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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 03 Oct 2026 21:47:33 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>certfr-2025-avi-0966 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans les produits Microsoft. Elles permettent à un attaquant de provoqu…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0966</link>
      <description>certfr-2025-avi-0966</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/certfr-2025-avi-0966</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>EUVD-2026-257107</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-257107</link>
      <description>EUVD-2026-257107</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-257107</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2025-12058</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-12058</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The Keras.Model.load_model method, including when executed with the intended security mitigation safe_mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from a specially crafted .keras archive. The constructor for the StringLookup layer accepts a vocabulary argument that can specify a local file path or a remote file path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Arbitrary Local File Read: An attacker can create a malicious .keras file that embeds a local path in the StringLookup layer&amp;#39;s configuration. When the model is loaded, Keras will attempt to read the content of the specified local file and incorporate it into the model state (e.g., retrievable via get_vocabulary()), allowing an attacker to read arbitrary local files on the hosting system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Keras utilizes tf.io.gfile for file operations. Since tf.io.gfile supports remote filesystem handlers (such as GCS and HDFS) and HTTP/HTTPS protocols, the same mechanism can be leveraged to fetch content from arbitrary network endpoints on the server&amp;#39;s behalf, resulting in an SSRF condition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security issue is that the feature allowing external path loading was not properly restricted by the safe_mode=True flag, which was intended to prevent such unintended data access.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;The Keras.Model.load_model method, including when executed with the intended security mitigation safe_mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from a specially crafted .keras archive. The constructor for the StringLookup layer accepts a vocabulary argument that can specify a local file path or a remote file path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Arbitrary Local File Read: An attacker can create a malicious .keras file that embeds a local path in the StringLookup layer&amp;#39;s configuration. When the model is loaded, Keras will attempt to read the content of the specified local file and incorporate it into the model state (e.g., retrievable via get_vocabulary()), allowing an attacker to read arbitrary local files on the hosting system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Keras utilizes tf.io.gfile for file operations. Since tf.io.gfile supports remote filesystem handlers (such as GCS and HDFS) and HTTP/HTTPS protocols, the same mechanism can be leveraged to fetch content from arbitrary network endpoints on the server&amp;#39;s behalf, resulting in an SSRF condition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security issue is that the feature allowing external path loading was not properly restricted by the safe_mode=True flag, which was intended to prevent such unintended data access.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2025-12058</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-mq84-hjqx-cwf2 — Keras is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mq84-hjqx-cwf2</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: keras&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Keras.Model.load_model method, including when executed with the intended security mitigation safe_mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from a specially crafted .keras archive. The constructor for the StringLookup layer accepts a vocabulary argument that can specify a local file path or a remote file path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Arbitrary Local File Read: An attacker can create a malicious .keras file that embeds a local path in the StringLookup layer&amp;#39;s configuration. When the model is loaded, Keras will attempt to read the content of the specified local file and incorporate it into the model state (e.g., retrievable via get_vocabulary()), allowing an attacker to read arbitrary local files on the hosting system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Keras utilizes tf.io.gfile for file operations. Since tf.io.gfile supports remote filesystem handlers (such as GCS and HDFS) and HTTP/HTTPS protocols, the same mechanism can be leveraged to fetch content from arbitrary network endpoints on the server&amp;#39;s behalf, resulting in an SSRF condition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security issue is that the feature allowing external path loading was not properly restricted by the safe_mode=True flag, which was intended to prevent such unintended data access.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: keras&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Keras.Model.load_model method, including when executed with the intended security mitigation safe_mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from a specially crafted .keras archive. The constructor for the StringLookup layer accepts a vocabulary argument that can specify a local file path or a remote file path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Arbitrary Local File Read: An attacker can create a malicious .keras file that embeds a local path in the StringLookup layer&amp;#39;s configuration. When the model is loaded, Keras will attempt to read the content of the specified local file and incorporate it into the model state (e.g., retrievable via get_vocabulary()), allowing an attacker to read arbitrary local files on the hosting system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Keras utilizes tf.io.gfile for file operations. Since tf.io.gfile supports remote filesystem handlers (such as GCS and HDFS) and HTTP/HTTPS protocols, the same mechanism can be leveraged to fetch content from arbitrary network endpoints on the server&amp;#39;s behalf, resulting in an SSRF condition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security issue is that the feature allowing external path loading was not properly restricted by the safe_mode=True flag, which was intended to prevent such unintended data access.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-mq84-hjqx-cwf2</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2025-12058 — Vulnerability in Keras Model.load_model Leading to Arbitrary Local File Loading and SSRF</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2025-12058</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2025-12058</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/msrc_cve-2025-12058</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>OESA-2025-2689 — python-Keras security update</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2025-2689</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: python-Keras&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Keras is a high-level neural networks API for Python.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Keras.Model.load_model method, including when executed with the intended security mitigation safe_mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from a specially crafted .keras archive. The constructor for the StringLookup layer accepts a vocabulary argument that can specify a local file path or a remote file path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Arbitrary Local File Read: An attacker can create a malicious .keras file that embeds a local path in the StringLookup layer&amp;amp;apos;s configuration. When the model is loaded, Keras will attempt to read the content of the specified local file and incorporate it into the model state (e.g., retrievable via get_vocabulary()), allowing an attacker to read arbitrary local files on the hosting system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Keras utilizes tf.io.gfile for file operations. Since tf.io.gfile supports remote filesystem handlers (such as GCS and HDFS) and HTTP/HTTPS protocols, the same mechanism can be leveraged to fetch content from arbitrary network endpoints on the server&amp;amp;apos;s behalf, resulting in an SSRF condition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security issue is that the feature allowing external path loading was not properly restricted by the safe_mode=True flag, which was intended to prevent such unintended data access.(CVE-2025-12058)&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1: python-Keras&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Keras is a high-level neural networks API for Python.&#13;
