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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-220246</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-220246</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-220246</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-220246</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-27498</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-27498</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;aes-gcm is a pure Rust implementation of the AES-GCM. In decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (which is the correct ciphertext) is exposed even if the tag is incorrect. This is because in decrypt_inplace in asconcore.rs, tag verification causes an error to be returned with the plaintext contents still in buffer. The vulnerability is fixed in 0.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;aes-gcm is a pure Rust implementation of the AES-GCM. In decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (which is the correct ciphertext) is exposed even if the tag is incorrect. This is because in decrypt_inplace in asconcore.rs, tag verification causes an error to be returned with the plaintext contents still in buffer. The vulnerability is fixed in 0.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-27498</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-r38m-44fw-h886 — AEADs/ascon-aead: Plaintext exposed in decrypt_in_place_detached even on tag verification failure</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r38m-44fw-h886</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: ascon_aead&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
In `decrypt_in_place_detached`, the decrypted ciphertext (which is the correct ciphertext) is exposed even if the tag is incorrect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
This is because in [decrypt_inplace](https://github.com/RustCrypto/AEADs/blob/8cda109f1128c4c7953a0bb0f53e1056d537e462/ascon-aead/src/asconcore.rs#L350-L364) in asconcore.rs, tag verification causes an error to be returned with the plaintext contents still in `buffer`. The root cause of this vulnerability is similar to https://github.com/RustCrypto/AEADs/security/advisories/GHSA-423w-p2w9-r7vq&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
```rust
use ascon_aead::Tag;
use ascon_aead::{Ascon128, Key, Nonce};
use ascon_aead::aead::{AeadInPlace, KeyInit};&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fn main() {&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;let key = Key::&amp;lt;Ascon128&amp;gt;::from_slice(b&amp;#34;very secret key.&amp;#34;);
    let cipher = Ascon128::new(key);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;let nonce = Nonce::&amp;lt;Ascon128&amp;gt;::from_slice(b&amp;#34;unique nonce 012&amp;#34;); // 128-bits; unique per message&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;let mut buffer: Vec&amp;lt;u8&amp;gt; = Vec::new(); // Buffer needs 16-bytes overhead for authentication tag
    buffer.extend_from_slice(b&amp;#34;plaintext message&amp;#34;);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Encrypt `buffer` in-place detached, replacing the plaintext contents with ciphertext
    cipher.encrypt_in_place_detached(nonce, b&amp;#34;&amp;#34;, &amp;amp;mut buffer).expect(&amp;#34;encryption failure!&amp;#34;);
    
    // Decrypt `buffer` in-place with the wrong tag, ignoring the decryption error
    let _ = cipher.decrypt_in_place_detached(nonce, b&amp;#34;&amp;#34;, &amp;amp;mut buffer, Tag::&amp;lt;Ascon128&amp;gt;::from_slice(b&amp;#34;\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00&amp;#34;));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;asser…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; crates.io: ascon_aead&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
In `decrypt_in_place_detached`, the decrypted ciphertext (which is the correct ciphertext) is exposed even if the tag is incorrect.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details
This is because in [decrypt_inplace](https://github.com/RustCrypto/AEADs/blob/8cda109f1128c4c7953a0bb0f53e1056d537e462/ascon-aead/src/asconcore.rs#L350-L364) in asconcore.rs, tag verification causes an error to be returned with the plaintext contents still in `buffer`. The root cause of this vulnerability is similar to https://github.com/RustCrypto/AEADs/security/advisories/GHSA-423w-p2w9-r7vq&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### PoC
```rust
use ascon_aead::Tag;
use ascon_aead::{Ascon128, Key, Nonce};
use ascon_aead::aead::{AeadInPlace, KeyInit};&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fn main() {&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;let key = Key::&amp;lt;Ascon128&amp;gt;::from_slice(b&amp;#34;very secret key.&amp;#34;);
    let cipher = Ascon128::new(key);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;let nonce = Nonce::&amp;lt;Ascon128&amp;gt;::from_slice(b&amp;#34;unique nonce 012&amp;#34;); // 128-bits; unique per message&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;let mut buffer: Vec&amp;lt;u8&amp;gt; = Vec::new(); // Buffer needs 16-bytes overhead for authentication tag
    buffer.extend_from_slice(b&amp;#34;plaintext message&amp;#34;);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;// Encrypt `buffer` in-place detached, replacing the plaintext contents with ciphertext
    cipher.encrypt_in_place_detached(nonce, b&amp;#34;&amp;#34;, &amp;amp;mut buffer).expect(&amp;#34;encryption failure!&amp;#34;);
    
    // Decrypt `buffer` in-place with the wrong tag, ignoring the decryption error
    let _ = cipher.decrypt_in_place_detached(nonce, b&amp;#34;&amp;#34;, &amp;amp;mut buffer, Tag::&amp;lt;Ascon128&amp;gt;::from_slice(b&amp;#34;\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00&amp;#34;));&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;asser…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-r38m-44fw-h886</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2025-27498</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-27498</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rust-aes-gcm, Ubuntu:25.10: rust-aes-gcm, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rust-aes-gcm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;aes-gcm is a pure Rust implementation of the AES-GCM. In decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (which is the correct ciphertext) is exposed even if the tag is incorrect. This is because in decrypt_inplace in asconcore.rs, tag verification causes an error to be returned with the plaintext contents still in buffer. The vulnerability is fixed in 0.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:24.04:LTS: rust-aes-gcm, Ubuntu:25.10: rust-aes-gcm, Ubuntu:26.04:LTS: rust-aes-gcm&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;aes-gcm is a pure Rust implementation of the AES-GCM. In decrypt_in_place_detached, the decrypted ciphertext (which is the correct ciphertext) is exposed even if the tag is incorrect. This is because in decrypt_inplace in asconcore.rs, tag verification causes an error to be returned with the plaintext contents still in buffer. The vulnerability is fixed in 0.4.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-27498</guid>
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