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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 19:49:12 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>bdu:2025-12288</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-12288</link>
      <description>bdu:2025-12288</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bdu:2025-12288</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>BELL-CVE-2025-38062</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2025-38062</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Alpaquita:23: linux-lts, Alpaquita:25: linux-lts, Alpaquita:stream: linux-lts&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/bell-cve-2025-38062</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2025-avi-0698 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de Debian. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0698</link>
      <description>certfr-2025-avi-0698</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0698</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-346901</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-346901</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-346901</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-346901</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-38062</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-38062</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The IOMMU translation for MSI message addresses has been a 2-step process,
separated in time:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) iommu_dma_prepare_msi(): A cookie pointer containing the IOVA address
    is stored in the MSI descriptor when an MSI interrupt is allocated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2) iommu_dma_compose_msi_msg(): this cookie pointer is used to compute a
    translated message address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This has an inherent lifetime problem for the pointer stored in the cookie
that must remain valid between the two steps. However, there is no locking
at the irq layer that helps protect the lifetime. Today, this works under
the assumption that the iommu domain is not changed while MSI interrupts
being programmed. This is true for normal DMA API users within the kernel,
as the iommu domain is attached before the driver is probed and cannot be
changed while a driver is attached.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Classic VFIO type1 also prevented changing the iommu domain while VFIO was
running as it does not support changing the &amp;#34;container&amp;#34; after starting up.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, iommufd has improved this so that the iommu domain can be changed
during VFIO operation. This potentially allows userspace to directly race
VFIO_DEVICE_ATTACH_IOMMUFD_PT (which calls iommu_attach_group()) and
VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS (which calls into iommu_dma_compose_msi_msg()).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This potentially causes both the cookie pointer and the unlocked call to
iommu_g…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The IOMMU translation for MSI message addresses has been a 2-step process,
separated in time:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) iommu_dma_prepare_msi(): A cookie pointer containing the IOVA address
    is stored in the MSI descriptor when an MSI interrupt is allocated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2) iommu_dma_compose_msi_msg(): this cookie pointer is used to compute a
    translated message address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This has an inherent lifetime problem for the pointer stored in the cookie
that must remain valid between the two steps. However, there is no locking
at the irq layer that helps protect the lifetime. Today, this works under
the assumption that the iommu domain is not changed while MSI interrupts
being programmed. This is true for normal DMA API users within the kernel,
as the iommu domain is attached before the driver is probed and cannot be
changed while a driver is attached.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Classic VFIO type1 also prevented changing the iommu domain while VFIO was
running as it does not support changing the &amp;#34;container&amp;#34; after starting up.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, iommufd has improved this so that the iommu domain can be changed
during VFIO operation. This potentially allows userspace to directly race
VFIO_DEVICE_ATTACH_IOMMUFD_PT (which calls iommu_attach_group()) and
VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS (which calls into iommu_dma_compose_msi_msg()).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This potentially causes both the cookie pointer and the unlocked call to
iommu_g…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-38062</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-35hv-9h7x-xw9j</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-35hv-9h7x-xw9j</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The IOMMU translation for MSI message addresses has been a 2-step process,
separated in time:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) iommu_dma_prepare_msi(): A cookie pointer containing the IOVA address
    is stored in the MSI descriptor when an MSI interrupt is allocated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2) iommu_dma_compose_msi_msg(): this cookie pointer is used to compute a
    translated message address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This has an inherent lifetime problem for the pointer stored in the cookie
that must remain valid between the two steps. However, there is no locking
at the irq layer that helps protect the lifetime. Today, this works under
the assumption that the iommu domain is not changed while MSI interrupts
being programmed. This is true for normal DMA API users within the kernel,
as the iommu domain is attached before the driver is probed and cannot be
changed while a driver is attached.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Classic VFIO type1 also prevented changing the iommu domain while VFIO was
running as it does not support changing the &amp;#34;container&amp;#34; after starting up.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, iommufd has improved this so that the iommu domain can be changed
during VFIO operation. This potentially allows userspace to directly race
VFIO_DEVICE_ATTACH_IOMMUFD_PT (which calls iommu_attach_group()) and
VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS (which calls into iommu_dma_compose_msi_msg()).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This potentially causes both the cookie pointer and the unlocked call to
iommu_g…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The IOMMU translation for MSI message addresses has been a 2-step process,
separated in time:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) iommu_dma_prepare_msi(): A cookie pointer containing the IOVA address
    is stored in the MSI descriptor when an MSI interrupt is allocated.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2) iommu_dma_compose_msi_msg(): this cookie pointer is used to compute a
    translated message address.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This has an inherent lifetime problem for the pointer stored in the cookie
that must remain valid between the two steps. However, there is no locking
at the irq layer that helps protect the lifetime. Today, this works under
the assumption that the iommu domain is not changed while MSI interrupts
being programmed. This is true for normal DMA API users within the kernel,
as the iommu domain is attached before the driver is probed and cannot be
changed while a driver is attached.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Classic VFIO type1 also prevented changing the iommu domain while VFIO was
running as it does not support changing the &amp;#34;container&amp;#34; after starting up.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, iommufd has improved this so that the iommu domain can be changed