&#13;
Security Fix(es):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Keras.Model.load_model method, including when executed with the intended security mitigation safe_mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from a specially crafted .keras archive. The constructor for the StringLookup layer accepts a vocabulary argument that can specify a local file path or a remote file path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Arbitrary Local File Read: An attacker can create a malicious .keras file that embeds a local path in the StringLookup layer&amp;amp;apos;s configuration. When the model is loaded, Keras will attempt to read the content of the specified local file and incorporate it into the model state (e.g., retrievable via get_vocabulary()), allowing an attacker to read arbitrary local files on the hosting system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Keras utilizes tf.io.gfile for file operations. Since tf.io.gfile supports remote filesystem handlers (such as GCS and HDFS) and HTTP/HTTPS protocols, the same mechanism can be leveraged to fetch content from arbitrary network endpoints on the server&amp;amp;apos;s behalf, resulting in an SSRF condition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security issue is that the feature allowing external path loading was not properly restricted by the safe_mode=True flag, which was intended to prevent such unintended data access.(CVE-2025-12058)&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/oesa-2025-2689</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>PYSEC-2026-1487 — Keras is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-1487</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: keras&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Keras.Model.load_model method, including when executed with the intended security mitigation safe_mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from a specially crafted .keras archive. The constructor for the StringLookup layer accepts a vocabulary argument that can specify a local file path or a remote file path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Arbitrary Local File Read: An attacker can create a malicious .keras file that embeds a local path in the StringLookup layer&amp;#39;s configuration. When the model is loaded, Keras will attempt to read the content of the specified local file and incorporate it into the model state (e.g., retrievable via get_vocabulary()), allowing an attacker to read arbitrary local files on the hosting system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Keras utilizes tf.io.gfile for file operations. Since tf.io.gfile supports remote filesystem handlers (such as GCS and HDFS) and HTTP/HTTPS protocols, the same mechanism can be leveraged to fetch content from arbitrary network endpoints on the server&amp;#39;s behalf, resulting in an SSRF condition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security issue is that the feature allowing external path loading was not properly restricted by the safe_mode=True flag, which was intended to prevent such unintended data access.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: keras&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Keras.Model.load_model method, including when executed with the intended security mitigation safe_mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from a specially crafted .keras archive. The constructor for the StringLookup layer accepts a vocabulary argument that can specify a local file path or a remote file path.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Arbitrary Local File Read: An attacker can create a malicious .keras file that embeds a local path in the StringLookup layer&amp;#39;s configuration. When the model is loaded, Keras will attempt to read the content of the specified local file and incorporate it into the model state (e.g., retrievable via get_vocabulary()), allowing an attacker to read arbitrary local files on the hosting system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;*  Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Keras utilizes tf.io.gfile for file operations. Since tf.io.gfile supports remote filesystem handlers (such as GCS and HDFS) and HTTP/HTTPS protocols, the same mechanism can be leveraged to fetch content from arbitrary network endpoints on the server&amp;#39;s behalf, resulting in an SSRF condition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The security issue is that the feature allowing external path loading was not properly restricted by the safe_mode=True flag, which was intended to prevent such unintended data access.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-1487</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2025-12058</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-12058</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: keras, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: keras&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Keras.Model.load_model method, including when executed with the intended security mitigation safe_mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from a specially crafted .keras archive. The constructor for the StringLookup layer accepts a vocabulary argument that can specify a local file path or a remote file path.   *  Arbitrary Local File Read: An attacker can create a malicious .keras file that embeds a local path in the StringLookup layer&amp;#39;s configuration. When the model is loaded, Keras will attempt to read the content of the specified local file and incorporate it into the model state (e.g., retrievable via get_vocabulary()), allowing an attacker to read arbitrary local files on the hosting system.   *  Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Keras utilizes tf.io.gfile for file operations. Since tf.io.gfile supports remote filesystem handlers (such as GCS and HDFS) and HTTP/HTTPS protocols, the same mechanism can be leveraged to fetch content from arbitrary network endpoints on the server&amp;#39;s behalf, resulting in an SSRF condition. The security issue is that the feature allowing external path loading was not properly restricted by the safe_mode=True flag, which was intended to prevent such unintended data access.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: keras, Ubuntu:20.04:LTS: keras&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Keras.Model.load_model method, including when executed with the intended security mitigation safe_mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from a specially crafted .keras archive. The constructor for the StringLookup layer accepts a vocabulary argument that can specify a local file path or a remote file path.   *  Arbitrary Local File Read: An attacker can create a malicious .keras file that embeds a local path in the StringLookup layer&amp;#39;s configuration. When the model is loaded, Keras will attempt to read the content of the specified local file and incorporate it into the model state (e.g., retrievable via get_vocabulary()), allowing an attacker to read arbitrary local files on the hosting system.   *  Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Keras utilizes tf.io.gfile for file operations. Since tf.io.gfile supports remote filesystem handlers (such as GCS and HDFS) and HTTP/HTTPS protocols, the same mechanism can be leveraged to fetch content from arbitrary network endpoints on the server&amp;#39;s behalf, resulting in an SSRF condition. The security issue is that the feature allowing external path loading was not properly restricted by the safe_mode=True flag, which was intended to prevent such unintended data access.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2025-12058</guid>
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