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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 20:56:19 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2025-13521</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-13521</link>
      <description>bdu:2025-13521</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-13521</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2025-38493</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2025-38493</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2025-38493</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2025-avi-0698 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0698</link>
      <description>certfr-2025-avi-0698</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0698</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-314627</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-314627</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-314627</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-314627</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-38493</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-38493</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing/osnoise: Fix crash in timerlat_dump_stack()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We have observed kernel panics when using timerlat with stack saving,
with the following dmesg output:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 88 byte write of buffer size 0
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 8153 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x55/0xa0
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 8153 Comm: timerlatu/2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.15.3-200.fc42.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Call Trace:
 &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;
 ? trace_buffer_lock_reserve+0x2a/0x60
 __fortify_panic+0xd/0xf
 __timerlat_dump_stack.cold+0xd/0xd
 timerlat_dump_stack.part.0+0x47/0x80
 timerlat_fd_read+0x36d/0x390
 vfs_read+0xe2/0x390
 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d5/0x210
 ksys_read+0x73/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x160
 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__timerlat_dump_stack() constructs the ftrace stack entry like this:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct stack_entry *entry;
...
memcpy(&amp;amp;entry-&amp;gt;caller, fstack-&amp;gt;calls, size);
entry-&amp;gt;size = fstack-&amp;gt;nr_entries;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since commit e7186af7fb26 (&amp;#34;tracing: Add back FORTIFY_SOURCE logic to
kernel_stack event structure&amp;#34;), struct stack_entry marks its caller
field with __counted_by(size). At the time of the memcpy, entry-&amp;gt;size
contains garbage from the ringbuffer, which under some circumstances is
zero, triggering a kernel panic by buffer overflow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Populate the size field before the memcpy so that the out-of-bounds
check knows the correct size. This is analogous to
__ftrace_trace_s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing/osnoise: Fix crash in timerlat_dump_stack()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We have observed kernel panics when using timerlat with stack saving,
with the following dmesg output:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 88 byte write of buffer size 0
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 8153 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x55/0xa0
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 8153 Comm: timerlatu/2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.15.3-200.fc42.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Call Trace:
 &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;
 ? trace_buffer_lock_reserve+0x2a/0x60
 __fortify_panic+0xd/0xf
 __timerlat_dump_stack.cold+0xd/0xd
 timerlat_dump_stack.part.0+0x47/0x80
 timerlat_fd_read+0x36d/0x390
 vfs_read+0xe2/0x390
 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d5/0x210
 ksys_read+0x73/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x160
 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__timerlat_dump_stack() constructs the ftrace stack entry like this:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct stack_entry *entry;
...
memcpy(&amp;amp;entry-&amp;gt;caller, fstack-&amp;gt;calls, size);
entry-&amp;gt;size = fstack-&amp;gt;nr_entries;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since commit e7186af7fb26 (&amp;#34;tracing: Add back FORTIFY_SOURCE logic to
kernel_stack event structure&amp;#34;), struct stack_entry marks its caller
field with __counted_by(size). At the time of the memcpy, entry-&amp;gt;size
contains garbage from the ringbuffer, which under some circumstances is
zero, triggering a kernel panic by buffer overflow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Populate the size field before the memcpy so that the out-of-bounds
check knows the correct size. This is analogous to
__ftrace_trace_s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-38493</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2xmx-r7cc-9x6c</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2xmx-r7cc-9x6c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing/osnoise: Fix crash in timerlat_dump_stack()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We have observed kernel panics when using timerlat with stack saving,
with the following dmesg output:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 88 byte write of buffer size 0
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 8153 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x55/0xa0
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 8153 Comm: timerlatu/2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.15.3-200.fc42.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Call Trace:
 &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;
 ? trace_buffer_lock_reserve+0x2a/0x60
 __fortify_panic+0xd/0xf
 __timerlat_dump_stack.cold+0xd/0xd
 timerlat_dump_stack.part.0+0x47/0x80
 timerlat_fd_read+0x36d/0x390
 vfs_read+0xe2/0x390
 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d5/0x210
 ksys_read+0x73/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x160
 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__timerlat_dump_stack() constructs the ftrace stack entry like this:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct stack_entry *entry;
...