during VFIO operation. This potentially allows userspace to directly race
VFIO_DEVICE_ATTACH_IOMMUFD_PT (which calls iommu_attach_group()) and
VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS (which calls into iommu_dma_compose_msi_msg()).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This potentially causes both the cookie pointer and the unlocked call to
iommu_g…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-35hv-9h7x-xw9j</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2025-38062 — genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2025-38062</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2025-38062</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2025-38062</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2026-1337 — kernel security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-1337</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;md/dm-raid: don&amp;amp;apos;t call md_reap_sync_thread() directly&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently md_reap_sync_thread() is called from raid_message() directly
without holding &amp;amp;apos;reconfig_mutex&amp;amp;apos;, this is definitely unsafe because
md_reap_sync_thread() can change many fields that is protected by
&amp;amp;apos;reconfig_mutex&amp;amp;apos;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, hold &amp;amp;apos;reconfig_mutex&amp;amp;apos; here is still problematic because this
will cause deadlock, for example, commit 130443d60b1b (&amp;amp;quot;md: refactor
idle/frozen_sync_thread() to fix deadlock&amp;amp;quot;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this problem by using stop_sync_thread() to unregister sync_thread,
like md/raid did.(CVE-2024-35808)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It turns out that AMD has a &amp;amp;quot;Meltdown Lite(tm)&amp;amp;quot; issue with non-canonical
accesses in kernel space.  And so using just the high bit to decide
whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good
old &amp;amp;quot;leak speculative data&amp;amp;quot; if you have the right gadget using the
result:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those
instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures,
which closes the speculation window.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames t…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS: kernel&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Linux Kernel, the operating system core itself.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;md/dm-raid: don&amp;amp;apos;t call md_reap_sync_thread() directly&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Currently md_reap_sync_thread() is called from raid_message() directly
without holding &amp;amp;apos;reconfig_mutex&amp;amp;apos;, this is definitely unsafe because
md_reap_sync_thread() can change many fields that is protected by
&amp;amp;apos;reconfig_mutex&amp;amp;apos;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, hold &amp;amp;apos;reconfig_mutex&amp;amp;apos; here is still problematic because this
will cause deadlock, for example, commit 130443d60b1b (&amp;amp;quot;md: refactor
idle/frozen_sync_thread() to fix deadlock&amp;amp;quot;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this problem by using stop_sync_thread() to unregister sync_thread,
like md/raid did.(CVE-2024-35808)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It turns out that AMD has a &amp;amp;quot;Meltdown Lite(tm)&amp;amp;quot; issue with non-canonical
accesses in kernel space.  And so using just the high bit to decide
whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good
old &amp;amp;quot;leak speculative data&amp;amp;quot; if you have the right gadget using the
result:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those
instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures,
which closes the speculation window.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames t…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2026-1337</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>openSUSE-SU-2025:20081-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2025:20081-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/opensuse-su-2025:20081-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2025:02853-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2025:02853-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/suse-su-2025:02853-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2025-38062</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-38062</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 186 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie The IOMMU translation for MSI message addresses has been a 2-step process, separated in time:  1) iommu_dma_prepare_msi(): A cookie pointer containing the IOVA address     is stored in the MSI descriptor when an MSI interrupt is allocated.  2) iommu_dma_compose_msi_msg(): this cookie pointer is used to compute a     translated message address. This has an inherent lifetime problem for the pointer stored in the cookie that must remain valid between the two steps. However, there is no locking at the irq layer that helps protect the lifetime. Today, this works under the assumption that the iommu domain is not changed while MSI interrupts being programmed. This is true for normal DMA API users within the kernel, as the iommu domain is attached before the driver is probed and cannot be changed while a driver is attached. Classic VFIO type1 also prevented changing the iommu domain while VFIO was running as it does not support changing the &amp;#34;container&amp;#34; after starting up. However, iommufd has improved this so that the iommu domain can be changed during VFIO operation. This potentially allows userspace to directly race VFIO_DEVICE_ATTACH_IOMMUFD_PT (which calls iommu_attach_group()) and VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS (which calls into iommu_dma_compose_msi_msg()). This potentially causes both the cookie pointer and the unlocked call to iommu_get_domai…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.4, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3 and 186 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie The IOMMU translation for MSI message addresses has been a 2-step process, separated in time:  1) iommu_dma_prepare_msi(): A cookie pointer containing the IOVA address     is stored in the MSI descriptor when an MSI interrupt is allocated.  2) iommu_dma_compose_msi_msg(): this cookie pointer is used to compute a     translated message address. This has an inherent lifetime problem for the pointer stored in the cookie that must remain valid between the two steps. However, there is no locking at the irq layer that helps protect the lifetime. Today, this works under the assumption that the iommu domain is not changed while MSI interrupts being programmed. This is true for normal DMA API users within the kernel, as the iommu domain is attached before the driver is probed and cannot be changed while a driver is attached. Classic VFIO type1 also prevented changing the iommu domain while VFIO was running as it does not support changing the &amp;#34;container&amp;#34; after starting up. However, iommufd has improved this so that the iommu domain can be changed during VFIO operation. This potentially allows userspace to directly race VFIO_DEVICE_ATTACH_IOMMUFD_PT (which calls iommu_attach_group()) and VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS (which calls into iommu_dma_compose_msi_msg()). This potentially causes both the cookie pointer and the unlocked call to iommu_get_domai…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-38062</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2025-1350 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen Denial of Service</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-1350</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein lokaler Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/wid-sec-w-2025-1350</guid>
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