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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 01:23:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2025-09720</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-09720</link>
      <description>bdu:2025-09720</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-09720</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2025-38424</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2025-38424</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2025-38424</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2025-avi-0698 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0698</link>
      <description>certfr-2025-avi-0698</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0698</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-347037</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-347037</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-347037</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-347037</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-38424</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-38424</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf: Fix sample vs do_exit()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a
synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access
MMIO in bad ways.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in
exit_mmap()&amp;#39;s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address
space it is trying to access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a
receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for
various reasons.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER
to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes
sure to set current-&amp;gt;mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual
teardown). Such that CPU wide events don&amp;#39;t trip on this same problem.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf: Fix sample vs do_exit()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a
synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access
MMIO in bad ways.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in
exit_mmap()&amp;#39;s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address
space it is trying to access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a
receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for
various reasons.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER
to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes
sure to set current-&amp;gt;mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual
teardown). Such that CPU wide events don&amp;#39;t trip on this same problem.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-38424</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-6p9w-8r99-f39c</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6p9w-8r99-f39c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf: Fix sample vs do_exit()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a
synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access
MMIO in bad ways.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in
exit_mmap()&amp;#39;s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address
space it is trying to access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a
receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for
various reasons.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER
to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes
sure to set current-&amp;gt;mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual
teardown). Such that CPU wide events don&amp;#39;t trip on this same problem.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;perf: Fix sample vs do_exit()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a
synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access
MMIO in bad ways.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in
exit_mmap()&amp;#39;s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address
space it is trying to access.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a
receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for
various reasons.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER
to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes
sure to set current-&amp;gt;mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual
teardown). Such that CPU wide events don&amp;#39;t trip on this same problem.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-6p9w-8r99-f39c</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2025-38424 — perf: Fix sample vs do_exit()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2025-38424</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2025-38424</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2025-38424</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2025-1959 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2025-1959</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm: state: fix out-of-bounds read during lookup&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;lookup and resize can run in parallel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The xfrm_state_hash_generation seqlock ensures a retry, but the hash
functions can observe a hmask value that is too large for the new hlist
array.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rehash does:
  rcu_assign_pointer(net-&amp;amp;gt;xfrm.state_bydst, ndst) [..]
  net-&amp;amp;gt;xfrm.state_hmask = nhashmask;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While state lookup does:
  h = xfrm_dst_hash(net, daddr, saddr, tmpl-&amp;amp;gt;reqid, encap_family);
  hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net-&amp;amp;gt;xfrm.state_bydst + h, bydst) {&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is only safe in case the update to state_bydst is larger than
net-&amp;amp;gt;xfrm.xfrm_state_hmask (or if the lookup function gets
serialized via state spinlock again).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by prefetching state_hmask and the associated pointers.
The xfrm_state_hash_generation seqlock retry will ensure that the pointer
and the hmask will be consistent.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The existing helpers, like xfrm_dst_hash(), are now unsafe for RCU side,
add lockdep assertions to document that they are only safe for insert
side.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr() uses the spinlock rather than RCU.
AFAICS this is an oversight from back when state lookup was converted to
RCU, this lock should be replaced with RCU in a future patch.(CVE-2024-57982)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;eth: bnxt: always recalculate features after XDP clearing, fix n…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm: state: fix out-of-bounds read during lookup&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;lookup and resize can run in parallel.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The xfrm_state_hash_generation seqlock ensures a retry, but the hash
functions can observe a hmask value that is too large for the new hlist
array.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rehash does:
  rcu_assign_pointer(net-&amp;amp;gt;xfrm.state_bydst, ndst) [..]
  net-&amp;amp;gt;xfrm.state_hmask = nhashmask;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While state lookup does:
  h = xfrm_dst_hash(net, daddr, saddr, tmpl-&amp;amp;gt;reqid, encap_family);
  hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net-&amp;amp;gt;xfrm.state_bydst + h, bydst) {&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This is only safe in case the update to state_bydst is larger than
net-&amp;amp;gt;xfrm.xfrm_state_hmask (or if the lookup function gets
serialized via state spinlock again).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by prefetching state_hmask and the associated pointers.
The xfrm_state_hash_generation seqlock retry will ensure that the pointer
and the hmask will be consistent.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The existing helpers, like xfrm_dst_hash(), are now unsafe for RCU side,
add lockdep assertions to document that they are only safe for insert
side.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr() uses the spinlock rather than RCU.
AFAICS this is an oversight from back when state lookup was converted to
RCU, this lock should be replaced with RCU in a future patch.(CVE-2024-57982)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;eth: bnxt: always recalculate features after XDP clearing, fix n…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2025-1959</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2025:20081-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2025:20081-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2025:20081-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2025:02853-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2025:02853-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2025:02853-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2025-38424</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-38424</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 213 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: Fix sample vs do_exit() Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access MMIO in bad ways. The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in exit_mmap()&amp;#39;s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address space it is trying to access. It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for various reasons. Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit(). Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes sure to set current-&amp;gt;mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual teardown). Such that CPU wide events don&amp;#39;t trip on this same problem.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:14.04:LTS: linux-lts-xenial, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-aws-hwe, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe and 213 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: Fix sample vs do_exit() Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access MMIO in bad ways. The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in exit_mmap()&amp;#39;s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address space it is trying to access. It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for various reasons. Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit(). Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes sure to set current-&amp;gt;mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual teardown). Such that CPU wide events don&amp;#39;t trip on this same problem.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-38424</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2025-1653 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-1653</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux-Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu erzeugen oder andere nicht spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein entfernter anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux-Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu erzeugen oder andere nicht spezifizierte Angriffe durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-1653</guid>
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