memcpy(&amp;amp;entry-&amp;gt;caller, fstack-&amp;gt;calls, size);
entry-&amp;gt;size = fstack-&amp;gt;nr_entries;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since commit e7186af7fb26 (&amp;#34;tracing: Add back FORTIFY_SOURCE logic to
kernel_stack event structure&amp;#34;), struct stack_entry marks its caller
field with __counted_by(size). At the time of the memcpy, entry-&amp;gt;size
contains garbage from the ringbuffer, which under some circumstances is
zero, triggering a kernel panic by buffer overflow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Populate the size field before the memcpy so that the out-of-bounds
check knows the correct size. This is analogous to
__ftrace_trace_s…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tracing/osnoise: Fix crash in timerlat_dump_stack()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We have observed kernel panics when using timerlat with stack saving,
with the following dmesg output:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 88 byte write of buffer size 0
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 8153 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x55/0xa0
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 8153 Comm: timerlatu/2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.15.3-200.fc42.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Call Trace:
 &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;
 ? trace_buffer_lock_reserve+0x2a/0x60
 __fortify_panic+0xd/0xf
 __timerlat_dump_stack.cold+0xd/0xd
 timerlat_dump_stack.part.0+0x47/0x80
 timerlat_fd_read+0x36d/0x390
 vfs_read+0xe2/0x390
 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d5/0x210
 ksys_read+0x73/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x160
 ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__timerlat_dump_stack() constructs the ftrace stack entry like this:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;struct stack_entry *entry;
...
memcpy(&amp;amp;entry-&amp;gt;caller, fstack-&amp;gt;calls, size);
entry-&amp;gt;size = fstack-&amp;gt;nr_entries;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since commit e7186af7fb26 (&amp;#34;tracing: Add back FORTIFY_SOURCE logic to
kernel_stack event structure&amp;#34;), struct stack_entry marks its caller
field with __counted_by(size). At the time of the memcpy, entry-&amp;gt;size
contains garbage from the ringbuffer, which under some circumstances is
zero, triggering a kernel panic by buffer overflow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Populate the size field before the memcpy so that the out-of-bounds
check knows the correct size. This is analogous to
__ftrace_trace_s…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-2xmx-r7cc-9x6c</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2025-38493 — tracing/osnoise: Fix crash in timerlat_dump_stack()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2025-38493</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2025-38493</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2025-38493</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2025:20081-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2025:20081-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2025:20081-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2025:21074-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2025:21074-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2025:21074-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2025-38493</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-38493</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 123 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing/osnoise: Fix crash in timerlat_dump_stack() We have observed kernel panics when using timerlat with stack saving, with the following dmesg output: memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 88 byte write of buffer size 0 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 8153 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x55/0xa0 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 8153 Comm: timerlatu/2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.15.3-200.fc42.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Call Trace:  &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;  ? trace_buffer_lock_reserve+0x2a/0x60  __fortify_panic+0xd/0xf  __timerlat_dump_stack.cold+0xd/0xd  timerlat_dump_stack.part.0+0x47/0x80  timerlat_fd_read+0x36d/0x390  vfs_read+0xe2/0x390  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d5/0x210  ksys_read+0x73/0xe0  do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x160  ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e __timerlat_dump_stack() constructs the ftrace stack entry like this: struct stack_entry *entry; ... memcpy(&amp;amp;entry-&amp;gt;caller, fstack-&amp;gt;calls, size); entry-&amp;gt;size = fstack-&amp;gt;nr_entries; Since commit e7186af7fb26 (&amp;#34;tracing: Add back FORTIFY_SOURCE logic to kernel_stack event structure&amp;#34;), struct stack_entry marks its caller field with __counted_by(size). At the time of the memcpy, entry-&amp;gt;size contains garbage from the ringbuffer, which under some circumstances is zero, triggering a kernel panic by buffer overflow. Populate the size field before the memcpy so that the out-of-bounds check knows the correct size. This is analogous to __ftrace_trace_stack().&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 123 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing/osnoise: Fix crash in timerlat_dump_stack() We have observed kernel panics when using timerlat with stack saving, with the following dmesg output: memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 88 byte write of buffer size 0 WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 8153 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x55/0xa0 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 8153 Comm: timerlatu/2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.15.3-200.fc42.x86_64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Call Trace:  &amp;lt;TASK&amp;gt;  ? trace_buffer_lock_reserve+0x2a/0x60  __fortify_panic+0xd/0xf  __timerlat_dump_stack.cold+0xd/0xd  timerlat_dump_stack.part.0+0x47/0x80  timerlat_fd_read+0x36d/0x390  vfs_read+0xe2/0x390  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d5/0x210  ksys_read+0x73/0xe0  do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x160  ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x1a0  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e __timerlat_dump_stack() constructs the ftrace stack entry like this: struct stack_entry *entry; ... memcpy(&amp;amp;entry-&amp;gt;caller, fstack-&amp;gt;calls, size); entry-&amp;gt;size = fstack-&amp;gt;nr_entries; Since commit e7186af7fb26 (&amp;#34;tracing: Add back FORTIFY_SOURCE logic to kernel_stack event structure&amp;#34;), struct stack_entry marks its caller field with __counted_by(size). At the time of the memcpy, entry-&amp;gt;size contains garbage from the ringbuffer, which under some circumstances is zero, triggering a kernel panic by buffer overflow. Populate the size field before the memcpy so that the out-of-bounds check knows the correct size. This is analogous to __ftrace_trace_stack().&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-38493</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2025-1665 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-1665</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder andere nicht spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen oder andere nicht spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-1665</guid>
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