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ALSA-2025:16880 — Moderate: kernel security update

Affected: AlmaLinux:9: kernel, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-core, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-core, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-devel, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-devel-matched, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-modules, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-modules-core, AlmaLinux:9: kernel-64k-debug-modules-extra and 66 more

The kernel packages contain the Linux kernel, the core of any Linux operating system.

Security Fix(es):

* kernel: netfilter: nf_conntrack: fix crash due to removal of uninitialised entry (CVE-2025-38472) * kernel: smb: client: fix use-after-free in cifs_oplock_break (CVE-2025-38527) * kernel: sctp: linearize cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv (CVE-2025-38718) * kernel: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list (CVE-2025-39682) * kernel: io_uring/futex: ensure io_futex_wait() cleans up properly on failure (CVE-2025-39698)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

bdu:2025-12988

BELL-CVE-2025-39682

Affected: Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts

certfr-2025-avi-0825 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provo…

certfr-2025-avi-0825

EUVD-2026-372461

fkie_cve-2025-39682

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list

Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record

If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there.

Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length).

Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.

GHSA-v2pf-75pf-9c5h

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list

Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record

ICSA-26-134-10 — Siemens SIMATIC

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Check link_res->hpo_dp_link_enc before using it [WHAT & HOW] Functions dp_enable_link_phy and dp_disable_link_phy can pass link_res without initializing hpo_dp_link_enc and it is necessary to check for null before dereferencing. This fixes 2 FORWARD_NULL issues reported by Coverity. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles

Encoding file handles is usually performed by a filesystem >encode_fh() method that may fail for various reasons.

The legacy users of exportfs_encode_fh(), namely, nfsd and name_to_handle_at(2) syscall are ready to cope with the possibility of failure to encode a file handle.

There are a few other users of exportfs_encode_{fh,fid}() that currently have a WARN_ON() assertion when ->encode_fh() fails. Relax those assertions because they are wrong.

The second linked bug report states commit 16aac5ad1fa9 ("ovl: support encoding non-decodable file handles") in v6.6 as the regressing commit, but this is not accurate.

The aforementioned commit only increases the chances of the assertion and allows triggering the assertion with the reproducer using overlayfs, inotify and drop_caches.

Triggering this assertion was always possible with other filesystems and other reasons of ->encode_fh() failures and more particularly, it was also possible with the exact same reproducer using overlay…

msrc_CVE-2025-39682 — tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list

msrc_CVE-2025-39682

NCSC-2026-0074 — Kwetsbaarheden verholpen in Google Android en Samsung Mobile

NCSC-2026-0074

OESA-2026-2417 — kernel security update

Affected: openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel

The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself. Security Fix(es):

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:mm/mempolicy: fix migrate_to_node() assuming there is at least one VMA in a MMWe currently assume that there is at least one VMA in a MM, which isn ttrue.So we might end up having find_vma() return NULL, to then de-referenceNULL. So properly handle find_vma() returning NULL.This fixes the report:Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTIKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6021 Comm: syz-executor284 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc7-syzkaller-00187-gf868cd251776 #0Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024RIP: 0010:migrate_to_node mm/mempolicy.c:1090 [inline]RIP: 0010:do_migrate_pages+0x403/0x6f0 mm/mempolicy.c:1194Code: ...RSP: 0018:ffffc9000375fd08 EFLAGS: 00010246RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000375fd78 RCX: 0000000000000000RDX: ffff88807e171300 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88803390c044RBP: ffff88807e171428 R08: 0000000000000014 R09: fffffbfff2039ef1R10: ffffffff901cf78f R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000003R13: ffffc9000375fe90 R14: ffffc9000375fe98 R15: ffffc9000375fdf8FS: 00005555919e1380(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033CR2: 00005555919e1ca8 CR3: 000000007f12a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0DR0…

openSUSE-SU-2025:20081-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

RHSA-2025:16904 — Red Hat Security Advisory: kernel security update

kernel: fs: export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix secretmem LSM bypass kernel: cifs: Fix the smbd_response slab to allow usercopy kernel: smb: client: fix use-after-free in cifs_oplock_break kernel: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list kernel: s390/sclp: Fix SCCB present check kernel: io_uring/futex: ensure io_futex_wait() cleans up properly on failure

SSA-032379 — SSA-032379: Multiple Vulnerabilities in SIMATIC CN 4100 Before V5.0

fs: relax assertions on failure to encode file handles

Encoding file handles is usually performed by a filesystem >encode_fh() method that may fail for various reasons.

The legacy users of exportfs_encode_fh(), namely, nfsd and name_to_handle_at(2) syscall are ready to cope with the possibility of failure to encode a file handle.

There are a few other users of exportfs_encode_{fh,fid}() that currently have a WARN_ON() assertion when ->encode_fh() fails. Relax those assertions because they are wrong.

The second linked bug report states commit 16aac5ad1fa9 ("ovl: support encoding non-decodable file handles") in v6.6 as the regressing commit, but this is not accurate.

The aforementioned commit only increases the chances of the assertion and allows triggering the assertion with the reproducer using overlayfs, inotify and drop_caches.

SUSE-SU-2025:03600-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel

Security update for the Linux Kernel

UBUNTU-CVE-2025-39682

Affected: Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 120 more

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Each recvmsg() call must process either - only contiguous DATA records (any number of them) - one non-DATA record If the next record has different type than what has already been processed we break out of the main processing loop. If the record has already been decrypted (which may be the case for TLS 1.3 where we don't know type until decryption) we queue the pending record to the rx_list. Next recvmsg() will pick it up from there. Queuing the skb to rx_list after zero-copy decrypt is not possible, since in that case we decrypted directly to the user space buffer, and we don't have an skb to queue (darg.skb points to the ciphertext skb for access to metadata like length). Only data records are allowed zero-copy, and we break the processing loop after each non-data record. So we should never zero-copy and then find out that the record type has changed. The corner case we missed is when the initial record comes from rx_list, and it's zero length.

WID-SEC-W-2025-1988 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Denial of Service

Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder nicht näher spezifizierte Auswirkungen zu erzielen.