amp;#34; is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called &amp;#34;len&amp;#34; in
print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned
type), this is then stored inside a variable called
&amp;#34;int remaining&amp;#34;, which is then assigned to &amp;#34;int linelen&amp;#34; which
is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump()
the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is
18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer()
on each iteration:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;for (i = 0; i &amp;lt; len; i += rowsize) {
		linelen = min(remaining, rowsize);
		remaining -= rowsize;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize,
				   linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;...
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The expected stopping condition (i &amp;lt; len) is effectively broken
since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to
the &amp;#34;ptr+i&amp;#34; being passed t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During the &amp;#34;size_check&amp;#34; label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended
attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs
&amp;#34;ea_get: invalid extended attribute&amp;#34; and calls print_hex_dump().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf-&amp;gt;xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds
INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf-&amp;gt;xattr));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper
limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads
&amp;#34;size&amp;#34; to wrap around and become negative (-184549328).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The &amp;#34;size&amp;#34; is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called &amp;#34;len&amp;#34; in
print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned
type), this is then stored inside a variable called
&amp;#34;int remaining&amp;#34;, which is then assigned to &amp;#34;int linelen&amp;#34; which
is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump()
the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is
18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer()
on each iteration:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;for (i = 0; i &amp;lt; len; i += rowsize) {
		linelen = min(remaining, rowsize);
		remaining -= rowsize;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize,
				   linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;...
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The expected stopping condition (i &amp;lt; len) is effectively broken
since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to
the &amp;#34;ptr+i&amp;#34; being passed t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rh6v-853j-mqjh</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2025-39735 — jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2025-39735</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2025-39735</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2025-39735</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2025-1729 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2025-1729</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:genirq/irqdesc: Prevent use-after-free in irq_find_at_or_after()irq_find_at_or_after() dereferences the interrupt descriptor which isreturned by mt_find() while neither holding sparse_irq_lock nor RCU readlock, which means the descriptor can be freed between mt_find() and thedereference:    CPU0                            CPU1    desc = mt_find()                                    delayed_free_desc(desc)    irq_desc_get_irq(desc)The use-after-free is reported by KASAN:    Call trace:     irq_get_next_irq+0x58/0x84     show_stat+0x638/0x824     seq_read_iter+0x158/0x4ec     proc_reg_read_iter+0x94/0x12c     vfs_read+0x1e0/0x2c8    Freed by task 4471:     slab_free_freelist_hook+0x174/0x1e0     __kmem_cache_free+0xa4/0x1dc     kfree+0x64/0x128     irq_kobj_release+0x28/0x3c     kobject_put+0xcc/0x1e0     delayed_free_desc+0x14/0x2c     rcu_do_batch+0x214/0x720Guard the access with a RCU read lock section.(CVE-2024-38385)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/lima: fix shared irq handling on driver remove&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;lima uses a shared interrupt, so the interrupt handlers must be prepared
to be called at any time. At driver removal time, the clocks are
disabled early and the interrupts stay registered until the very end of
the remove process due to the devm usage.
This is potentially a bug as the interrupts access…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:genirq/irqdesc: Prevent use-after-free in irq_find_at_or_after()irq_find_at_or_after() dereferences the interrupt descriptor which isreturned by mt_find() while neither holding sparse_irq_lock nor RCU readlock, which means the descriptor can be freed between mt_find() and thedereference:    CPU0                            CPU1    desc = mt_find()                                    delayed_free_desc(desc)    irq_desc_get_irq(desc)The use-after-free is reported by KASAN:    Call trace:     irq_get_next_irq+0x58/0x84     show_stat+0x638/0x824     seq_read_iter+0x158/0x4ec     proc_reg_read_iter+0x94/0x12c     vfs_read+0x1e0/0x2c8    Freed by task 4471:     slab_free_freelist_hook+0x174/0x1e0     __kmem_cache_free+0xa4/0x1dc     kfree+0x64/0x128     irq_kobj_release+0x28/0x3c     kobject_put+0xcc/0x1e0     delayed_free_desc+0x14/0x2c     rcu_do_batch+0x214/0x720Guard the access with a RCU read lock section.(CVE-2024-38385)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/lima: fix shared irq handling on driver remove&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;lima uses a shared interrupt, so the interrupt handlers must be prepared
to be called at any time. At driver removal time, the clocks are
disabled early and the interrupts stay registered until the very end of
the remove process due to the devm usage.
This is potentially a bug as the interrupts access…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2025-1729</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2025:01620-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2025:01620-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2025:01620-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2025-39735</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-39735</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 167 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get() During the &amp;#34;size_check&amp;#34; label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs &amp;#34;ea_get: invalid extended attribute&amp;#34; and calls print_hex_dump(). Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf-&amp;gt;xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped: 	int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf-&amp;gt;xattr)); Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads &amp;#34;size&amp;#34; to wrap around and become negative (-184549328). The &amp;#34;size&amp;#34; is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called &amp;#34;len&amp;#34; in print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned type), this is then stored inside a variable called &amp;#34;int remaining&amp;#34;, which is then assigned to &amp;#34;int linelen&amp;#34; which is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump() the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is 18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer() on each iteration: 	for (i = 0; i &amp;lt; len; i += rowsize) { 		linelen = min(remaining, rowsize); 		remaining -= rowsize; 		hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize, 				   linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii); 		... 	} The expected stopping condition (i &amp;lt; len) is effectively broken since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to the &amp;#34;ptr+i&amp;#34; being passed to hex_dump…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 167 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get() During the &amp;#34;size_check&amp;#34; label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs &amp;#34;ea_get: invalid extended attribute&amp;#34; and calls print_hex_dump(). Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf-&amp;gt;xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped: 	int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf-&amp;gt;xattr)); Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads &amp;#34;size&amp;#34; to wrap around and become negative (-184549328). The &amp;#34;size&amp;#34; is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called &amp;#34;len&amp;#34; in print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned type), this is then stored inside a variable called &amp;#34;int remaining&amp;#34;, which is then assigned to &amp;#34;int linelen&amp;#34; which is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump() the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is 18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer() on each iteration: 	for (i = 0; i &amp;lt; len; i += rowsize) { 		linelen = min(remaining, rowsize); 		remaining -= rowsize; 		hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize, 				   linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii); 		... 	} The expected stopping condition (i &amp;lt; len) is effectively broken since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to the &amp;#34;ptr+i&amp;#34; being passed to hex_dump…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-39735</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2025-0861 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-0861</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand oder nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkungen zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Zustand oder nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkungen zu verursachen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-0861</guid>
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